Full transcript
Introduction
0:00- Mossad will do anything.
0:01Mossad has no qualms doing what it takes
0:05to ensure the survival of every Israeli citizen
0:08around the world.
0:09Most other countries will stop at some point,
0:13but Mossad doesn't do that.
0:17- The following is a conversation with Andrew Bustamante,
0:20former CIA Covert Intelligence Officer
0:22and US Air Force Combat veteran,
0:24including the job of operational targeting,
0:27encrypted communications and launch operations
0:31for 200 nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles.
0:36Andrew's over seven years as a CIA spy,
0:39have given him a skillset
0:41and a perspective on the world
0:43that is fascinating to explore.
0:46This is the Lex Fridman Podcast.
0:48To support it, please check out our sponsors
0:50in the description.
0:52And now, dear friends, here's Andrew Bustamante.
CIA and the President
0:56The Central Intelligence Agency
0:58was formed almost 75 years ago.
1:01What is the mission of the CIA? How does it work?
1:04- The mission of the CIA is to collect intelligence
1:07from around the world that supports
1:08a national security mission
1:10and be the central repository
1:12for all other intelligence agencies.
1:14So that it's one collective source
1:17where all intelligence can be synthesized
1:20and then passed forward to the decision-makers.
1:23- That doesn't include domestic intelligence,
1:26it's primarily looking outward outside the United States.
1:29- Correct, CIA is the Foreign Intelligence Collection.
1:35King spoke if you will.
1:37FBI does domestic
1:38and then Department of Homeland Security does domestic,
1:41law enforcement essentially handles all things domestic.
1:45Intelligence is not law enforcement,
1:46so we technically cannot work inside the United States.
1:50- Is there clear lines to be drawn between,
1:52like you just said, the CIA, FBI
1:56and the other US intelligence agencies like the DIA,
2:00Defense Intelligence Agency,
2:01Department of Homeland Security,
2:04NSA, National Security Agency.
2:07And there's a list...
2:08- There's a list of about 33 different
2:10intelligence organizations.
2:11- It's like the army, the Navy has it.
2:13All the different organizations
2:14have their own intelligence groups.
2:16So is there clear lines here to be drawn
2:19or is the CIA the giant integrator of all of these?
2:23- It's a little bit of both, to be honest.
2:24So yes, there are absolutely lines.
2:26And more so than the lines, there are lines that divide
2:29what our primary mission is.
2:30Everything's gotta be prioritized.
2:32That's one of the benefits and the superpowers
2:34of the United States,
2:36is we prioritize everything.
2:38So different intelligence organizations are prioritized
2:41to collect certain types of intelligence.
2:43And then within the confines of how they collect,
2:47they're also given unique authorities.
2:49Authorities are a term that's directed
2:51by the executive branch.
2:53Different agencies have different authorities
2:55to execute missions in different ways.
2:58FBI can't execute the same way CIA executes
3:01and CIA can't execute the same way NGA executes.
3:05But then at the end, excuse me, when it's all collected,
3:08then yes, CIA still acts
3:11as a final synthesizing repository to create
3:15what's known as the President's daily brief.
3:17The PDB, the only way CIA can create the PDB is
3:20by being the single source of all source intelligence
3:24from around the IC, the intelligence community,
3:28which are those 30 some odd
3:30and always changing organizations that are sponsored
3:34for intelligence operations.
3:36- What does the PDB, the President's Daily Brief look like?
3:38How long is it? What does it contain?
3:41- So, first of all, it looks like the most
3:43expensive book report you can ever imagine.
3:45It's got its own binder. It's all very high end.
3:48It feels important. It looks important.
3:51It's not like a cheap trapper keeper.
3:54It's somewhere between, I would give it probably
3:56between 50 and 125 pages a day.
3:59It's produced every day around two o'clock in the morning
4:02by a dedicated group of analysts.
4:05And each page is essentially a short paragraph
4:09to a few paragraphs about a priority happening
4:13that affects national security from around the world.
4:16The president rarely gets to the entire briefing in a day.
4:19He relies on a briefer instead to prioritize what
4:23inside the briefing needs to be shared with the president.
4:25'Cause some days the PDB will get briefed in 10 minutes
4:28and some days it'll be briefed over the course of two hours.
4:30It depends on the president's schedule.
4:32- How much competition is there for the first page.
4:36And so how much jockeying there is for attention for,
4:41I imagine for all the different intelligence agencies
4:44and within the CIA, there's probably different groups
4:47that are modular and they're all care about
4:49different nations or different cases.
4:53And do you understand
4:57how much competition there is for the attention
4:59for the limited attention of the president?
5:01- You're 100% correct in how the agency
5:05and how officers and managers at the agency handle the PDB.
5:09There's a ton of competition.
5:10Everybody wants to be the first on the radar.
5:12Everybody wants to be on the first page.
5:14The thing that we're not baking into the equation
5:17is the president's interests.
5:19The president dictates what's on the first page of his PDB
5:21and he will tell them, usually the day before,
5:23I wanna see this on the first page tomorrow,
5:25bring this to me in the beginning.
5:26I don't want to hear about
5:27what's happening in Mozambique.
5:28I don't really care about what's happening in Saudi Arabia.
5:30I wanna see one, two, three.
5:32And regardless of whether or not those are
5:34the three biggest things in the world,
5:37the president's the executive.
5:38He's the one, he's the ultimate customer.
5:40So we do what the customer says.
5:42That has backfired in the past,
5:44if you haven't already started seeing how
5:46that could go wrong, that has backfired in the past.
5:49But that is essentially what happens when you serve
5:51in the executive branch.
5:53You serve the executive.
5:55- So what's the role, the director of the CIA
5:58versus the president?
5:59What's that dance like?
6:01So the president really leads the focus of the CIA?
6:06- The president is the commander-in-chief for the military.
6:09But the executive, the president
6:11is also the executive for the entirety
6:14of the intelligence community.
6:16So he's the ultimate customer.
6:19If you look at it like a business, the customer,
6:22the person spending the money is the president
6:25and the director is the CEO.
6:27So if the director doesn't create
6:29what the president wants, there's gonna be a new director.
6:31That's why the director of CIA
6:32is a presidential appointed position.
6:34Sometimes they're extremely
6:35qualified intelligence professionals.
6:37Sometimes they're just professional politicians
6:39or soldiers that get put into that seat
6:41because the president trusts them to do
6:44what he wants them to do.
6:46Another gaping area
6:50that causes problems.
6:52But that's still the way it is.
6:54- So you think this is a problematic configuration
6:57of the whole system?
6:58- Massive flaw in the system.
6:59It is a massive flaw in the system
7:00because if you're essentially appointing a director to do
7:04what you want them to do, then you're assigning a crony.
7:08And that's what we define corruption
7:10as within the United States.
7:11And inside the United States,
7:12we say if you pick somebody outside of merit
7:15for any other reason other than merit, then it's cronyism
7:17or it's nepotism.
7:19Here that's exactly what our structure's built on.
7:21All presidential appointees are appointed
7:23on something other than merit.
7:25- So for an intelligence agency to be effective,
7:27it has to discover the truth and communicate that truth.
7:31And maybe if you're appointing the director of that agency,
7:35they're less likely to communicate the truth to you
7:38unless the truth aligns perfectly
7:40with your desired worldview.
7:41- Well, not necessarily perfectly,
7:43because there are other steps, right?
7:45They have to go in front of Congress
7:46and they have to have the support
7:48of multiple legislatures or legislators.
7:51But the challenge is that the shortlist of people
7:55who even get the opportunity
7:57aren't a meritorious list.
7:59It's a short list based off of who the president is picking
8:01or who the would be president is picking.
8:03Now I think we've proven
8:05that an intelligence organization can be extremely effective
8:10even within the flawed system.
8:13The challenge is
8:14how much more effective could we be if we improved?
8:17And I think that's the challenge that faces
8:20a lot of the US government.
8:21I think that's a challenge that has resulted in
8:26what we see today when it comes to the decline
8:28of American power and American influence,
8:31the rise of foreign influence,
8:33authoritarian powers and a shrinking US economy.
8:37A growing Chinese economy.
8:39And it's just, we have questions, hard questions
8:42we need to ask ourselves about
8:43how we're gonna handle the future.
8:45- What aspect of that communication between the president
8:47and the CIA could be fixed to help
8:52fix the problems that you're referring to
8:54in terms of the decline of American power.
8:57- So when you talk about the president wanting to prioritize
9:02what the president cares about, that immediately shows
9:06a break between what actually matters
9:09to the long-term success of the United States
9:12versus what benefits the short-term success
9:15of the current president.
9:16- Because any president is just a human being
9:20and has a very narrow focus.
9:21And narrow focus is not a long-term calculation.
9:24- Exactly, what's the maximum amount of years
9:26a president can be president?
9:28Eight, he or she...
9:30- In the United States.
9:31- In the United States according
9:33to our current constitution.
9:35(Andrew laughing)
9:36But they're very limited
9:39in terms of what they have to prioritize.
9:41And then if you look at a four year cycle,
9:44two years of that is essentially preparing
9:45for the next election cycle.
9:47So what's only two years of really quality attention
9:49you get from the president,
9:50who's the chief executive of all the intelligence community.
9:53So the most important thing to them
9:55is not always the most important thing
9:57to the long-term survival of the United States.
9:59- What do you make of the hostile relationship
10:02that to me at least stands out of the presidents
10:04between Donald Trump and the CIA?
10:07Was that a very kind of a personal bickering?
10:11I mean, is there something interesting to you
10:13about the dynamics between that particular president
10:16and that particular instantiation
10:18of the intelligence agency?
10:19- Man, there were lots of things fascinating to me
10:21about that relationship, so first...
10:24- What's the good and the bad? Sorry to interrupt.
10:26- So lemme start with the good first
10:27'cause there's a lot of people who don't
10:28think there was any good.
10:30So the good thing is, we saw that the president,
10:35who's the chief customer, the executive to the CIA,
10:40when the president doesn't want to hear what CIA
10:43has to say, he's not gonna listen.
10:45I think that's an important lesson for everyone
10:47to take home.
10:49If the president doesn't care what you have to say,
10:51he's gonna take funding away, or she will take funding away.
10:54They're gonna take attention away.
10:56They're going to shut down
10:59your operations, your missions.
11:02They're gonna kill the careers of the people working there.
11:04Think about that, for the four years
11:05that President Trump was the president,
11:08basically everybody at CIA, their career was put on pause.
11:12Some people's careers were ended,
11:13some people voluntarily left their career there
11:16because they found themselves working for a single customer
11:20that didn't want what they had to produce.
11:21- So for people who don't know,
11:24Donald Trump did not display significant
11:26deep interest in the output.
11:30- [Andrew] He did not trust it, yeah.
11:30- He was a disinterested customer of the information.
11:32- Exactly right, and then what
11:34do disinterested customers do?
11:37They go find someone else to create their product.
11:39And that's exactly what Donald Trump did.
11:40And he did it through the private intelligence world,
11:43funding private intelligence companies
11:45to run their own operations
11:46that brought him the information he cared about
11:49when CIA wouldn't.
11:50It also didn't help that CIA stepped outside
11:53of their confines, right?
11:54CIA is supposed to collect foreign intelligence
11:56and not comment on domestic matters.
11:58They went way outside of that
12:00when they started challenging the president,
12:02when they started questioning the results, when they started
12:06publicly claiming Russian influence.
12:08That's all something the FBI could have handled by itself,
12:10the Justice Department could have handled by itself.
12:12CIA had no place to contribute to that conversation.
12:16And when they did, all they did was undermine
12:18the relationship they had with their primary customer.
12:21- Let me sort of focus in on this relationship
12:26between the president or the leader
12:29and the intelligence agency
12:31and look outside the United States.
War in Ukraine
12:34It seems like authoritarian regimes
12:36or regimes throughout history,
12:37if you look at Stalin and Hitler, if you look at today
12:40with Vladimir Putin, the negative effects
12:43of power corrupting the mind of a leader
12:47manifest itself is that they start
12:50to get bad information from the intelligence agencies.
12:53So this kind of thing that you're talking about,
12:55over time, they start hearing information
12:59they want to hear.
13:00The agency starts producing only the kind of information
13:04they want to hear.
13:06And the leader's worldview starts becoming distorted
13:09to where the propaganda they generate is also
13:14the thing that the intelligence agencies provide to them.
13:18And so they start believing their own propaganda
13:21and they start getting distorted view of the world.
13:23Sorry for the sort of walking through in a weird way.
13:27But I guess I want to ask, do you think,
13:30let's look at Vladimir Putin specifically.
13:32Do you think he's getting accurate information
13:37about the world?
13:38Do you think he knows the truth of the world?
13:40Whether that's the war in Ukraine,
13:42whether that's the behavior of the other nations in NATO,
13:45the United States in general.
13:47What do you think?
13:49- It's rare that I'll talk about just thinking,
13:52I prefer to share my assessment.
13:55Why I assess things a certain way rather than just
13:57what's my random opinion.
13:59And my assessment, Vladimir Putin is winning.
14:03Russia is winning.
14:04They're winning in Ukraine,
14:05but they're also winning the battle of influence
14:07against the West.
14:08They're winning in the face of economic sanctions.
14:11They're winning empirically.
14:13When you look at the math, they're winning.
14:15So when you ask me whether
14:17or not Putin is getting good information
14:19for his intelligence services,
14:20when I look at my overall assessment
14:22of multiple data points,
14:24he must be getting good information.
14:26Do I know how or why? I do not.
14:29I don't know how or why it works there.
14:31I don't know how such deep cronyism,
14:35such deep corruption can
14:38possibly yield true real results.
14:41And yet somehow there are real results happening.
14:43So it's either excessive waste and an accidental win,
14:47or there really is a system
14:48and a process there that's functioning.
14:50- So this winning idea is very interesting.
14:52In what way, short term and long term, is Russia winning?
14:56Some people say there was a miscalculation
14:58of the way the invasion happened.
15:00There was an assumption that you would be able to
15:03successfully take Kiev.
15:06You'd be able to successfully capture the east,
15:09the south, and the north of Ukraine.
15:11And with what now appears to be
15:15significantly insufficient troops spread way too thin
15:18across way too large of a front.
15:21So that seems to be like an intelligence failure.
15:27And that doesn't seem to be like winning.
15:29In another way, it doesn't seem like winning
15:31if we put aside the human cost of war,
15:34it doesn't seem like winning because the hearts
15:38and minds of the West were completely
15:41on the side of Ukraine.
15:43This particular leader in Vladi Zelensky
15:46captured the attention of the world and the hearts
15:48and minds of Europe, the West
15:52and many other nations throughout the world,
15:54both financially in terms of military equipment
15:57and in terms of sort of social and cultural
16:01and emotional support
16:03for the independence fight of this nation.
16:05That seems to be like a miscalculation.
16:08So against that pushback,
16:12why do you think there's still kernels of
16:17winning in this on the Russian side?
16:19- What you're laying out isn't incorrect
16:21and the miscalculations are not unexpected.
16:26Anybody who's been to a military college,
16:28including the Army War College in Pennsylvania,
16:30where so many of our military leaders are brought up.
16:34When you look at the conflict in Ukraine,
16:37it fits the exact mold of what
16:40an effective long-term military conflict,
16:44protracted military conflict would
16:46and should look like for military dominance.
16:49Now, did Zelensky and did the Ukrainians shock the world?
16:53Absolutely, but in that
16:55they also shocked American intelligence,
16:57which like you said, miscalculated.
17:00The whole world, miscalculated
17:01how the Ukrainians would respond.
17:03Putin did not move in there accidentally.
17:05He had an assessment.
17:06He had high likelihood of a certain outcome,
17:09and that outcome did not happen.
17:11Why did he have that calculation? Because in 2014 it worked.
17:15He took Crimean in 14 days.
17:19He basically created
17:23an infiltration campaign
17:25that turned key leaders over in the first few days
17:27of the conflict.
17:29So essentially there was no conflict.
17:30It worked in 2008 when he took Georgia,
17:33nobody talks about that.
17:35He invaded Georgia the exact same way. And it worked.
17:38So in 2008 it worked. In 2014, it worked.
17:40There was no reason to believe it
17:41wasn't going to work again.
17:43So he just carried out the same campaign.
17:45But this time something was different.
17:47That was a miscalculation for sure on the part of Putin.
17:51And the reason that there was no support from the West
17:53'cause let's not forget, there is no support.
17:55There is nothing other than the Lend-Lease Act,
17:59which is putting Ukraine in massive debt
18:01right now to the West.
18:03That's the only form of support they're getting from NATO
18:05or the United States.
18:08So if somebody believed Ukraine would win,
18:10if somebody believed Ukraine had a chance,
18:12they would've gotten more material support than just debt.
18:15And we can jump into that anytime you want to.
18:17But the whole world miscalculated.
18:19Everybody thought Russia was gonna win in 14 days.
18:21I said that they would win in 14 days
18:23'cause that was the predominant calculation.
18:26Once the first invasion didn't work, then the military does
18:30what professional militaries do, man, they reevaluate,
18:35they reorganize leaders
18:38and then they take a new approach.
18:40You saw three approaches. The first two did not work.
18:43The first two campaigns against Ukraine did not work
18:46the way they were supposed to work.
18:47The third has worked exactly like it's supposed to work.
18:51You don't need Kiev to win Ukraine.
18:53You don't need hearts and minds to win Ukraine.
18:56- [Lev] What's the third?
18:57- Yeah, what you need is control of natural resources,
19:00which they're taking in the East.
19:02And you need access to the heartbeat,
19:05the blood flow of food and money into the country,
19:09which they're taking in the South.
19:10The fact that Ukraine had to go to the negotiation table
19:14with Russia and Turkey in order to get exports
19:19out of the Black Sea, approved again, demonstrates just
19:22how much Ukraine is losing.
19:25The aggressor had a seat at the negotiation table
19:29to allow Ukraine the ability
19:31to even export one of its top exports.
19:33If Russia would've said no,
19:35then they would not have had that.
19:37That's like someone holding your throat.
19:39It's like somebody holding your jugular vein
19:41and saying, "If you don't do what I tell you to do,
19:46then I'm not gonna let you breathe.
19:48I'm not gonna let blood flow to your brain."
19:50- So do you think it's possible that Russia
19:53takes the south of Ukraine?
19:58So starting from Mariupol, the Haisyn region,
20:03- All the way to Odessa.
20:04- [Lex] All the way to Odessa
20:05- And into Moldova.
20:09I believe all of that will happen before the fall.
20:12- Fall of this year? - Fall of this year.
20:14Before winter hits Europe,
20:16NATO wants, Germany needs to be able
20:20to have sanctions lifted so they can tap into Russian power.
20:23There's no way they can have those sanctions lifted
20:26unless Russia wins.
20:28And Russia also knows that all of Europe,
20:31all of NATO is the true people feeling the pain of the war
20:36outside of Ukraine are the NATO countries
20:39because they're so heavily reliant on Russia.
20:42And as they have supported American sanctions against
20:45Russia, their people feel the pain economically,
20:49their people feel the pain.
20:50What are they gonna do in the winter?
20:51Because without Russian gas,
20:54their people are gonna freeze to death.
20:56- [Lex] Ukrainian people? - People all over NATO.
21:00Ukraine, everybody knows Ukrainians at risk.
21:03Everybody knows Ukrainians are dying.
21:05The game of war
21:08isn't even played majoratively
21:10by the people who are fighting.
21:11The game of war is played by everyone else.
21:13It's an economic game. It's not a military game.
21:16- [Lex] The flow of resources and energy, food
21:18- Attention, exactly right.
21:21- I was on the front in the Haisyn region, this very area
21:25that you're referring to, and I spoke to a lot of people
21:29and the morale is incredibly high.
21:33And I don't think the people in that region,
21:38soldiers, volunteer soldiers, civilians,
21:43are going to give up that land without dying.
21:47- I agree with you.
21:48- I mean, in order to take Odessa
21:51would require huge amount of artillery
21:57and slaughter of civilians, essentially.
22:00- They're not gonna use artillery in Odessa
22:01because Odessa is too important to Russian culture.
22:06It's gonna be even uglier than that.
22:07It's going to be clearing of streets, clearing of buildings,
22:11person by person, troop by troop.
22:13It'll be a lot like what it was in Mariupol.
22:16- [Lex] Just shooting at civilians.
22:18- Because they can't afford to just do bombing raids
22:20because they're gonna destroy cultural significant
22:24architecture that's just too important
22:25to the Russian culture.
22:26And that's gonna demoralize their own Russian people.
22:29- I have to do a lot of thinking to try to understand
22:31what I even feel, I don't know.
22:33But in terms of information,
22:37the thing that the soldiers are saying,
22:39the Russian soldiers are saying,
22:40the thing the Russian soldiers really believe
22:43is that they're freeing,
22:45they're liberating the Ukrainian people from Nazis.
22:54And they believe this
22:56because I visited Ukrainian, I spoke to the over a hundred,
23:00probably a couple hundred Ukrainian people
23:02from different walks of life.
23:04It feels like the Russian soldiers at least
23:08aren't under a cloud of propaganda.
23:11They're not operating on a clear view of the whole world.
23:15And given all that,
23:20I just don't see
23:26Russia taking the south
23:28without committing war crimes.
23:32And if Vladimir Putin is aware of what's happening
23:36in terms of the treatment of civilians,
23:39I don't see him pushing forward all the way
23:43to take the south,
23:44because that's not going to be effective strategy
23:49for him to win the hearts and minds of his people.
23:54- Autocracies don't need to win hearts and minds.
23:56That's a staunchly democratic point of view.
24:00Hearts and minds mean very little to people
24:03who understand core basic needs
24:09and true power.
24:12You don't see Xi Jinping worrying about
24:14hearts and minds in China.
24:16You don't see it in North Korea,
24:17you don't see it in Congo,
24:20you don't see it in most of the world.
24:22Hearts and minds are a luxury.
24:24In reality, what people need is food, water, power.
24:27They need income to be able to secure a lifestyle.
24:32It is absolutely sad.
24:34I am not in any way, shape or form saying
24:37that my assessment on this is enriching
24:42or enlightening or hopeful.
24:46It's just fact.
24:48It's just calculatable empirical evidence.
24:52If Putin loses in Ukraine, the losses,
24:56the influential losses, the economic losses, the lives lost,
25:01the power lost is too great.
25:03So it is better for him to push and push
25:07and push through war crimes, through everything else.
25:09War crimes are something defined
25:10by the International Court system.
25:12The International Court system has
25:14Russia as part of its board.
25:16And the international court system is largely powerless
25:20when it comes to enforcing its own outcomes.
25:23So the real risk gain scenario here for Russia
25:30is significantly in favor of gain over risk.
25:34The other thing that I think is important
25:36to talk about is everybody is trapped in the middle
25:40of a gigantic information war.
25:42Yes, there's battlefield bullets and cannons and tanks,
25:46but there's also a massive informational war.
25:48The same narrative
25:51that you see these ground troops in Ukraine,
25:55these Russian ground troops in Ukraine believing
25:57they're clearing the land of Nazis.
25:59That information is being fed to them
26:02from their own home country.
26:05I don't know why people seem to think that the information
26:07that they're reading in English is any more or less true.
26:10Every piece of news coming outta the West,
26:13every piece of information coming out
26:14in the English language is also a giant narrative
26:18being shared intentionally to try to undermine the morale
26:23and the faithfulness of English speaking Russians,
26:26which somebody somewhere knows exactly
26:27how many of those there are.
26:29So we have to recognize
26:31that we're not getting true information from other side
26:33because there is a strategic value in making sure
26:36that there is just the right amount of miss
26:38or disinformation out there.
26:40Not because someone's trying to lie to Americans,
26:42but because someone is trying
26:43to influence the way English speaking Russians think.
26:47And in that world, that's exactly why you see
26:49so many news articles cited to anonymous sources,
26:54government officials who do not wanna be named.
26:56There's nothing that links back responsibility there, right?
26:59There's nothing that can go to court there.
27:02But the information still gets released
27:04and that's enough to make Ukrainians believe
27:08that the United States is gonna help them,
27:10or that the West is gonna help them.
27:11It's enough to make Russians think
27:14that they're going to lose.
27:15And maybe they should just give up now
27:18and leave from the battlefield now.
27:19We have to understand we are in the middle
27:21of a giant information war.
27:24- Maybe you can correct me,
27:25but it feels like in the English speaking world,
27:27it's harder to control, it's harder to fight
27:30the information war because of, you know,
27:34some people say there's not really a freedom of speech
27:36in this country.
27:37But I think if you compare,
27:40there's a lot more freedom of speech
27:41and it's just harder to control narratives
27:44when there's a bunch of gorilla journalists that are able
27:48to just publish anything they want on Twitter or anything.
27:52It's just harder to control narratives.
27:53- So people don't understand where freedom of speech is.
27:56That's the first major problem.
27:57And it's shameful
27:59how many people in the United States do not understand
28:01what freedom of speech actually protects.
28:03So that aside, you're absolutely right.
28:06Fighting the information war in the West is extremely
28:09difficult because anyone with a blog,
28:14anyone with a Twitter account, I mean,
28:17anyone can call themselves a journalist essentially.
28:19We live in a world, we live in a country
28:21where people read the headline
28:23and they completely bypass the author line
28:26and they go straight into the content
28:28and then they decide whether the content's real or not,
28:30based on how they feel
28:31instead of based on empirical, measurable evidence.
28:35- So you mentioned the Lend-Lease Act
28:37and the support of the United States,
28:39support of Ukraine by the United States.
28:42Are you skeptical to the level of support
28:44that the United States is providing
28:46and is going to provide over time?
28:50- The strategy that the United States has taken
28:51to support Ukraine is similar to the strategy we took
28:54to support Great Britain during World War II.
28:57The enactment of the Lend-Lease Act
28:58is a perfect example of that.
29:00The Lend-Lease Act means that we are lending
29:02or leasing equipment to the Ukrainian government
29:06in exchange for future payment.
29:08So every time a rocket is launched,
29:10every time a drone crashes into a tank,
29:13that's a bill that Ukraine is just racking up.
29:18It's like when you go to a restaurant
29:19and you start drinking shots,
29:21sometime the bill will come due.
29:23This is exactly what we did when Europe
29:26and when Great Britain was in the face of Nazi invasion.
29:30We signed the same thing into motion.
29:32Do you know that the UK did not pay off the debt
29:34from World War II until 2020.
29:37They've been paying that debt since the end of World War II.
29:41So what we're doing is we're indebting Ukraine
29:45against the promise
29:46that perhaps they will secure their freedom,
29:48which nobody seems to want to talk about
29:50what freedom is actually gonna look like
29:51for Ukrainians, right?
29:52What are the true handful of outcomes,
29:55the realistic outcomes that could come of this,
29:57and which of those outcomes really looks
29:59like freedom to them, especially in the face of the fact
30:02that they're going to be trillions of dollars in debt
30:05to the West for supplying them with the training
30:09and the weapons and the food and the med kits
30:11and everything else that we're giving them.
30:12Because none of it's free. It's all coming due.
30:16We're a democracy, but we're also a capitalist country.
30:20We can't afford to just give things away for free,
30:23but we can give things away at a discount.
30:24We can give things away layaway,
30:27but the bill will come due.
30:28And unfortunately, that is not part of the conversation
30:31that's being had with the American people.
30:32- So debt is a way to establish some level of control.
30:37- Power - Is power.
30:39That said, having a very close relationship
30:44between Ukraine and the United States does not seem to be
30:49a negative possibility when Ukrainians think
30:52about their future in terms of freedom.
30:54That's one thing.
30:54And the other, there's some aspect of this war
30:57that I've just noticed that one
31:00of the people I talked to said that, "All great nations
31:06have a independence war", have to have a war
31:09for their independence.
31:11There's something, it's dark,
31:12but there's something about war just being a catalyst
31:16for finding your own identity as a nation.
31:19So you can have leaders, you can have sort of
31:22signed documents, you can have all this kind of stuff,
31:24but there's something about war
31:25that really brings the country together
31:27and actually try to figure out what is at the core
31:30of the spirit of the people that defines this country.
31:32And they see this war as that, as the independence war
31:37to define the heart of what the country is.
31:39So there's been, before the war, before this invasion,
31:43there was a lot of factions in the country.
31:46There was a lot of influence from oligarchs
31:50and corruption and so on.
31:51A lot of that was the factions were brought together
31:56under one umbrella effectively to become one nation
32:00because of this invasion.
32:01So they see that as a positive direction
32:04for the defining of
32:07what a free democratic country looks like
32:10after the war, in their perspective,
32:13after the war is won.
32:14- It's a difficult situation
32:16because I'm trying to make sure that you
32:19and all everybody listening understands that
32:23what's happening in Ukraine among Ukrainians is noble
32:26and brave and courageous
32:29and beyond the expectations of anyone.
32:35The fact is,
32:37there is no material support coming from the outside.
32:40In the American Revolution was won
32:43because of French involvement.
32:44French ships, French troops, French generals,
32:47French military might.
32:49The independence of communist China
32:54was won through Russian support.
32:56Russian generals, Russian troops on the ground
32:59fighting with the communists.
33:01That's how revolutions are won.
33:03That's how independent countries are born.
33:06Ukraine doesn't get any of that there.
33:08No one is stepping into that
33:10because we live in a world right now
33:14where there simply is no economic benefits
33:17to the parties in power to support Ukraine to that level.
33:21And war is a game of economics.
33:24The economic benefit of Ukraine is crystal clear in favor
33:29of Russia, which is why Putin cannot lose.
33:31He will not let himself lose.
33:33Short of something completely unexpected, right?
33:36I'm talking 60%, 70% probability Ukraine loses,
33:40but there's still 20%, 30% probability
33:42of the unimaginable happening.
33:44Who knows what that might be.
33:45And oligarch assassinates Putin
33:48or a nuclear bomb goes off somewhere
33:50or who knows what, right?
33:52There's still a chance that something unexpected will happen
33:55and change the tide of the war.
33:57But when it comes down to the core calculus here,
34:01Ukraine is the agricultural bed to support a future Russia.
34:06Russia knows, they know they have to have Ukraine.
34:09They know that they have to have it
34:10to protect themselves against
34:12military pressure from the West.
34:13They have to have it for agricultural reasons.
34:15They have major oil on natural gas pipelines
34:20that flow through Eastern Ukraine.
34:22They cannot let Ukraine fall outside
34:26of their sphere of influence, they cannot.
34:28The United States doesn't really have any economic
34:32vested interest in Ukraine.
34:34You know, ideological points of view and promises aside,
34:37there's no economic benefit.
34:39And the same thing goes for NATO.
34:41NATO has no economic investments in Ukraine.
34:44Ukrainian output, Ukrainian food
34:49goes to the Middle East and Africa.
34:51It doesn't go to Europe.
34:53So the whole, the West siding with Ukraine
34:58is exclusively ideological
35:00and it's putting them in a place
35:02where they fight a war with Russia
35:04so the whole world can see Russia's capabilities.
35:06Ukraine is a, as sad as it is to say, man,
35:09Ukraine is a pawn on a table for superpowers
35:14to calculate each other's capacities.
35:17Right now we've only talked
35:18about Russia and the United States.
35:19We haven't even talked about Iran.
35:21We haven't even talked about China, right?
35:23It is a pawn on a table.
35:25This is a chicken fight so that people get to watch
35:27and see what the other trainers are doing.
35:29- Well, a lot of people might have said the same thing
35:31about the United States back in the independence fight.
35:34So there is possibilities, as you've said.
35:38We're not saying 0% chance,
35:41and it could be a reasonably high percent chance
35:44that this becomes one of the great democratic nations
35:48that the 21st century is remembered by.
35:50- [Andrew] Absolutely. - And so you said
35:54American support, so ideologically, first of all,
35:57you don't assign much long-term power to that,
36:03that US could support Ukraine purely
36:06on ideological grounds.
36:09- Just look in the last four years, the last three years,
36:12do you remember what happened in Hong Kong
36:14right before Covid?
36:16China swooped into Hong Kong violently beating protesters,
36:22killing them in the street,
36:23imprisoning people without just cause.
36:26And Hong Kong was a democracy
36:30and the whole world stood by and let it happen.
36:32And then what happened in Afghanistan just a year ago?
36:35And the whole world stood by
36:37and let the Taliban take power again after 20 years of loss.
36:42We are showing a repeatable point of view.
36:46We will talk American politicians, American administrations,
36:51we will say a lot of things.
36:53We will promise a lot of ideological pro-democracy,
36:56rah rah statements, we will say it.
36:59But when it comes down to putting our own people,
37:02our own economy, our own GDP at risk,
37:07we step away from that fight.
37:09- America is currently supplying
37:11military equipment to Ukraine. - [Andrew] Absolutely.
37:13- And a lot of that military equipment has
37:15actually been the thing that turned the tides of war
37:18a couple of times already.
37:20Currently that's the HIMARS systems.
37:23So you mentioned sort of Putin can't afford to lose,
37:27but winning can look in different ways.
37:30So you've kind of defined so on, at this moment,
37:34the prediction is that winning looks like capturing not just
37:37the east but the south of Ukraine,
37:41but you can have narratives of winning that returned back
37:45to the, what was it?
37:48The beginning of this year before the invasion?
37:50That Crimea is still with Russia.
37:53There's some kind of negotiated thing about Donbas
37:56where it still stays with the Ukraine,
37:58but it there's some... - Public government.
38:01Just like what they have in Georgia right now.
38:03- And that could still be defined through mechanisms...
38:07- [Andrew] As Russia winning.
38:08- As Russia winning for Russia
38:09and then for Ukraine as Ukraine winning
38:13and for the West as democracy winning.
38:17And you kind of negotiate.
38:19I mean that seems to be how geopolitics works,
38:22everybody can walk away with a win-win story,
38:25and then the world progresses, with lessons learned.
38:29- That's the high likely, that's the most probable outcome.
38:31The most probable outcome is that Ukraine remains
38:35in air quotes, "a sovereign nation".
38:38It's not going to be truly sovereign
38:41because it will become,
38:43it will have to have new government put in place.
38:47Zelensky will, it's extremely unlikely he will be president
38:50because he has gone too far
38:53to demonstrate his power over the people
38:56and his ability to separate the Ukrainian people
38:59from the autocratic power of Russia.
39:02So he would have to be unseated.
39:04Whether he goes into exile
39:06or whether he is peacefully left alone is all gonna
39:09be part of the negotiations.
39:11But the thing to keep in mind also is
39:14that a negotiated piece really just means
39:16a negotiated ceasefire.
39:17And we've seen this happen all over the world.
39:19North Korea and South Korea are technically still
39:20just in negotiated cease fire.
39:23What you end up having is Russia will allow Ukraine
39:27to call itself Ukraine, to operate independently,
39:29to have their own debt to the United States.
39:32Russia doesn't wanna take on that debt.
39:34And then in exchange for that,
39:36they will have firmer guidelines
39:38as to how NATO can engage with Ukraine.
39:41And then that becomes an example
39:43for all the other former Soviet satellite states,
39:45which are all required economically by Russia,
39:48not required economically by the West.
39:51And then you can see
39:54how the whole thing plays out once you realize
39:56that the keystone is Ukraine.
40:00- There is something about Ukraine, the deep support
40:03by the Ukrainian people of America that is in contrast
40:07with, for example, Afghanistan,
40:10that it seems like ideologically Ukraine could be
40:15a beacon of freedom used in narratives by the United States
40:20to fight geopolitical wars in that part of the world.
40:24That they would be a good partner for this idea
40:27of democracy, of freedom, of all the values
40:30that America stands for.
40:31They're a good partner
40:32and so it's valuable if you sort of have a cynical,
40:37pragmatic view, sort of like Henry Kissinger type of view.
40:41It's valuable to have them as a partner, so valuable
40:45that it makes sense to support them in achieving
40:48a negotiated ceasefire that's on the side of Ukraine.
40:52But because of this particular leader,
40:54this particular culture, this particular dynamics
40:58of how the war unrolled and things like Twitter
41:02and the way digital communication currently works,
41:05it just seems like this is a powerful symbol of freedom
41:08that's useful for the United States,
41:09if we're sort of to take the pragmatic view.
41:12Don't you think it's possible that
41:17United States supports Ukraine financially,
41:21militarily enough for it to get an advantage in this war?
41:25- I think they've already got an advantage in the war.
41:27The fact that the war is still going on demonstrates
41:29the asymmetrical advantage.
41:30The fact that Russia has stepped up to the negotiating table
41:34with them several times without just turning to,
41:41I mean, you remember what happened in Chechnya,
41:42without turning to Chechnya level,
41:45just mass blind destruction, which was another Putin war.
41:51To see that those things have happened demonstrates
41:53the asymmetric advantage that the West has given.
41:56I think the true way to look at the benefit of Ukraine
42:01as a shining example of freedom in Europe for the West
42:06isn't to understand whether or not they could,
42:09they absolutely could.
42:10It's the question of how valuable is that in Europe,
42:14how valuable is Ukraine?
42:16Which before February, nobody even thought about Ukraine.
42:22And the people who did know about Ukraine knew
42:24that it was a extremely corrupt, former Soviet state
42:28with 20% of its national population,
42:31self-identifying as Russian.
42:33There's a reason Putin went into Ukraine.
42:35There's a reason he's been promising he would go
42:37into Ukraine for the better part of a decade
42:40because the circumstances were aligned.
42:43It was a corrupt country that self-identified
42:45as Russian in many ways.
42:48It was supposed to be an easier of multiple marks
42:52in terms of the former Soviet satellite states to go after.
42:55That's all part of the miscalculation
42:58that the rest of the world saw too,
42:59when we thought it would fall quickly.
43:02So to think that it could be a shining example of freedom
43:05is accurate, but is it as shining a star as Germany?
43:10Is it as shining a star as the UK?
43:12Is it as shining a star as Romania?
43:14Is it as shiny a star as France?
43:17Like it's got a lot of democratic freedom
43:20based countries in Europe to compete against,
43:23to be the shining stellar example.
43:26And in exchange on counterpoint to that,
43:29it has an extreme amount of strategic value to Russia,
43:33which has no interest in making it a shining star
43:36of the example of democracy and freedom.
43:38- Outside of resource,
43:39in terms of the shininess of the star, I would argue yes.
43:43If you look at how much it captivated
43:45the attention of the world.
43:46- The attention of the world has made no
43:47material difference, man, that's what I'm saying.
43:50- That's your estimation,
43:51but are you sure we can't...
43:56If you can convert that into political influence,
43:59into money, don't you think attention is money?
44:03- Attention is money in democracies
44:05and capitalist countries, yes.
44:08- Which serves as a counterweight
44:09to sort of authoritarian regimes.
44:11So for Putin resources matter,
44:14for the United States also resources matter,
44:16but the attention and the belief of the people also matter
44:21because that's how you attain and maintain political power.
44:24- So going to that exact example, then I would highlight
44:28that our current administration has the lowest
44:30approval ratings of president in history.
44:33So if people were very fond of the war going on in Ukraine,
44:36wouldn't that counterbalance some of our upset,
44:39some of the dissent coming from the economy
44:42and some of the dissent coming from the Great Recession
44:47or the great resignation
44:48and whatever's happening with the down stock market,
44:51you would think that people
44:52would feel like they're sacrificing for something.
44:54If they really believed that Ukraine mattered,
44:58that they would stand next to the president
45:01who is so staunchly driving
45:03and leading the West against this conflict?
45:06- Well, I think the opposition to this particular president,
45:09I personally believe has less to do with the policies
45:12and more to do with a lot of the other human factors.
45:19- But again, empirically this is, I look at things
45:21through a very empirical lens,
45:24a very cold fact-based lens.
45:26And there are multiple data points that suggest
45:29that the American people ideologically sympathize
45:32with Ukraine, but they really just want
45:34their gas prices to go down.
45:36They really just want to be able
45:37to pay less money at the grocery store for their food.
45:40And they most definitely don't want their sons
45:41and daughters to die in exchange for Ukrainian freedom.
45:46- It does hurt me to see
45:47the politicization of this war as well.
45:50I think that's maybe has to do with the kind of calculation
45:55you're referring to,
45:56but it seems like it doesn't.
45:58It seems like there's a cynical whatever takes attention
46:02of the media for the moment.
46:04The the red team chooses one side
46:07and the blue team chooses another.
46:09And then I think, correct me if I'm wrong,
46:12but I believe the Democrats went into full like support
46:17of Ukraine on the idealogical side.
46:20And then I guess republicans are saying,
46:22"Why are we wasting money?
46:24The gas prices are growing up."
46:25That's a very crude kind of analysis,
46:27but they basically picked whatever argument
46:29on whatever side.
46:30And now more and more and more,
46:33this particular war in Ukraine is becoming
46:37a kind of pawn in the game of politics.
46:40That's first the midterm elections then building up towards
46:43the presidential elections
46:45and stops being about the philosophical, the social,
46:50the geopolitical aspects, parameters of this war
46:53and more about just like whatever the heck captivates
46:56Twitter, and we're gonna use that for politics.
46:58- You're right in the sense of the fact that it's,
47:02I wouldn't say that the red team
47:03and the blue team picked opposite sides on this.
47:05What I would say is that media discovered
47:08that talking about Ukraine wasn't as profitable
47:12as talking about something else.
47:14People simply, the American people who read media
47:17or who watch media,
47:18they simply became bored reading about news
47:22that didn't seem to be changing much.
47:24And we turned back into wanting
47:26to read about our own economy
47:27and we wanted to hear more about cryptocurrency,
47:29and we wanted to hear more about the Kardashians.
47:31And that's what we care about.
47:32So that's what media writes about.
47:33That's how a capitalist market-driven world works,
47:37and that's how the United States works.
47:38That's why in both red papers and blue papers, red sources
47:41and blue sources, you don't see
47:43Ukraine being mentioned very much.
47:44If anything, I would say
47:46that your Republicans are probably more in support
47:48of what's happening in Ukraine right now
47:50because we're creating new weapons systems,
47:52our military is getting stronger,
47:54we get to test military systems
47:57in combat in Ukraine, that's priceless.
48:02In the world of the military industrial complex,
48:05being able to field test, combat test a weapon
48:10without having to sacrifice your own people
48:12is incredibly valuable.
48:13You get all the data, you get all the performance metrics,
48:15but you don't have to put yourself at risk.
48:17That is one of the major benefits of
48:20what we're seeing from supporting Ukraine
48:22with weapons and with troops.
48:23The long-term benefit to what will come of this
48:26for the United States, practically speaking
48:30in the lens of national security through military readiness,
48:34through future economic benefits, those are super strong.
48:38The geopolitical fight is essentially moot
48:42because Ukraine is not a geopolitical player.
48:45It was not for 70 years.
48:48And after this conflict is over, it will not again.
48:51Just think about what you were just saying,
48:53with the American people's attention span to Twitter
48:56and whatever's currently going on.
48:57If the Ukraine conflict resolved itself today
49:01in any direction, how many weeks do you think
49:04before no one talked about Ukraine anymore?
49:06Do you think we would make it two weeks
49:07or do you think we'd make it maybe seven days?
49:09It would be headline news for one or two days
49:13and then we'd be onto something else.
49:15It's just an unfortunate reality of
49:18how the world works in a capitalist democracy.
49:23- Yeah, it just breaks my heart how much, you know,
49:27I know that there's Yemen and Syria and...
49:32- That nobody talks about anymore.
49:33Still raging conflicts going on.
49:37- It just breaks my heart
49:38how much generational hatred is born.
49:42I happen to be from, my family is from Ukraine
49:46and from Russia.
49:47And so for me, just personally, it's a part of the world
49:50I care about in terms of its history.
49:54Because I speak the language, I can appreciate the beauty
49:58of the literature, the music, the art,
50:00the cultural history of the 20th century
50:02through all the dark times, through all the hell of
50:08the dark sides of authoritarian regimes,
50:10the destruction of war,
50:12there is still just the beauty that I'm able to appreciate
50:14that I can't appreciate about China, Brazil, other countries
50:18because I don't speak their language.
50:19This one I can appreciate.
50:20And so in that way, this is personally really painful to me
50:24to see so much of that history.
50:26The beauty in that history, suffocated by the hatred
50:30that is born through this kind of geopolitical game,
50:36fought mostly by the politicians, the leaders.
50:40- People are beautiful.
50:41And that's what you're talking about.
50:44People are beautiful creatures.
50:47Culture and art and science,
50:52like these are beautiful, beautiful things
50:53that come about because of human beings.
50:55And the thing that gives me hope is that
51:00no matter what conflict the world has seen,
51:02and we've seen some devastating,
51:04horrible crimes against humanity already.
51:07We saw nuclear bombs go off in Japan.
51:11We saw genocide happen in Rwanda.
51:13We've seen horrible things happen, but people persevere.
51:18Language, culture, arts, science, they all persevere.
51:21They all shine through.
51:24People don't even realize
51:25how gorgeous the architecture
51:27and the culture is inside Iran.
51:29People have no idea.
51:31Chinese people in the rural parts of China
51:35are some of the kindest,
51:37most amazing people you'll ever meet.
51:39And Korean arts and Korean dance, Korean drumming,
51:44I know nobody has ever even heard of Korean drumming.
51:47Korean drumming is this magical, beautiful thing.
51:50And the north, in North Korea does it better
51:53than anybody in the world.
51:54Taekwondo in North Korea is just
51:56exceptional to watch. - [Lex] in North Korea?
51:58In North Korea.
51:59Nobody knows these things.
52:00- How do you know about Taekwondo in North Korea?
52:02I have questions. (both laughing)
52:05That's fascinating, like, people don't think about that,
52:08but the culture, the beauty of the people
52:09still flourishes even in the toughest of places.
52:11- Absolutely and we always will.
52:13We always will because that is what people do.
52:16And that is just the truth of it.
52:18And it breaks my heart to see travesties
52:21that people commit against people.
52:23But whether you're looking at a micro level,
52:26like what happens with shootings here in the United States,
52:30or whether you look at a macro level
52:31like geopolitical power exchanges
52:35and intra and interstate conflicts
52:37like what you see in Syria
52:38and what you see in Ukraine,
52:40those are disgusting, terrible things.
52:42"War is a terrible thing."
52:43That is a famous quote,
52:47but people will persevere.
52:49People will come through.
52:53- I hope so. I hope so.
52:55And I hope we don't do something
53:00that I'll probably also ask you about later on is things
53:03that destroy the possibility of perseverance,
53:08which is things like nuclear war,
53:09things that can do such tremendous damage
53:14that we will never recover.
53:17But yeah, amidst your pragmatic pessimism,
53:20(Andrew laughing)
53:22I think both you and I have a kind of maybe
53:25small flame of optimism in there about the perseverance
53:28of the human species in general.
Most powerful intelligence agencies
53:30Let me ask you about intelligence agencies
53:33outside of the CIA.
53:37Can you illuminate
53:40what is the most powerful intelligence agency in the world?
53:43The CIA, the FSB, formerly the KGB, the MI6, Mossad.
53:49I've gotten a chance to interact with a lot of Israelis
53:52while in Ukraine.
53:54Just incredible people in terms of both training and skills.
53:58Just all and every front.
54:00American soldiers too.
54:01Just American military is incredible.
54:04The competence and skill of the military, the United States,
54:09Israeli, got to interact, and Ukrainian as well.
54:13- [Andrew] It's striking. - It's striking.
54:14It's beautiful, I just love people, I love carpenters
54:16or people that are just extremely good at their job
54:19and they take pride in their craftsmanship.
54:22It's beautiful to see.
54:22And I imagine the same kind of thing happens inside
54:24of intelligence agencies as well that we don't get
54:27to appreciate because of the secrecy.
54:29Same thing with like Lockheed Martin, I interviewed
54:32the CTO of Lockheed Martin.
54:34It breaks my heart as a person who loves engineering
54:38because of the cover of secrecy,
54:41we'll never get to know some of the incredible engineering
54:43that happens inside of Lockheed Martin and Boeing...
54:45- [Andrew] Raytheon.
54:47- You know, there's kind of this idea that these are,
54:50you know, people have conspiracy theories
54:52and they're kind of assign evil
54:53to these companies to some part.
54:56But I think there's beautiful people inside those companies,
54:59brilliant people and some incredible science
55:02and engineering is happening there.
55:04Anyway, that said the CIA, the FSB,
55:08the MI6, Mossad, China, I know very little about the...
55:12- MSS Ministry of State Security.
55:15- I don't know how much you know,
55:16(both laughing)
55:17or just other intelligence agencies in India,
55:20Pakistan, I've also heard...
55:21- Yep, RAW is powerful. And so is ISS or ISSI.
55:26- And then of course European nations in Germany and France.
55:30Yeah, so what can you say about the power of the influence
55:34of the different intelligence agencies
55:35within their nation and outside?
55:37- Yeah, so to answer your question, your original question,
55:41which is the most powerful, I'm gonna have
55:43to give you a few different answers.
55:44So the most powerful intelligence organization in the world
55:49in terms of reach is the Chinese MSS,
55:53the Ministry of State Security because they have created
55:57a single solitary intelligence service that has global reach
56:02and is integrated with Chinese culture.
56:06So that essentially every Chinese person
56:08anywhere in the world is an informant to the MSS
56:11because that's their way of serving
56:14the middle kingdom jungle, the central kingdom,
56:17the Chinese word for China.
56:19So they're the strongest,
56:21the most intelligence service in terms of reach,
56:24most assets, most informants, most intelligence.
56:26- So it is deeply integrated with a citizenry?
56:29- Correct, with their culture.
56:30You know what, a Chinese person
56:32who lives in Syria thinks of themself as?
56:34A Chinese person.
56:35Do you know what a Chinese person,
56:36a Chinese national living in the United States
56:38thinks of themself as?
56:40A Chinese person, right?
56:41Americans living abroad often think of ourselves as expats,
56:45expatriates, living on the local economy,
56:48embracing the local culture.
56:50That is not how Chinese people
56:51view traveling around the world.
56:52- And by the way, if I may mention, I believe
56:56the way Mossad operates is similar kind of thing
57:01because people from Israel living abroad still think
57:05of themselves as Jewish and Israeli first.
57:09So that allows you to integrate the...
57:11- Culture and yep, the faith-based aspects. Exactly right.
57:14But the number of people in Israel is much, much smaller
57:17than the number of people in China.
57:18- So when it comes to reach China wins that game.
57:21When it comes to professional capability, it's the CIA
57:25by far because budget wise, capability wise,
57:29weapons system wise, modern technology wise,
57:31CIA is the leader around the world,
57:34which is why every other intelligence organization out there
57:36wants to partner with CIA.
57:38They want to learn from CIA, they want to train with CIA,
57:43they wanna partner on counter-narcotics
57:45and counter-drug and counter-terrorism
57:47and counter-Uyghur, you name it.
57:49People wanna partner with CIA.
57:50So CIA is the most powerful
57:51in terms of capability and wealth.
57:54And then you've got the idea, you've got tech.
57:59So tech alone, meaning corporate espionage,
58:04economic espionage, nothing beats DGSE in France,
58:09they're the top.
58:10They've got a massive budget that almost goes exclusively
58:12to stealing foreign secrets.
58:14They're the biggest threat to the United States,
58:16even above Russia and above China.
58:19DGSE in France is a massively powerful
58:22intelligence organization, but they're
58:24so exclusively focused on a handful of types
58:28of intelligence collection that nobody even
58:30really thinks that they exist.
58:31And then in terms of just terrifying violence,
58:35you have Mossad.
58:36Mossad will do anything.
58:38Mossad has no qualms doing what it takes
58:42to ensure the survival
58:43of every Israeli citizen around the world.
58:46Most other countries will stop at some point,
58:49but Mossad doesn't do that.
58:51- So it's the lines you're willing to cross?
58:54- And the reasons that you're willing to cross them.
58:56You know, the CIA will let an Americans stay in jail
59:01in Russia unlawfully and seek a diplomatic solution.
59:06I mean, the United States has let people,
59:07there are two gentlemen in from the 1950s
59:10who were imprisoned in China for 20 years
59:12waiting for diplomatic solutions to their release.
59:18We do not kill to save a citizen.
59:22But Mossad will.
59:26- And then they'll not just kill,
59:28they'll like do large scale infiltration.
59:31- They do amazing things.
59:33They spare no expense
59:35because it's a demonstration to their own people.
59:38Again, going back to the whole idea of influence,
59:40every intelligence operation that sees the light of day
59:45has two purposes.
59:47The first purpose is the intelligence operation,
59:51but if it was just the intelligence operation,
59:53it would stay secret forever.
59:54The second purpose
59:56of every successful intelligence operation,
59:58when they become public, it's to send a signal to the world.
1:00:02If you work against us, we will do this to you.
1:00:05If you work for us, we will take care of you in this way.
1:00:09It's a massive information campaign.
1:00:11- Do you think in that way, CIA is not doing a good job?
1:00:15Because there's, you know, the FSB perhaps much less so GRU
1:00:20but the KGB did this well,
1:00:24which is to send a signal, like basically communicate
1:00:28that this is a terrifying organization with a lot of power
1:00:33and Mossad is doing a good job of that.
1:00:36So this the psychological information warfare,
David Petraeus
1:00:40and it seems like the CIA also
1:00:45has a lot of kind of myths about it,
1:00:47conspiracy theories about it,
1:00:49but much less so than the other agencies.
1:00:52- CIA does a good job of playing to the mythos.
1:00:54So when General Petraeus used to be
1:00:57the director of CIA, 2000...
1:00:59- And your workout partner, I read about this.
1:01:01- [Andrew] And workout partner.
1:01:02- So I loved and hated those workouts with Petraeus
1:01:05because he is a physical beast.
1:01:07He's a strong, fit at the time,
1:01:1060 something year old man.
1:01:11- Let me take a tangent on that
1:01:12'cause he's coming on this podcast.
1:01:14- Oh, excellent man. - So can you say
1:01:18what you've learned from the man in terms of,
1:01:22or like what you think is interesting and powerful
1:01:25and inspiring about the way he sees the world,
1:01:28or maybe what you learned in terms of how to get
1:01:31strong in the gym, or anything about life?
1:01:34- Two things right away.
1:01:34And one of 'em I was gonna share with you anyway,
1:01:36so I'm glad that you asked the question.
1:01:37So the first is that on our runs,
1:01:42and man, he runs fast,
1:01:43and we would go for six mile runs through Bangkok.
1:01:46And he talked openly about, I asked him,
1:01:51"How do you keep this mystery,
1:01:55this epic mythology about your fitness
1:01:59and your strength?
1:02:00How do you keep all of this alive with the troops?"
1:02:04And he had this amazing answer
1:02:06and he was like, "I don't talk about it."
1:02:08Myths are born not from somebody orchestrating the myth,
1:02:13but from the source of the myth, simply being secretive.
1:02:16So he's like, "I don't talk about it. I've never about it.
1:02:19I've never exacerbated it.
1:02:21I just do what I do and I let the troops talk."
1:02:24And he's like, "When it goes in favor of discipline
1:02:27and loyalty and commitment, I let it run.
1:02:30If it starts getting destructive or damaging,
1:02:33then I have my leadership team step into fix it."
1:02:37But when it comes to the mythos,
1:02:40the myth of him being superpowered soldier,
1:02:43that's what he wants every soldier to be.
1:02:44So he lets it run.
1:02:45And it was so enlightening when he told me,
1:02:48"When there's a myth that benefits you, you just let it go."
1:02:51You let it happen because it gets you further
1:02:54without you doing any work.
1:02:55It costs no investment for me.
1:02:56- So the catalyst of the virality of the myth
1:02:58is just being mysterious.
1:03:00- And that's what CIA does well.
1:03:02To go back to your first question, what does CIA do?
1:03:04They don't answer any questions. They don't say anything.
1:03:08And wherever the myth goes, the myth goes,
1:03:11whether it's that they sold drugs or use child prostitutes
1:03:14or whatever else, wherever the myth goes, they let it go.
1:03:17Because at the end of the day, everybody sits back
1:03:19and says, "Wow, I really just don't know."
1:03:22Now the second thing that I learned from Petraeus,
1:03:23and I really am a big fan of Petraeus.
1:03:27I know he made personal mistakes.
1:03:29You don't get to be that powerful
1:03:30without making personal mistakes.
1:03:32But when I worked out with him,
1:03:36the one thing that my commanding officer told me not
1:03:39to ask about, he was like,
1:03:40"Never ask the general about his family."
1:03:44I'm a family guy.
1:03:45So as soon as I met General Petraeus,
1:03:48one of the first things I asked him was,
1:03:49"Hey, what was it like raising a family
1:03:51and being the commander of forces in the Middle East?
1:03:55Like you weren't with your family very much."
1:03:57And the thing I love about the guy,
1:03:59he didn't bite off my head.
1:04:00He didn't snap at me. He didn't do anything.
1:04:02He openly admitted that he regretted some of the decisions
1:04:05that he made because he had to sacrifice
1:04:09his family to get there.
1:04:11Relationships with his children,
1:04:13absentee father, missing birthdays.
1:04:17We all say how sad it's to miss birthdays
1:04:19and miss anniversaries, yada, yada, yada.
1:04:21Everybody knows what that feels like.
1:04:22Even business people know what that feels like.
1:04:23The actual pain
1:04:25that we're talking about is when you're not there
1:04:27to handle your 13 year old's questions,
1:04:29when a boy breaks up with her or when you're not there
1:04:33to handle the bloody lip that your 9-year-old comes back
1:04:35with from their first encounter with a bully.
1:04:37Those are the truly heartbreaking moments
1:04:39that a parent lives and dies by.
1:04:42He missed almost all of those
1:04:45because he was fighting a war that we forgot
1:04:48and we gave up on 20 years later, right?
1:04:51He's so honest about that.
1:04:54And it was really inspiring to me
1:04:57to be told not to ask that question.
1:04:59And when I broke that guidance, he didn't reprimand me.
1:05:03He was authentic.
1:05:05And it was absolutely one of the big decisions
1:05:07that helped me leave CIA on my own in 2014.
1:05:10- And he was honest on the sacrifice you make.
1:05:16- The same man who just taught me a lesson
1:05:17about letting a myth live.
1:05:21That same guy was willing to be
1:05:23so authentic about this personal mistake.
1:05:27- I like complicated people like that.
1:05:30(Andrew laughing)
1:05:31So what do you make of that calculation,
1:05:34of family versus job?
1:05:36You've given a lot of your life
1:05:39and passion to the CIA to that work.
1:05:44You spoken positively about that world
1:05:47the good it does.
1:05:51And yet you are also a family man and you value that.
1:05:53What's that calculation like?
1:05:55What's that trade off like?
1:05:56- I mean, for me the calculation is very clear. It's family.
1:05:58I left CIA because I chose my family.
1:06:03And when my son was born, my wife and I found out
1:06:06that we were pregnant while we were still on mission.
1:06:08We were a tandem couple.
1:06:09My wife is also a former CIA officer undercover like me.
1:06:12We were operating together overseas.
1:06:14We got the positive pregnancy tests like so many people do.
1:06:20And she cried. My wife was a badass.
1:06:25I was like the accidental spy,
1:06:26but my wife was really good at what she does.
1:06:29And she cried and she was like, "What do we do now?"
1:06:31Like, it's what we've always wanted, a child,
1:06:34but we're in this thing right now
1:06:38and like, there's no space for a child.
1:06:41So long story short, we had our baby,
1:06:45CIA brought us back to have the baby.
1:06:48And when we started having the conversations about,
1:06:50"Hey, what do we do next?"
1:06:51'Cause we're not the type of people
1:06:53to want to just sit around and be domestic.
1:06:57What do we do next?
1:06:58But keep in mind we have a child now,
1:07:00so here's some of our suggestions.
1:07:02We could do this and we can do that.
1:07:04Let us get our child to a place
1:07:05where we can put him into an international school.
1:07:07Or we can get him into some sort of program where
1:07:12we can both operate together again during the day.
1:07:17But CIA, they had no patience for that conversation.
1:07:19There, family is not their priority.
1:07:23So the fact that we were a tandem couple, two officers,
1:07:26two operators trying to have a baby was irrelevant to them.
1:07:30So when they didn't play with us, when they did nothing
1:07:33to help us prioritize parenthood
1:07:39as part of our overall experience,
1:07:41that's when we knew that they never would.
1:07:43And what good is it to commit yourself
1:07:45to a career if the career is always going
1:07:47to challenge the thing that you value most?
1:07:50And that was the calculation that we made to leave CIA.
1:07:53Not everybody makes that calculation.
1:07:55And a big part of why I am so vocal about my time at CIA is
1:08:00because I am immensely appreciative of the men and women
1:08:05who to this day have failed marriages
1:08:09and poor relationships with their children
1:08:12because they chose national security,
1:08:14they chose protecting over their own family.
1:08:17And they've done it even though it's made them a, you know,
1:08:21abuse alcohol and abuse substances
1:08:24and they've got permanent permanent diseases
1:08:28and issues from living and working abroad.
1:08:31It's just insane the sacrifice that officers make
1:08:35to keep America free.
1:08:37And I'm just not one of those people. I chose family.
1:08:41- You said that your wife misses it. Do you miss it?
1:08:45- We both miss it. We miss it for different reasons.
1:08:47We miss it for similar reasons, I guess,
1:08:49but we miss it in different ways.
1:08:52The people at CIA a are just amazing.
1:08:57They're everyday people like the guy and the gal next door,
1:09:00but so smart and so dedicated
1:09:02and so courageous about what they do and how they do it.
1:09:06I mean, the sacrifices they make are massive,
1:09:08more massive than the sacrifices I made.
1:09:10So I was always inspired
1:09:12and impressed by the people around me.
1:09:13So both my wife and I absolutely miss the people.
1:09:16My wife misses the work because you know everything.
1:09:20When you're inside, it's all, I mean, we had top secret,
1:09:25we had TSSCI clearances at the time.
1:09:27I had a CAT 6, CAT 12, which makes me nuclear cleared.
1:09:30My wife had other privy clearances that allowed her
1:09:33to look into, you know, areas that were specialized.
1:09:37But there wasn't a headline that went out
1:09:40that we couldn't fact check with a click of a few buttons.
1:09:44And she misses that 'cause she loved that kind of...
1:09:45- And now you're just one of us living in the, you know,
1:09:50the cloud of mystery. - [Andrew] Exactly.
1:09:51Not really knowing anything about what's going on.
1:09:54- Exactly, but for me, I've always been the person
1:09:57that likes operating.
1:09:59And you know what you still get to do when you leave CIA,
1:10:01you still get to operate.
1:10:02Operating is just working with people.
1:10:04It's understanding how people think,
1:10:06predicting their actions, driving their direction
1:10:08of their thoughts, persuading them, winning negotiations.
1:10:13You still get to do that. You do that every day.
1:10:15- And you go apply that in all kinds of domains.
Undercover disguises
1:10:18Well, let me ask you on that,
1:10:20you were a covert CIA intelligence officer
1:10:24for several years.
1:10:26Maybe can you tell me the story of how it all began?
1:10:29Were you recruited and what did the job entail?
1:10:32To the degree you can speak about.
1:10:34- Feel free to direct me if I'm getting too boring.
1:10:36- No, every aspect of this is super exciting.
1:10:39(both laughing)
1:10:41- So I was leaving the United States Air Force in 2007.
1:10:48I was a lieutenant getting ready to pin on captain.
1:10:51My five years was up
1:10:53and I was a very bad fit for the US Air Force.
1:10:56I was an Air Force Academy graduate, not by choice,
1:10:58but by lack of opportunity,
1:11:00lack of lack of options otherwise.
1:11:01So I forced myself through the academy, barely graduated
1:11:04with a 2.4 GPA
1:11:07and then went on the Air Force, taught me how to fly.
1:11:09And then the Air Force taught me about nuclear weapons.
1:11:12And I ended up as a nuclear missile commander in Montana.
1:11:18And I chose to leave the Air Force
1:11:20because I didn't like shaving my face.
1:11:23I didn't like having short hair
1:11:24and I most definitely didn't like shining my shoes.
1:11:26And I did not want to be one of the people
1:11:28in charge of nuclear weapons.
1:11:29So when I found myself as a person in charge
1:11:31of 200 nuclear weapons,
1:11:33I knew that I was going down the wrong road.
1:11:34- I have questions about this
1:11:36and more importantly, I have questions
1:11:37about your hair, so you had short hair at the time?
1:11:40- Yeah, you have to, Military regulations,
1:11:42you can't have hair longer than one inch.
1:11:44- Okay, and the beautiful hair you have now
1:11:49that came to be in the CIA or after?
1:11:52- So I discovered I had messy hair in CIA
1:11:55'cause I used to go muj, we called it muj.
1:11:58I used to go mujahideen style.
1:12:00Big burly beard and crazy wacky hair.
1:12:03Because an ambiguously brown guy with a big beard
1:12:06and long hair can go anywhere in the world
1:12:09without anyone even noticing him.
1:12:12They either think that he is a janitor
1:12:14or they think that he is like some
1:12:17forgotten part of history.
1:12:18But nobody ever thinks that that guy is a spy.
1:12:21So it was the perfect, for me,
1:12:23it was one of my favorite disguises.
1:12:27It's what's known as a level two disguise.
1:12:29One of my favorite disguises to don
1:12:30was just dilapidated brown guy.
1:12:34(both laughing)
1:12:35- Can you actually, we'll just take a million tangents.
1:12:37What's a level two disguise?
1:12:41What are the different levels of disguise?
1:12:43What are the disguises?
1:12:44- Yeah, there's three levels of disguise by and large.
1:12:46Level one is what we also call light disguise.
1:12:50So that's essentially, you put on sunglasses and a ball cap
1:12:54and that's a disguise.
1:12:55You look different than you normally look.
1:12:57So it's just different enough
1:12:59that someone who's never seen you before,
1:13:01someone who literally has to see you
1:13:03just from a picture on the internet,
1:13:05they may not recognize you.
1:13:06It's why you see celebrities walk around with ball caps
1:13:09and oversized jackets and baseball hats
1:13:11'cause they just need to not look like they look
1:13:13in the tabloid or not look like they look in TV.
1:13:16That's level one.
1:13:18Lemme jump from level one to level three.
1:13:19Level three is all of your prosthetics,
1:13:22all the stuff you see in "Mission Impossible."
1:13:24Your fake ears, your fake faces, your fat suits,
1:13:28your stilts inside your feet.
1:13:31All that's level three.
1:13:32Whenever they make any kind of prosthetic disguise,
1:13:35that's a level three disguise.
1:13:37Because prosthetics are very damning
1:13:41if you are caught with a prosthetic.
1:13:43If you're caught wearing a baseball hat and sunglasses,
1:13:47nobody's gonna say, "You're a spy."
1:13:49But when you're caught with a custom made, you know,
1:13:51nose prosthetic, that changes the way your face looks.
1:13:55Or when someone pops out a fake jaw
1:13:57and they see that your top teeth don't look like they did
1:14:00in this prosthetic, then all of a sudden
1:14:03you've got some very difficult questions
1:14:04to ask or to answer.
1:14:06So level three is extremely dangerous.
1:14:08Level one is not dangerous. Level two is long-term disguise.
1:14:12Level two is all the things that you can do
1:14:14to permanently change the way you look
1:14:16for a long period of time.
1:14:17So that whether you're aggressed in the street
1:14:20or whether someone breaks into your hotel room
1:14:22or whatever, it's real.
1:14:24So maybe you get a tattoo,
1:14:27maybe you cut your hair short,
1:14:28maybe you grow your hair long, maybe you go bald,
1:14:31maybe you start wearing glasses.
1:14:32Well, glasses are technically a prosthetic,
1:14:34but if you have teeth pulled,
1:14:38if you gain 20 pounds, really gain 20 pounds
1:14:42or lose 15 pounds, whatever you might do.
1:14:44All of that's considered level two.
1:14:45It's designed for a long-term mission so that
1:14:49people believe you are who you say you are in that disguise.
1:14:53- A lot of that is physical characteristics?
1:14:55What about like, you know, what actors do,
1:14:59which is the.. - [Andrew] method acting.
1:15:02- Yeah, the method acting sort of
1:15:04developing a backstory in your own mind
1:15:07and then you start, you know, pretending
1:15:11that you host a podcast and teach at a university
1:15:15and then do research and so on,
1:15:18just so that people can believe
1:15:20that you're not actually a agent.
1:15:22Is that part of the disguise levels or no?
1:15:24- So yes, disguise has to do with physical character traits.
1:15:28That's what a disguise is.
1:15:29What you're talking about is known as a cover legend.
1:15:32When you go undercover, what you claim to be,
1:15:34who you claim to be, that's called your cover legend.
1:15:38Every disguise would theoretically have
1:15:40its own cover legend.
1:15:42Even if it's just to describe why you're wearing
1:15:44what you're wearing.
1:15:45It's all a cover.
1:15:47So the method acting, this is a fantastic point
1:15:50that I don't get to make very often, so I'm glad you asked.
1:15:52The difference between CIA officers in the field
1:15:55and method actors is that method actors try
1:15:57to become the character.
1:16:00They try to shed all vestiges of who they really are
1:16:04and become the character.
1:16:05And that's part of what makes them so amazing.
1:16:07But it's also part of what, like,
1:16:10makes them mentally unstable over long periods of time.
1:16:13It's part of what feeds their depression, their anxiety,
1:16:15their personal issues,
1:16:16because they lose sight of who they really are.
1:16:18Field officers don't get that luxury.
1:16:20We have to always, always remember
1:16:24we are a covert CIA intelligence officer
1:16:26collecting secrets in the field.
1:16:28We have to remember that.
1:16:29So we're taught a very specific skill
1:16:32to compartmentalize our true self separately,
1:16:38but make that true self the true identity.
1:16:42So then we can still live and act
1:16:45and effectively carry out our cover legend without ever
1:16:48losing sight, without ever losing that compass true north
1:16:51of who we actually are.
1:16:53And then we can compartmentalize
1:16:55and secure all the information that we need, retain it,
1:16:57remember it, but then return to our true self
1:17:00when we get back to a position of safety.
1:17:03- Is it possible to do that?
1:17:04So I just have kind of anecdotal evidence for myself.
1:17:09I really try to be the exact same person in all conditions,
1:17:12which makes it very easy.
1:17:15Like if you're not lying, it makes it very easy to,
1:17:19first of all, to exist,
1:17:21but also to communicate a kind of authenticity
1:17:23and genuineness, which I think is really important.
1:17:26Like trust and integrity
1:17:28around trust is extremely important to me.
1:17:30It's the thing that opens doors and maintains relationships.
1:17:34And I tend to think, like when I was in Ukraine,
1:17:39so many doors just opened to the
1:17:41like very high security areas and everywhere else too.
1:17:46Like I've just interacted
1:17:47with some incredible people without any kind of concerns.
1:17:51You know, who's this guy, is he gonna spread it?
1:17:54You know, all that kind of stuff.
1:17:55And I tend to believe that you are able
1:17:58to communicate a trustworthiness somehow
1:18:01if you just are who you are.
1:18:04And I think, I suppose method actors are trying
1:18:07to achieve that by becoming something
1:18:09and I just feel like there is very subtle cues
1:18:14that are extremely difficult to fake.
1:18:17Like you really have to become that person, be that person.
1:18:22But you're saying as a CIA agent, you have to remember
1:18:26that you are there to collect information.
1:18:29Do you think that gives you away?
1:18:31- So one of the flaws in your argument is
1:18:35that you keep referring to how you feel.
1:18:38I feel this, I feel that, I feel like this
1:18:40I feel like that.
1:18:41That feeling is a predictable character trait
1:18:45of all human beings.
1:18:46It's a pink matter, we call it pink matter.
1:18:49It's a cognitive trait.
1:18:52You are not alone in trusting your feelings.
1:18:55All people trust their feelings.
1:18:56But because what CIA teaches us is
1:18:59how to systematically create artificial relationships
1:19:04where we're the one in control of the source
1:19:06that is giving us intelligence.
1:19:08And the core element to being able
1:19:11to control a relationship is understanding
1:19:13the pink matter truth of feelings.
1:19:16What all people feel becomes their point of view
1:19:19on what reality is.
1:19:21So when you understand and you learn how to manipulate
1:19:23what people feel, then you can essentially direct them
1:19:26to feel any way you want them to feel.
1:19:28So if you want them to feel like they can trust you,
1:19:30you can make them feel that way.
1:19:32If you want them to feel like you're a good guy
1:19:34or a bad guy, if you want them
1:19:35to feel like they should give you secrets,
1:19:37even though their government tells them not to,
1:19:39you can do that.
1:19:40There are men who make women feel like they love them,
1:19:43and just so the women will sleep with them.
1:19:45There are women who make men feel like they love them
1:19:47just so the men will give them their money.
1:19:49Manipulation is a core behavioral trait
1:19:52of all the human species
1:19:54because we all understand to some level
1:19:56how powerful feelings are,
1:19:58but feelings are not the same thing
1:19:59as logical, rational thought.
1:20:01They're two different sides of the brain.
1:20:03What CIA teaches us how to do is systematically tap into
1:20:07the right side, emotional side of the brain so that we can
1:20:12quickly get past all of the stuff you were just saying.
1:20:14All of the well, don't you have to be convincing
1:20:16and don't you have to really know your story
1:20:18and don't you have to be able to defend it,
1:20:20don't you have to have authenticity
1:20:21and don't you have to have genuine feelings?
1:20:25Yes, all of those things are true if you're having
1:20:28a genuine relationship, but in an artificial relationship,
1:20:31there's ways to bypass all of that
1:20:32and get right to the heart of making someone
1:20:34feel comfortable and safe.
1:20:35- I guess the question I'm asking,
1:20:37and the thing I was implying is
1:20:40that creating an artificial relationship
1:20:42is an extremely difficult skill to accomplish the level.
1:20:48Like how good I am at being me
1:20:51and creating a feeling in another person that I create,
1:20:56for you to do that artificially,
1:21:00my sense is you gotta be really
1:21:01damn good at that kind of thing.
1:21:03I would venture to say it's, I mean, I don't know how
1:21:08to measure how difficult the thing is,
1:21:10but especially when you're communicating
1:21:12with people whose job depends
1:21:15on forming trusting relationships,
1:21:18they're gonna smell bullshit.
1:21:21And to get past that bullshit detector is tough.
1:21:27It's a tough skill.
1:21:28- [Andrew] Well, it's interesting, so I would say that...
1:21:30- Or maybe I'm wrong actually on that.
1:21:32- I would say that once you understand the system,
1:21:34it's not that hard.
1:21:35It makes a lot of sense.
1:21:37But I would also say that to your exact point,
1:21:39you are right that people smell bullshit.
1:21:42People smell bullshit.
1:21:43But here's the thing,
1:21:45if you come in smelling like goat shit,
1:21:48you still smell like shit,
1:21:49but you don't smell like bullshit.
1:21:51So they don't count you out right away.
1:21:53And if you come in smelling like rotten tomatoes
1:21:57or if you come in smelling like lavender,
1:21:59or if you come in smelling like manila
1:22:00or if you come in without any smell at all,
1:22:02all that matters is that you don't smell like bullshit.
1:22:05Here's the thing that's one of the secret sauces of CIA.
1:22:10When you look and act like a spy,
1:22:12people think you're a spy .
1:22:14If you look and act in any other way, you know what,
1:22:16they never ever think you are?
1:22:19A spy. They might think you're an idiot.
1:22:24They might think you're trailer trash,
1:22:24they might think that you're a migrant worker,
1:22:27but they never think you're a spy.
1:22:30And that lesson in everyday life is immensely powerful.
1:22:37If you're trying to take your boss's job,
1:22:39as long as you don't ever look like the employee
1:22:41who's trying to take the boss's job,
1:22:43the boss is focused on all the employees
1:22:44who are trying to take his job.
1:22:46Everybody's prioritizing whether they know it or not.
1:22:49The goal is to just not be the one that they're targeting.
1:22:51Target them without them knowing you're targeting them.
1:22:54- So people just, when they meet you, they put you in a bin.
1:22:58And if you want to avoid being put in a particular bin,
1:23:01just don't act like the person that will be,
1:23:03just show some kind of characteristics
1:23:06that bin you in some other way.
1:23:07- Exactly right. You have to be in a bin.
1:23:09Just choose the bin.
1:23:11(Andrew laughing)
1:23:11- Alright, so how
1:23:14you knowing these methods, when you talk to people,
Human nature
1:23:17especially in civilian life, how do you know
1:23:20who's lying to you and not?
1:23:22- That gets to be more into the trained skill
1:23:25side of things.
1:23:26There's body cues, there's micro expressions.
1:23:31I don't believe that micro expressions alone do anything.
1:23:33I also don't believe that micro expressions
1:23:36without an effective baseline do anything.
1:23:37So don't for a second think that I'm...
1:23:40All the people out there pitching
1:23:41that you can tell if someone's lying
1:23:42to you just by looking at their face, it's all baloney.
1:23:46In my world, that's baloney.
1:23:47- Like the way you move your eyes or something like that?
1:23:50- [Andrew] Without knowing a baseline, without knowing...
1:23:51- For that individual. - For that individual,
1:23:53then you actually don't know.
1:23:54And an individual's baseline is based on education, culture,
1:23:57life experience, you name it, right?
1:23:58So it's huge.
1:24:00But when you combine facial expressions with body movements,
1:24:04body language, nonverbal cues,
1:24:06and you add on top of that effective elicitation techniques
1:24:10that you are in control of,
1:24:12now you have a more robust platform
1:24:15to tell if someone's lying to you.
1:24:16- So there's like a set of like interrogation trajectories
1:24:22you can go down that can help you figure out a person.
1:24:26- Technically they're interview concepts.
1:24:29- [Lex] Like this podcast concepts.
1:24:30- Correct, because an interrogation
1:24:32and interrogation is something
1:24:33very different than an interview.
1:24:34And in the world of professionals
1:24:36and interrogation is very different.
1:24:37- What's the difference?
1:24:38The nature or how relaxed the thing is or what?
1:24:40- So in an interrogation
1:24:42there's a clear pattern of dominance.
1:24:44There's no equality. Also, there's no escape.
1:24:47You are there until the interrogator is done with you.
1:24:49Anybody who's ever been reprimanded by mom and dad
1:24:51knows what an interrogation feels like.
1:24:53Anybody who's ever been called into the principal's office
1:24:54or the boss's office, that's what interrogation feels like.
1:24:57You don't leave until the boss says you can leave
1:24:59and you're there to answer questions,
1:25:01the boss asks questions.
1:25:02An interview is an equal exchange of ideas.
1:25:05You are in control of this interview for sure.
1:25:09But if we were having coffee,
1:25:11I could take control if I wanted to take control,
1:25:13if I wanted to ask you personal questions, I would,
1:25:15if I wanted to talk to you about your background, I could.
1:25:17- Why am I in control of this interview? Exactly.
1:25:19- Because the person in control
1:25:20is the person asking questions, always.
1:25:23- I'm sitting here, as you've spoken about,
1:25:26my power here is I'm the quiet one listening.
1:25:29(both laughing)
1:25:30- You're exactly right. Guess where this conversation goes?
1:25:33Anywhere you choose to take it,
1:25:35because you're the one asking questions.
1:25:36Every time I answer a question, I'm creating a pattern
1:25:39of obedience to you,
1:25:41which subliminally, subconsciously makes me
1:25:43that much more apt to answer your questions.
1:25:45- Of course you can always turn that
1:25:46and start asking me questions that should, you know...
1:25:50But you're saying that there's,
1:25:52through conversation, you can call it interviewing,
1:25:57you can start to
1:26:01see cracks in the story of the person
1:26:05and the degree to which they exaggerate or lie
1:26:08or to see how much they could be trusted,
1:26:12that kind of stuff?
1:26:13- What I'm saying is that
1:26:14through a conversation you develop a baseline, right?
1:26:16Like even just in the first part of our conversation,
1:26:20I've been able to create some baseline elements about you.
1:26:23You've been able to create baseline elements about me.
1:26:25Maybe they're just not front of mind.
1:26:27From those baselines, now we can push
1:26:30through more intentional questions to test...
1:26:34- [Lex] Got it.
1:26:35- To test whether or not the person is being truthful
1:26:37because they're operating within their baseline.
1:26:39Or if you are triggering sensitivities outside
1:26:42of their baseline, and then you
1:26:43can start to see their tells.
1:26:45- That's fascinating, yeah baseline,
1:26:46like even like the tells, right?
1:26:49The eye contact.
1:26:50Like you've probably already formed a baseline.
1:26:52I have trouble making eye contact.
1:26:54And so like, so if you ask me difficult questions
1:26:56and I'm not making eye contact, maybe
1:26:58that's not a good signal of me lying or whatever.
1:27:01Because I always have trouble making eye contact,
1:27:04stuff like that.
1:27:05That's really fascinating.
1:27:06- The majority of your eye movement is to the right.
1:27:08Your right. My left, right?
1:27:10Which is usually someone who's,
1:27:11if you ask micro expressionists,
1:27:13that's someone who's referencing fact.
1:27:16That's not necessarily what's happening for you
1:27:18because you're pulling concepts out of the air.
1:27:19So it's also a place that you
1:27:20reference something other than fact.
1:27:22It's a place for you to find creativity.
1:27:24So if I just thought that you were lying
1:27:25because you look up and to the right,
1:27:27I would be wrong.
1:27:28- That's so fascinating.
1:27:29And a lot of that has to do with like, habits
1:27:31that are formed and all those kinds of things.
1:27:33Or maybe some right hand, left hand type of situation.
1:27:36- [Andrew] Right eye dominance.
1:27:36- Right eye dominance is gonna make you look to the right.
1:27:39- Is this a science or an art?
1:27:40- It's a bit of both.
1:27:41I would say that like all good art,
1:27:44art is taught from a foundation of skills.
1:27:47And those skills are played
1:27:51or taught in a very structured manner.
1:27:53And then the way that you use the skills
1:27:56after that's more of the artistic grace.
1:27:59So I've always called espionage an art. Spying is an art.
1:28:03Being able to hack human beings is an art,
1:28:06but it's all based in a foundation of science.
1:28:08You still have to learn how to mix the color palette
1:28:10and use certain brushes.
1:28:12- Do you think of that
1:28:13as a kind of the study of human psychology?
1:28:17Isn't that what a psychologist does? Or a psychiatrist?
1:28:20What, from this process, have you learned
1:28:23about human nature?
1:28:25- [Andrew] Human nature?
1:28:26- I mean, I suppose the answer to that
1:28:28could be a book, and probably will be a book.
1:28:32- [Andrew] I'll save you that, yeah.
1:28:33- But sort of is there things that are surprising
1:28:37about human nature, surprising to us civilians
1:28:42that you could speak to?
1:28:43- Yes, one thing is extremely surprising about human nature,
1:28:47which is funny 'cause that's not the answer I would've said.
1:28:49So I'm glad that you clarified this specific question.
1:28:53The thing that's surprising about human nature
1:28:55is that human beings long, like in their soul,
1:29:02there's like a painful longing to be with other people.
1:29:07And that's really surprising
1:29:08because we all wanna pretend like we're strong.
1:29:11We all wanna pretend like we're, you know, independent.
1:29:14We all wanna pretend like we are the masters of our destiny.
1:29:18But what's truly consistent in all people is this like,
1:29:24longing to commune with others like us.
1:29:30My more practical answer about what I've learned
1:29:33to be the truth is that human nature is predictable.
1:29:36And that predictability is
1:29:38what gives people an incredible advantage over other people.
1:29:41But that's not the surprising piece.
1:29:43I mean, even when CIA taught me
1:29:44that human nature is predictable, it just made sense.
1:29:47I was like, oh yeah, that makes sense.
1:29:49But what I never ever anticipated was, no matter
1:29:53where I've been in the world, no matter who I've talked to,
1:29:55no matter what socioeconomic bracket,
1:29:58is that longing, man, it hurts.
1:30:01Loneliness sucks. And togetherness feels good.
1:30:04Even if you're together with someone you know isn't
1:30:06the right person, it still feels better than being alone.
1:30:09- I mean, that's such a deep truth you speak to.
1:30:11And I could talk about
1:30:13that for a long time.
1:30:15There is, I mean, through these conversations in general,
1:30:18whether it's being recorded or not,
1:30:21I hunger to discover in the other person that longing,
1:30:27you strip away the other things
1:30:29and then you share in the longing for that connection.
1:30:32And I particularly also have detected that in people
1:30:38from all walks of life.
1:30:40Including people that others might identify as evil or hard
1:30:47as completely cold, it's there.
1:30:52- It's there, they've hardened themselves in their search
1:30:57and who knows what dark place their brain is in,
1:30:59their heart is in.
1:31:00But that longing is still there.
1:31:03Even if it's an ember, it's there.
1:31:06It's the reason why in World War I
1:31:09and World War II, you know,
1:31:11enemy combatants still shared cigarettes on the front lines,
1:31:15you know, during periods of holidays
1:31:17or bad weather or whatever else.
1:31:18Because that human connection, man, it triumphs overall.
1:31:22- See, that's in part of what I refer to when I say love.
1:31:28Because I feel like if like political leaders
1:31:32and people in conflict at the small scale
1:31:34and the large scale were
1:31:37able to tune into that longing to seek in each other
1:31:44that basic longing for human connection.
1:31:46A lot of problems could be solved,
1:31:49but of course is difficult
1:31:53because it's a game of chicken
1:31:56is if you open yourself up to reveal that longing
1:32:00for connection with others, people can hurt you.
1:32:03- Well, I would go a step farther
1:32:04and I would say that taking the connection away, punishing,
1:32:10penalizing people by removing the connection
1:32:14is a powerful tool.
1:32:16And that's what we see. That's why we send people to jail.
1:32:20That's why we put economic sanctions on countries.
1:32:22That's why we ground our children
1:32:24and send them to their rooms.
1:32:25We are penalizing them, whether we know it or not.
1:32:28We're using punitive damage by taking away
1:32:32that basic human connection, that longing for community.
CIA recruitment process
1:32:36- What was your recruitment process and training process
1:32:40and things you could speak to
1:32:44in the CIA?
1:32:46- As I was leaving the Air Force, all that was on my mind.
1:32:50I don't know what you were like at 27,
1:32:52but I was a total dip shit at 27.
1:32:54I'm not much better now at 42, but yeah...
1:32:57- You owe me both. (both laughing)
1:33:00Fake it till you make it.
1:33:01- But I was like, I just wanted
1:33:03to be anything other than a military officer.
1:33:06So I was actually in the process of applying
1:33:09to the Peace Corps through this thing called the internet,
1:33:12which was still fairly rudimentary in 2007.
1:33:16I had a computer lab that we went to
1:33:18and it had 10 computers in it and you had to log in
1:33:20and log out and slow internet and everything else.
1:33:22But anyways, I was filling out an online application
1:33:25to go work in the US Peace Corps.
1:33:28I wanted to grow my hair out.
1:33:29I wanted to stop wearing shoes that were shiny.
1:33:33I wanted to meet a hippie chick
1:33:35and have hippie babies in the wild,
1:33:37teaching Nigerian children how to read.
1:33:40So that was the path I was going down.
1:33:42And as I filled in all of my details, there came this page
1:33:46that popped up and it was this blinking red page
1:33:48and it said, "Stop here.
1:33:50You may qualify for other government positions.
1:33:53If you're willing to put your application on hold
1:33:55for 72 hours, that gives us a chance to reach out to you."
1:33:59So again, 27-year-old, I was like, sure,
1:34:04I'll put myself on hold if I might qualify
1:34:05for other government opportunities.
1:34:07And then about a day later I got a phone call
1:34:09from an almost unlisted number.
1:34:11It just said 703, which was very strange
1:34:14to see on my flip phone at the time.
1:34:16Just one 703 area code.
1:34:18And I picked it up and it was a person
1:34:23from Northern Virginia telling me that I was qualified
1:34:27for a position in national security
1:34:29and if I would be interested, they'll pay for my ticket
1:34:32and fly me up to Langley, Virginia.
1:34:35They didn't say CIA, they said Langley.
1:34:37I put one and one together and I was like,
1:34:39maybe this is CIA.
1:34:41Like this could, how cool is this?
1:34:43Or maybe this is all make-believe and this is totally fake.
1:34:45So either way it doesn't hurt me at all to say "Yes",
1:34:47they already have my phone number.
1:34:49So yes, yes, yes.
1:34:50And then I remember thinking, there's no way
1:34:52that happened and this isn't real.
1:34:54And then a day later I got FedEx or an overnight delivery
1:34:59of an airplane ticket
1:35:00and a hotel reservation and a rental car reservation.
1:35:03And then I just kept doing the next thing,
1:35:05which I found out later on as a form of control.
1:35:07You just do the next thing that they tell you to do.
1:35:10And then before I knew it, I was interviewing
1:35:12in a nondescript building with a person
1:35:15who only told me their first name for a position
1:35:17with the National Clandestine Service.
1:35:19- So you never really got a chance to think about it
1:35:21because there's a small steps along the way
1:35:23and it kind of just leads you
1:35:26and maybe your personality such that...
1:35:30- [Andrew] That's an adventure.
1:35:30- It's an adventure and because it's one step at a time,
1:35:34you don't necessarily see the negative consequences
1:35:36of the adventure.
1:35:37You don't think about any of that.
1:35:38You're just stepping
1:35:40into the adventure one step at a time.
1:35:41- And it's easy. There's no work involved.
1:35:43Somebody else is doing all the work
1:35:45telling me where to be and when.
1:35:46It's a lot like basic training in the military.
1:35:48Anybody who's ever been through basic training will tell you
1:35:50they hated the first few days.
1:35:52And then by the end it was really comforting
1:35:54because you just did what you were told.
1:35:56They told you when to eat,
1:35:57they made the decision of what to eat.
1:35:59Then you marched when they told you to march,
1:36:01shined your shoes when they told you to shine your shoes.
1:36:03Human beings love being told what to do.
1:36:06- What about the training process
1:36:10for becoming a covert CIA agent?
1:36:16- So the interview process is...
1:36:19- Yeah, the interview process too.
1:36:21How rigorous was that?
1:36:22- It was very rigorous.
1:36:23That was where it became difficult.
1:36:26Everything up to the first interview was easy,
1:36:28but there's three interviews and some people are lucky
1:36:31enough to have four or five interviews
1:36:33if something goes wrong
1:36:34or something goes awry with the first few interviews.
1:36:37And again, this might be dated from what I went through,
1:36:41but during the interview process is when
1:36:43they do your psychological evaluations.
1:36:47They do personality assessments, they do skills assessments.
1:36:53They'll start sending you back to your,
1:36:55wherever you're living with assignments.
1:36:58Not intel assignments,
1:36:59but actual like homework assignments.
1:37:02Write an essay about three parts of the world
1:37:05that you think will be most impacted
1:37:08in the next three to five years.
1:37:09Or, you know, prioritize the top three strategic priorities
1:37:12for the United States
1:37:13and you know, put it into 250 words or 2,500 words
1:37:17and whatever else,
1:37:19double spaced in this font, yada, yada, yada.
1:37:21Like super specific stuff.
1:37:22It's kind of stressful, but it's just like
1:37:24going back to college again.
1:37:26So you go through all of those acts
1:37:27and then you submit this stuff to some PO box that
1:37:31doesn't have anybody that's ever gonna respond to you.
1:37:33And then you hope you just send it into the ether
1:37:35and you hope that you sent it right.
1:37:38You hope that you wrote well enough.
1:37:40You hope that your assessment was right,
1:37:42whatever else it might be.
1:37:43And then eventually get another phone call that says,
1:37:45"Hey, we received your package.
1:37:46You've been moved to the next level of interview
1:37:49and now we need you to go to this other nondescript building
1:37:52in this other nondescript city."
1:37:53And then you start meeting,
1:37:56you start sitting in waiting rooms
1:37:59with other groups of people
1:38:00who are at the same phase of interview with you,
1:38:02which were some of the coolest experiences
1:38:04that I remember still.
1:38:05One of my best friends to this day who I don't get
1:38:07to talk to, 'cause he's still undercover,
1:38:10is a guy I met during those interview processes.
1:38:12And I was like, oh, we met and I saw what he was wearing.
1:38:15He saw what I was wearing. I was brown.
1:38:17- So you immediately connected
1:38:18and you liked the people there?
1:38:19- Close. More like we immediately judge each other.
1:38:22'Cause we're all untrained.
1:38:24So he looked at me
1:38:25and he was like, brown dude with crazy hair.
1:38:27And I was wearing, dude, I was dressed like a total ass.
1:38:29I was dressed in like a clubbing shirt.
1:38:32I don't know why I thought it would be a good idea to go
1:38:33to a CIA interview in like a clubbing shirt
1:38:36with my buttons unbuttoned down to here.
1:38:39And he was like, after we got in, he was like,
1:38:42"Yeah dude, you were always really cool to talk to."
1:38:43But I was like, there's no way that idiot's getting in.
1:38:46And I remember looking at him and being like,
1:38:47"Dude, you were just another white guy in a black suit.
1:38:50They're not looking for you. But here you are."
1:38:52So it was just, those kinds of things were so interesting
1:38:54'cause we were totally wrong about what CIA was looking for.
1:38:56Until you're in, you have no idea what they're looking for
1:38:59and you're just shooting in the dark.
1:39:02- Did they have you do like a lie detector test?
1:39:05- Yes. It's called a polygraph.
1:39:07- Polygraph, how effective, just interesting
1:39:09Per our previous discussion.
1:39:11How effective are those?
1:39:12- Polygraphs are really interesting.
1:39:14So one of the things
1:39:15that people don't understand about polygraphs
1:39:17is that polygraphs aren't meant to detect a lie.
1:39:19Like they're called a lie detector,
1:39:21but they're not actually meant to detect a lie.
1:39:23They're built to detect variants
1:39:27from your physiological baseline.
1:39:29So they're essentially meant to identify sensitivities
1:39:33to certain types of questions.
1:39:35And then as they identify a sensitivity to a question,
1:39:37it gives the interviewer an additional piece of information
1:39:40to direct the next round of questions.
1:39:43So then from there they can kind of see
1:39:44how sensitive you are to a certain level of questions.
1:39:46And your sensitivity could be a sign of dishonesty,
1:39:50but it could also be a sign of vulnerability.
1:39:54So the interrogator themselves, the interviewer themselves,
1:39:57they're the one that have to make
1:39:59the judgment call as to which one it is.
1:40:00Which is why you might see multiple interviewers
1:40:03over the course of multiple polygraphs.
1:40:06But that's really what they're all about.
1:40:07So I mean, they're extremely uncomfortable,
1:40:11like they're mentally uncomfortable.
1:40:13But then there's also, you sit on a pad
1:40:15because the pad is supposed to be able
1:40:17to tell like your body movements,
1:40:18but also like your sphincter contractions or whatever.
1:40:22So you're sitting on this pad, you're plugged in,
1:40:24you're strapped in, you're tied up,
1:40:26and it takes so much time to get in there.
1:40:28And then they start asking you questions,
1:40:30baseline questions at first,
1:40:31and then other questions from there.
1:40:33And you're just answering the best you can.
1:40:34And you never know what they're seeing
1:40:36and you don't know what they're doing.
1:40:37And it's really hard not to get anxious of that anyways.
1:40:39- Are they the whole time monitoring the readings?
1:40:42- Yeah, from like a big, they've got multiple screens
1:40:45and it's all information superiority.
1:40:47They have information superiority.
1:40:50You're the idiot looking away from them
1:40:51or looking sideways of them and trying not to move
1:40:54because you're afraid that if you like have gas
1:40:57or if you move a little bit's gonna
1:40:58vary you from your baseline.
1:40:59And the whole time you're worried your heart's racing
1:41:01and your blood pressure's increasing,
1:41:02which is a variance from baseline.
1:41:04So yeah, I means an interesting art.
1:41:06- Or your baseline. - [Andrew] Correct.
1:41:08- Maybe there's some people
1:41:08that are just chilling the whole time
1:41:10and that's their baseline.
1:41:13- But that's what they're doing.
1:41:14They're establishing a baseline.
1:41:15I mean, I guess that means the polygraph is a skill
1:41:20that you develop to do it well.
1:41:22- So when people talk about beating a lie detector,
1:41:24it's not that they're telling an effective lie.
1:41:26That's not hard.
1:41:27It's not hard to tell a lie to an interviewer.
1:41:31And the interviewer doesn't care if you're being honest
1:41:33or not honest about a topic.
1:41:34What they're looking for is sensitivity.
1:41:36If they see no sensitivity, that's a big sign for them.
1:41:40That's a big sign that you're probably a pathological liar.
1:41:43If you show sensitivity to many things, then that's a sign
1:41:47that you're probably an anxious person
1:41:49and they can still reset their baseline
1:41:51because they can tell how your anxiety is increasing,
1:41:54you know, in 15 minute increments.
1:41:57It's a unique skill.
1:41:58I mean, a really good polygrapher is immensely valuable.
1:42:02But it's the misnomers,
1:42:04the misconceptions about polygraphs are vast.
1:42:07- You also mentioned personality tests.
1:42:09That's really interesting.
1:42:11So how effective are personality tests?
1:42:14One for the hiring process,
1:42:15but also for understanding a human being.
1:42:17- So personality is extremely important
1:42:19for understanding human being.
1:42:20And I would say that there's a thousand different ways
1:42:22of looking at personality.
1:42:23The only one that I count
1:42:25with any significance is the MBTI.
1:42:28And the MBTI is what all the leading spy agencies
1:42:30around the world use as well.
1:42:32- Well, that's kind of interesting to hear.
1:42:34So there's been criticisms of that kind of test.
1:42:36- There have been criticisms for a long time.
1:42:38- And you think there's value? - Absolutely. Absolutely.
1:42:41And there's a few reasons why, right?
1:42:43So first, MBTI makes the claim
1:42:45that your core personality doesn't change over time.
1:42:48And that's how it's calibrated.
1:42:51And one of the big arguments is that people say
1:42:53that your personality can change over time.
1:42:56In my experience, the MBTI is exactly correct.
1:42:59Your core personality does not change
1:43:01because your core personality is defined
1:43:04as your personality when all resources are removed.
1:43:08So essentially your emergency mode, your dire conditions,
1:43:13that is your core personality.
1:43:15We can all act a little more extroverted.
1:43:18We can all, you know,
1:43:20be a little more empathetic when we have tons of time
1:43:23and money and patience.
1:43:25When you strip away all that time, money, and patience,
1:43:27how empathetic are you?
1:43:29How much do you like being around other people?
1:43:31How much do you like being alone?
1:43:33Do you make judgements
1:43:34or do you analyze information?
1:43:37That's what's so powerful about MBTI,
1:43:39it's talking about what people are like
1:43:40when you strip away resources.
1:43:42And then because it's so consistent,
1:43:44it's also only four codes.
1:43:46It's super easy to be able to assess a human being
1:43:50through a dialogue, through a series of conversations
1:43:54to be able to hone in with high accuracy,
1:43:57what is there four letter code.
1:44:00There's only 16 options and it becomes extremely valuable.
1:44:04Is it perfectly precise? And does everybody do it the same?
1:44:08I mean, the answers to those are no.
1:44:10But is it operationally useful in a short period of time?
1:44:15That is a resoundingly powerful yes.
1:44:18- Yeah I only know I think the first letter,
1:44:20it's introvert and extroverted, right?
1:44:21- [Andrew] Yep. I've taken the test before,
1:44:25just like a crude version of the test.
1:44:27And that's the same problem you have with IQ tests.
1:44:30There's the right thorough way of doing it
1:44:33and then there's like fun internet way of doing.
1:44:36And do you mind sharing
1:44:38what your personality...
1:44:41- [Andrew] Yeah my type index? - Yes.
1:44:44- I'm an ENTP, that's an extrovert,
1:44:46intuitor, perceiver, thinker.
1:44:51ENT thinker, P perceiver.
1:44:54My wife is an ISFJ, which is the polar opposite of me.
1:44:59E, I'm extroverted. She's introverted.
1:45:01I'm an intuitive, she's a sensor.
1:45:04I'm a thinker. She's a feeler.
1:45:05I'm a perceiver. She's a judger.
1:45:07- Is there a good science on like
1:45:10long-term successful relationships
1:45:12in terms of the dynamics of that?
1:45:13The 16, I wonder if there's good data on this.
1:45:17- I don't think there's a lot of good data
1:45:19in personalities writ large.
1:45:21Because there's not a lot of money
1:45:23to be made in personality testing.
1:45:26But I would say that
1:45:30with experience with a good MBTI test
1:45:34with a good paid test, a 400, 500 question test.
1:45:38Once you understand your own code
1:45:41and then you're taught how to assess the code of others.
1:45:44With those two things kind of combined
1:45:46'cause then you have experience in learning.
1:45:50It becomes very useful.
1:45:52And you can have high confidence in the conclusions
1:45:55that you reach about people's professions,
1:45:58about people's relationships with family,
1:46:00about people's relationships professionally,
1:46:02people's capabilities to deal with stress,
1:46:05how people will perform
1:46:07when pushed outside of their comfort zones.
1:46:09Really, really powerful useful stuff in corporate world
1:46:12and in the espionage world.
1:46:14- So in terms of compressed representation
1:46:16of another human being,
1:46:19you can't do much better than those four letters.
1:46:22- I don't believe you can do much better.
1:46:23In my experience, I have not seen anything better.
1:46:26- Yeah, it's difficult to realize
1:46:30that there is a core personality or the degree that's true.
1:46:34It seems to be true.
1:46:35It's even more difficult to realize that there is a stable,
1:46:40or at least the science says so,
1:46:42a stable, consistent intelligence.
1:46:46Unfortunately, you know, the G factor that they call
1:46:51that if you do a barrage of IQ test that's going
1:46:53to consistently represent that G factor.
1:46:57And we're all born with that and we can't fix it.
1:46:59And that defines so much of who we are. It's sad.
1:47:03- I don't see it as sad
1:47:04because it's, for me, the faster you learn it,
1:47:07the faster you learn what your own sort of natural strengths
1:47:12and weaknesses are, the faster you get to stop wasting time
1:47:17on things that you're never gonna be good at.
1:47:19And you get to double down on the things
1:47:21that you're already naturally skilled or interested in.
1:47:23So there's always a silver lining to a cloud.
1:47:26But I know now that I will never be a ballerina
1:47:29or a ballerino.
1:47:30I know that I'll never be an artist,
1:47:32I'll never be a musician.
1:47:33I'll never be any of those things.
1:47:35And when I was 18, that might've made me sad.
1:47:37But now at 42, I'm like, well shit, awesome.
1:47:40I can go be something else good
1:47:43instead of always being bad.
1:47:44- You're not gonna be a ballerina (indistinct)?
1:47:46- Because I'm not graceful.
1:47:48- And you've learned this through years of experience.
1:47:51- [Andrew] Yeah, exactly.
1:47:52- Well, I don't know if there's an MBTI equivalent
1:47:55for grace of movement.
1:47:56- I think it's called S sensor.
1:48:00Because a sensor is someone who's able to interact
1:48:02with the world around them
1:48:03through their five senses very effectively.
1:48:06Like if you talk to dancers,
1:48:07dancers can actually feel the grace in all of their muscles.
1:48:10They know what position their finger is in.
1:48:13I don't have any idea, I don't know
1:48:14what position my feet are in right now.
1:48:15I'd have to look to make sure I
1:48:17actually feel the floor right.
1:48:18- Yeah, I definitely have... Oh, that's good to know.
1:48:21So I don't, you know, I'm not a dancer, but I do have that.
1:48:25- [Andrew] You're a musician man.
1:48:27- Well the music, I don't know if that correlated
1:48:28- [Andrew] To be able to plug guitar.
1:48:29- Sure, yeah, that's true.
1:48:31There is that physical component,
1:48:32but I think deeper
1:48:33'cause there's a technical aspect to that
1:48:35that's just like, it's less about feel.
1:48:39But I do know jiujitsu, you know,
1:48:41and grappling I've done all my life.
1:48:43I don't, you know, there's some people who are clumsy
1:48:46and they drop stuff all the time.
1:48:47They run into stuff. I don't.
1:48:50First of all, I don't know how that happens, but to me,
1:48:52I just have an awareness of stuff.
1:48:54Like if there's a little...
1:48:55- [Andrew] Spiritual orientation.
1:48:56- Yeah, like I know that there's a small object I have
1:49:00to step over and I have a good sense of that.
1:49:04It's so interesting.
1:49:05Yeah, you're just like born with that or something.
1:49:06- My wife is brilliant and she still walks into doors.
1:49:10I mean, she'll walk in a doorway,
1:49:11she'll bang her knee on the same wall
1:49:13that's been there for the last 50 years.
1:49:15- It's for some reason really hilarious.
1:49:17That's good for that. (Andrew laughing)
CIA and secrecy
1:49:20You've been asked, I think on Reddit,
1:49:23"Are there big secrets that you know
1:49:25that could lend you and our country in terrible trouble
1:49:28if you came out to the public?"
1:49:29And you answered, "Yes, I wish I could forget them."
1:49:32So lemme ask you just about secrecy in general.
1:49:36Are these secrets or just other secrets,
1:49:40ones that the public will never know
1:49:43or will it come out in 10, 20, 50 years?
1:49:47I guess the deeper question is
1:49:49what is the value of secrecy and transparency?
1:49:54- The standard classification
1:49:56for all human intelligence operations
1:49:59is something called 25X2, 25 by 2.
1:50:03So 50 years, 25 years times two years, or times two rounds.
1:50:07So in essence, anything that I've seen has the first chance
1:50:12of becoming public domain declassified after 50 years,
1:50:17unless there's some congressional requirement for it
1:50:20to be reviewed and assessed earlier.
1:50:22So by then, you know, I'll be 80 something years old
1:50:24or potentially dead, which is either way, that's when
1:50:29it can come out according to its typical classification.
1:50:35The value of secrets I have seen
1:50:39is that secrets create space.
1:50:44Secrets give opportunity for security.
1:50:48They give opportunity for thinking they give space.
1:50:52And space is an incredibly advantageous thing to have.
1:50:55If you know something somebody else doesn't know,
1:50:57even if it's just 15 or 20 minutes different,
1:51:00you can change the course of fate.
1:51:02So I find secrets to be
1:51:04extremely valuable, extremely useful.
1:51:07Even at the place where secrets are being kept
1:51:10from a large mass,
1:51:13part of what all Americans need to understand is that
1:51:17one of the trade-offs to building a system of government
1:51:23that allows us to be first world
1:51:26and wealthy and secure and successful.
1:51:28One of the trade-offs is
1:51:29that we have given up a great deal of personal freedom.
1:51:32And one of the personal freedoms
1:51:33that we give up is the freedom of knowing
1:51:37what we want to know.
1:51:39You get to know what the government tells you.
1:51:41You get to know what you need to know
1:51:43or what you've learned yourself,
1:51:44but you don't get to know secrets.
1:51:46People who do get to know secrets know them for a reason.
1:51:49That's why it's called a need to know.
1:51:51- How difficult is it to maintain secrecy?
1:51:54- It's surprisingly difficult as technology changes.
1:51:58It's also surprisingly difficult
1:52:02as our culture becomes one where people want notoriety,
1:52:06people wanna be the person who breaks the secret.
1:52:1025 years ago, 40 years ago, that wasn't the case.
1:52:13There was a time in the United States
1:52:14where if someone gave you a secret,
1:52:16it was a point of personal honor not to share the secret.
1:52:20Now we're in a place where someone tells you a secret
1:52:22like that could turn into a Twitter post
1:52:24that gets you a bunch of thumbs up
1:52:26and a bunch of likes or whatever else.
1:52:27- [Lex] It's an opportunity. - Right.
1:52:28So the value of secrets has changed
1:52:31and now there's almost a greater value on exposing secrets
1:52:34than there is on keeping secrets.
1:52:36That makes it difficult to keep secrets,
1:52:38especially when technology is going in the same direction.
1:52:41- Where is the line?
1:52:43And by the way, I'm one of those old school people
1:52:44with the secrets.
1:52:46I think it's a karma thing.
1:52:51Again, back to the trust.
1:52:52I think in the short term, you can benefit
1:52:55by sharing a secret.
1:52:57But in the long term,
1:52:58if people know they can trust you,
1:53:00like the juicy of the secret,
1:53:02it's a test of sorts, if they know you can keep
1:53:06that secret, that means like you're somebody
1:53:09that could be trusted.
1:53:10And I believe that like,
1:53:12not just effectiveness in this life,
1:53:14but happiness in this life is informing a circle
1:53:17of people you can trust.
1:53:18- Right, we're taught that secrets
1:53:20and lies are similar in that they have a limited shelf life.
1:53:24If you treat them like food.
1:53:26Secrets and lies have a very limited shelf life.
1:53:29So if you cash in on them while they're still fresh,
1:53:33you beat them before they spoil.
1:53:35You get to take advantage of 'em before they spoil.
1:53:38However, trust has no limit to its shelf life.
1:53:43So it's almost like you're trading a short-term victory
1:53:46and losing a long-term victory.
1:53:48It's always better to keep the secret.
1:53:50It's always better to let the lie live
1:53:53because it will eventually come to light from somebody else,
1:53:57not from you, because it already has a limited shelf life.
1:53:59But what you win in exchange for not being the one
1:54:02that cashed in on the secret is immense trust.
1:54:07- Let me ask you about lying and trust and so on.
1:54:12So I don't believe I've been contacted by
1:54:15or interacted with the CIA, the MI6, the FSB, Massod
1:54:20or any other intelligence agency.
1:54:23I'm kind of offended. (Andrew laughing)
1:54:26But would I know if I was?
1:54:29So from your perspective. - No.
1:54:31You would not know if you were.
1:54:33For sure you've been on their radar. Absolutely.
1:54:35You've got a file, you've got a dossier somewhere.
1:54:38- Why would I be on the radar?
1:54:39- [Andrew] Because you're... - Who's interesting
1:54:43- It's not necessarily
1:54:44that you are interesting to someone as a foreign asset
1:54:48or an intelligence collection source,
1:54:51but your network is extremely interesting.
1:54:54- The networks are important too?
1:54:55- Correct, if someone was able to clone your phone,
1:55:01every time you cross a border,
1:55:02you go through some sort of security.
1:55:04If you've ever been pulled into secondary
1:55:06and separated from your bag, that's exactly when
1:55:09and how people clone computers.
1:55:10They clone phones, they make whatever photocopies
1:55:15of your old school planner, whatever it might be.
1:55:19But for sure, you are an intelligence target.
1:55:23It just may be that you're not suitable to be a person
1:55:27who reports foreign intelligence.
1:55:28We've gotta understand that all people are potential sources
1:55:31of valuable information
1:55:33to the national security infrastructure of our host country
1:55:36and any country that we visit.
1:55:39Someone like you with your public footprint,
1:55:41with your notoriety,
1:55:42with your educational background,
1:55:43with your national identifications, becomes a viable
1:55:48and valuable target of information.
1:55:50- Yeah, so to speak to that,
Cyber security
1:55:55you know, I take security pretty seriously,
1:55:58but not to the degree that, you know,
1:56:01it runs my life, which I'm very careful about.
1:56:06- [Andrew] That's good. I'm glad to hear that.
1:56:07- So the moment you start to think about germs, right,
1:56:11like you start to freak out
1:56:14and you become sort of paralyzed by the stress of it.
1:56:17So you have to balance those two things.
1:56:19If you think about all the things
1:56:21that can hurt you in this world
1:56:24and all the risk you can take
1:56:27it can overwhelm your life.
1:56:29That said, the cyber world is a weird world.
1:56:32Because it doesn't have the same...
1:56:36I know not to cross the street without looking each way
1:56:39because there's a physical intuition about it.
1:56:42I'm not sure, you know, I'm a computer science guy,
1:56:45so I have some intuition, but it's the cyber world,
1:56:49it's really hard to build up an intuition
1:56:51what is safe and not.
1:56:53I've seen a lot of people, you know,
1:56:55just a logging out of your devices all the time,
1:56:58like regularly, just like that physical access step is,
1:57:01a lot of people don't take,
1:57:03I can just like walk in into the offices of a lot of CEOs
1:57:07and everything's wide open
1:57:10for physical access of those systems,
1:57:13which is kind of incredible for somebody,
1:57:16that sounds really shady, but it's not.
1:57:18I've written key loggers,
1:57:20like things that record everything you type
1:57:21and the mouse you moved
1:57:23and like, I did during my PhD,
1:57:27I was recording everything you do on your device
1:57:30and everything you do on your computer to under, like,
1:57:33people sign up to the study, they willingly do this
1:57:36to understand behavior.
1:57:37I was trying to use machine learning to identify
1:57:39who you are based on different biometric
1:57:42and behavioral things,
1:57:44which allows me to study human behavior
1:57:45and to see which is uniquely identifiable.
1:57:49And the goal there was to remove the need for a password,
1:57:53but how easy it is to write a thing
1:57:56that logs everything you type.
1:57:58I was like, wait a minute.
1:57:59Like I can probably get a lot of people in the world
1:58:03to run this for me.
1:58:04I can then get all of their passwords.
1:58:07I mean, you could do so much.
1:58:10Like I can run the entirety of the CIA just myself if I was,
1:58:16and I imagine there's a lot of really good hackers like that
1:58:19out there, much better than me.
1:58:22So I try to prevent myself from being
1:58:25all the different low hanging fruit attack vectors
1:58:28in my life.
1:58:29I try to make it difficult to be that.
1:58:33But then I'm also aware that there's probably people
1:58:35that are like five steps ahead.
1:58:38- You're doing the right thing.
1:58:40What I always advocate is the low hanging fruit is
1:58:44what keeps you from being a target of opportunity
1:58:46because you're half-assed hackers, you're lazy hackers,
1:58:51your unskilled hackers
1:58:53they're looking for low hanging fruit.
1:58:54They're looking for the person who gets the Nigeria email
1:58:57about how you could be getting $5 million
1:58:59if you just gimme your bank account.
1:59:01That's what they're looking for.
1:59:03And the thing that's scary is that if you're not a target
1:59:05of opportunity, if you become a intentional target,
1:59:10then there's almost nothing you can do.
1:59:11Because once you become an intentional target,
1:59:14then your security apparatus,
1:59:19they will create a dedicated, customized vector of attacking
1:59:25your specific security apparatus.
1:59:27And because security is always after, right?
1:59:31There's the leading advantage
1:59:33and the trailing advantage.
1:59:35When it comes to attacks,
1:59:36the leader always has the advantage
1:59:38because they have to create the attack
1:59:40before anybody else can create a way
1:59:42to protect against the attack.
1:59:44So the attack always comes first
1:59:45and that means they always have the advantage.
1:59:47You are always stuck just leaning on
1:59:49this is the best security that I know of.
1:59:52Meanwhile, there's always somebody who can create a way
1:59:54of attacking the best security out there.
1:59:57And once they win, they have a monopoly.
1:59:59They have all that time
2:00:00until a new defensive countermeasure is deployed.
2:00:04- Yeah, I tend to think exactly as you said,
2:00:07that the low hanging fruit protects against like yeah,
2:00:10crimes of opportunity.
2:00:11And then I assume that people can just hack in
2:00:15if they really want.
2:00:17- Think about how much anxiety we would be able
2:00:18to solve if everybody just accepted that.
2:00:21- Well, there's several things you do.
2:00:23First of all, to be honest,
2:00:26it keeps me honest not to be a douche bag
2:00:30or like not
2:00:35to assume everything could be public
2:00:41and so don't trade in information
2:00:43that could hurt people if it was made public.
2:00:46So I try to do that.
2:00:47And the thing I try to make sure
2:00:51is I like home alone style, try...
2:00:54(Andrew laughing) - [Andrew] A booby trap.
2:00:55- I really would like to know if I was hacked.
2:00:59And so I try to assume that I will be hacked
2:01:03and detect it.
2:01:06- [Andrew] Have a trip wire of some sort.
2:01:07- Yeah, a trip wire through everything.
2:01:10And not paranoid trip wires, just like open door.
2:01:13But I think that's probably the future
2:01:16of life on this earth like,
2:01:18everybody of interest is going to be hacked.
2:01:21That hopefully inspires, now this is outside of company.
2:01:25These are individuals I mean.
2:01:26There's of course if you're actually operating,
2:01:30like who am I?
2:01:31I'm just a scientist person, podcasting person.
2:01:36So if I was actually running a company
2:01:41or was an integral part of some
2:01:44kind of military operation, then you have to probably have
2:01:47to have an entire team that's now doing that battle
2:01:51of like trying to be ahead
2:01:54of like the best hackers in the world that are attacking.
2:01:57But that requires a team
2:01:59that like full time is their focus.
2:02:01Even then you still get in trouble.
2:02:03- Correct, so what I've seen as the norm, well
2:02:06what I've seen is the cutting edge standard for corporations
2:02:12and the ultra wealthy
2:02:13and even intelligence organizations is
2:02:17that we have trip wires.
2:02:20If you can't prevent from being hacked,
2:02:22the next best thing is to know as soon as you get hacked,
2:02:26because then you can essentially
2:02:28terminate all the information.
2:02:30If you know it fast enough,
2:02:31you can just destroy the information.
2:02:32This is what the ultra wealthy do.
2:02:34They have multiple phones.
2:02:36So as soon as one phone gets hacked, the trip wire goes off,
2:02:38the operating system is totally deleted
2:02:40along with all data on the phone.
2:02:42And a second phone is turned on
2:02:44with a whole new separate set of metadata.
2:02:47And now for them, there's no break in service.
2:02:49It's just, oh, this phone went black.
2:02:51It's got a warning on it that says it was hacked.
2:02:54So trash it 'cause they don't care
2:02:55about the price of the phone.
2:02:56Pick up the next phone and we move on.
2:02:58That's the best thing that you can do essentially
2:03:01outside of trying to out hack the hackers.
2:03:04And then even in your intelligence
2:03:06and military worlds where cyber warfare is active,
2:03:09the people who are aggressing
2:03:11are not trying to create aggression that beats security.
2:03:16They're trying to find a aggressive techniques,
2:03:19offensive techniques that have no security
2:03:21built around them yet, because it's too cost
2:03:24and time intensive to protect against
2:03:27what you know is coming.
2:03:28It's so much more efficient and cost effective
2:03:30to go after new vectors.
2:03:32So it just becomes like,
2:03:36it becomes almost a silly game of your neighbor
2:03:39gets a guard dog, so you get a bigger guard dog
2:03:43and then your neighbor gets a fence.
2:03:45So you're just constantly outdoing each other.
2:03:46It's called the security paradigm.
2:03:48People just one up each other
2:03:50because it's never worth it to just get to the same level.
2:03:53You're always trying to outdo each other.
2:03:54- Yeah, then maybe like banks have to fight that fight.
2:03:58But not everybody can...
2:04:00Yeah, no, so you're saying I operate at the state of the art
2:04:03with the trip wires, this is good to know.
2:04:05- [Andrew] Absolutely, man.
2:04:06- And also just not using anybody else's services,
2:04:10doing everything myself.
2:04:12So that's harder to figure out
2:04:14what the heck this person is doing
2:04:15'cause if I'm using somebody else's service,
2:04:17like I did with QNAP. (Andrew laughing)
2:04:21I have a QNAP NAS I used for cold storage
2:04:24of unimportant things that are large videos.
2:04:27And I don't know if you know,
2:04:28but QNAP is a company that does now storage devices
2:04:32and they got hacked.
2:04:34And everybody that didn't update
2:04:37as of a week ago from the point
2:04:39of the zero day hack, everybody got hacked.
2:04:42It's several thousands of machines.
2:04:44And they asked,
2:04:48you can get your data back if you pay,
2:04:50I forget what it was, but it was
2:04:53as about a couple thousand dollars.
2:04:55And the QNAP can get all the data back
2:04:58for their customers if they pay, I think $2 million.
2:05:01But that came from me relying
2:05:03on the systems of others for security.
2:05:06I assumed this company would have their security handled.
2:05:10But then those very valuable lessons to me.
2:05:13I now have like layers of security
2:05:17and also an understanding which data is really important,
2:05:21which is somewhat important, which is not that important
2:05:24and layering that all together.
2:05:26- So just so you know, the US government,
2:05:28the military woke up to that exact same thing
2:05:30about two years ago.
2:05:31It's still very new.
2:05:33I mean, they were sourcing,
2:05:35take night vision goggles, for example.
2:05:37They were sourcing components and engineering
2:05:39and blueprints for night vision goggles
2:05:41from three, four, five different subcontractors
2:05:44all over the country.
2:05:45But they never asked themselves what the security status
2:05:48was of those subcontractors.
2:05:50So, you know, fast forward, you know, a few years
2:05:55and all of a sudden they start getting faulty components.
2:05:57They start having night vision goggles that don't work.
2:06:00They start having supply chain issues where they have
2:06:02to change their provider.
2:06:04And the army doesn't know that the provider is changing.
2:06:07I mean, this is a strategy.
2:06:09The idea of going through third party systems
2:06:12is identifying the vulnerability in the supply chain.
2:06:16That's a savvy offensive practice
2:06:20for more than just, you know, cyber hackers.
2:06:24- Let me ask you about physical hacking.
2:06:26So I'm now like, I'm a introvert,
2:06:29so I'm a paranoid about all social interaction.
2:06:31But how much truth is there?
Sexpionage
2:06:35It's kind of a funny question.
2:06:37How suspicious should I be when I'm traveling in Ukraine
2:06:40or different parts of the world
2:06:42when an attractive female walks up to me
2:06:44and shows any kind of a attention?
2:06:46(Andrew laughing) Is that like this
2:06:47kind of James Bond spy movie stuff?
2:06:49Or is that kind of stuff used by intelligence agencies?
2:06:54- I don't think it's used. It's absolutely used.
2:06:56It's called sex-spionage.
2:06:59That's the term that we jokingly call it, is sex-spionage.
2:07:02But yeah, the art of attraction, appeal,
2:07:07the manifestation of feelings through sexual manipulation,
2:07:11all of that is super powerful tool.
2:07:14The Chinese use it extremely well.
2:07:15The Russians use it extremely well.
2:07:18In the United States,
2:07:19we actively train our officers not to use it
2:07:23because in the end, it leads to complications
2:07:26in how you professionally run a case.
2:07:28So we train our officers not to use it.
2:07:30However, you can't control what other people think.
2:07:33So if you're an attractive male
2:07:34or an attractive female officer
2:07:36and you're trying to talk to a, you know,
2:07:39an older general who just happens to be gay
2:07:41or happens to be straight
2:07:43and is attracted to you, of course they're gonna be
2:07:45that much more willing to talk to an American
2:07:46who is also attractive.
2:07:48So it's (indistinct).
2:07:49- Well in all definitions,
2:07:51so it could be all elements of charisma.
2:07:56So, you know, attractiveness in a dynamic sense of the word.
2:08:00So it's visual attractiveness.
2:08:02But the smile, the humor, the wit, the flirting,
2:08:05all that kind of stuff that could be used
2:08:09to the art of conversation.
2:08:10- There's also elements of sexuality
2:08:12that people underestimate, right?
2:08:14So physical sexuality,
2:08:16physical attraction is the most obvious one.
2:08:18It's the one that everybody talks about and thinks about.
2:08:20But then there's also sapiosexuality,
2:08:23which is being sexually attracted
2:08:26to thoughts, to intelligence.
2:08:28And then you've got all the various varieties
2:08:32of personal preferences.
2:08:34Some people like people of a certain color skin
2:08:36or they like big noses, they like small noses,
2:08:39they like big butts, they like small butts,
2:08:40they like tall guys, they like bald guys.
2:08:42Whatever it might be, you can't ever predict
2:08:45what someone's preferences, sexual arousal preferences
2:08:49are going to be.
2:08:50So then you end up walking into a situation
2:08:53where then you discover, you know,
2:08:55and just imagine being an unattractive,
2:08:59overweight, married guy.
2:09:01And you're walking into an asset
2:09:03or a target meeting with like a middle aged female
2:09:06who is also not very attractive and also married.
2:09:09But then it turns out that that person is a sapiosexual
2:09:11and gets extremely turned on by intelligent conversation.
2:09:14That's exactly what you're there to do.
2:09:16Your mission is to have intelligent conversation
2:09:20with this person to find out if they have access to secrets.
2:09:22And by virtue of you carrying out your mission,
2:09:24they become extremely aroused and attracted to you.
2:09:26That is a very complicated situation.
2:09:29- It's hard to know who to trust.
2:09:30Like how do you know your wife or how does your wife know
2:09:33that you're not a double agent from Russia?
2:09:37- There's a large element of experience
2:09:41and time that goes into that.
2:09:43She's also trained and I think my wife and I also..
2:09:47- [Lex] So you think, - Yeah, my wife and I also
2:09:49have the benefit of being recruited
2:09:53young and together where...
2:09:56- So over time you can start to figure out things
2:09:58that are very difficult to...
2:10:02So you form the baseline,
2:10:03you start to understand the person,
2:10:05it becomes very difficult to lie.
2:10:06- The most difficult thing in the world is consistency.
2:10:08It's the most difficult thing in the world.
2:10:10Some people say that discipline
2:10:11or self-discipline, what they're really
2:10:13talking about is consistency.
2:10:14When you have someone who performs consistently
2:10:17over long periods of time under various levels of stress,
2:10:20you have high, high confidence that
2:10:22that is the person that you can trust.
2:10:23You can trust again, you can trust them
2:10:26to behave within a certain pattern.
2:10:30You can trust an asshole to be an asshole
2:10:33without trusting the asshole to take care of your kids.
2:10:36So I don't ever wanna mix up the idea
2:10:38of personal trust versus trusting the outcome.
2:10:42You can always trust a person
2:10:44to operate within their pattern of behavior.
2:10:45It just takes time for you
2:10:49to get consistent feedback as to what
2:10:50that baseline is for them
2:10:52- So would form a good model, predictive model of
2:10:55what their behavior's going to be like.
2:10:57- Right and you know, what's fascinating is I think
2:10:59the challenge is building that model quickly.
2:11:03So technology is one of those tools
2:11:05that will be able in the future
2:11:07to very quickly create a model of behavior.
2:11:10Because technology can pull in multiple data points
2:11:13in a very short period of time
2:11:15that the human brain simply can't pull in
2:11:19at the same speed.
2:11:20- Well, that's actually what I did my PhD on.
2:11:22That's what I did at Google,
2:11:23is forming a good representation, unique representation,
2:11:27across the entire world
2:11:29based on the behavior of the person.
2:11:31The specific task there is,
2:11:33so that you don't have to type in the password.
2:11:35The idea was to replace the password.
2:11:38But it also allows you to actually study human behavior
2:11:40and to think, all right, what is the unique
2:11:42representation of a person?
2:11:46'Cause we have very specific patterns
2:11:48and a lot of humans are very similar in those patterns.
2:11:51What are the unique identifiers
2:11:52within those patterns of behavior?
2:11:55And I think that's, from a psychology perspective,
2:11:57a super fascinating question.
2:11:59And from a machine learning perspective, it's something
2:12:01that you can, as the systems get better and better
2:12:03and better, and as we get more
2:12:05and more digital data about each individual,
2:12:09you start to be able to do
2:12:10that kind of thing effectively.
2:12:11- And I mean, when I think of the fact
2:12:13that you could create a dossier on somebody in a matter
2:12:15of 24 or 48 hours, if you could wire them
2:12:19for two days, right?
2:12:21Internet of things style.
2:12:22You put it in their underwear or whatever, right?
2:12:24Some chip that just reads everything.
2:12:26How heavy are they walking? How much time do they sleep?
2:12:28How many times do they open the refrigerator?
2:12:30When they log into their computer, how do they do it?
2:12:32Like which hand do they use when they log in?
2:12:35What's their most common swipe?
2:12:36What's their most visited website?
2:12:38You could collect an enormous amount
2:12:41of normative data in a short period of time
2:12:43where otherwise we're stuck.
2:12:45The way that we do it now, once or twice a week,
2:12:48we go out for a coffee for two hours.
2:12:51And two hours at a time,
2:12:52over the course of six, eight weeks, 12 weeks,
2:12:54you're coming up with a 50% assessment on
2:12:58how you think this person is going to be behave.
2:13:00Just that time savings is immense.
2:13:03- Something you've also spoken about is private intelligence
2:13:06and the power and the reach and the scale
Private intelligence
2:13:10and the importance of private intelligence
2:13:12versus government intelligence.
2:13:13Can you elaborate on the role of
2:13:15what is private intelligence
2:13:17and what's the role of private intelligence in the scope
2:13:20of all the intelligence that is gathered
2:13:24and used in the United States?
2:13:26- Yeah, absolutely, it's something that
2:13:28so few people know about,
2:13:30and it became a more mainstream topic
2:13:33with the Trump administration
2:13:35because Trump made it no secret that he was going
2:13:38to hire private intelligence organizations
2:13:40to run his intelligence operations and fund them.
2:13:43So that really brought it to the mainstream.
2:13:45But going all the way back to 9/11,
2:13:46going all the way back to 2001.
2:13:49When the 9/11 attacks happened, there was a commission
2:13:53that was formed to
2:13:57determine the reasons that 9/11 happened.
2:14:00And among the lists that they determined,
2:14:02of course they found out that the intelligence community
2:14:04wasn't coordinating well with each other.
2:14:06There were fiefdoms and there was infighting
2:14:08and there wasn't good intel sharing.
2:14:10But more than that, they identified that we were operating
2:14:14at Cold War levels,
2:14:16even though we were living in a time when terrorism
2:14:19was the new biggest threat to national security.
2:14:22So the big recommendation coming outta the 9/11 commission
2:14:25was that the intelligence organizations,
2:14:27the intelligence community significantly increased
2:14:30the presence of intelligence operators overseas
2:14:33and in terms of analytical capacity
2:14:36here in the United States.
2:14:38When they made that decision, it completely destroyed,
2:14:42it totally was incongruent with the existing hiring process
2:14:46because the existing hiring process for CIA
2:14:48or NSA is a six to nine month process.
2:14:51The only way they could plus up their sizes fast enough
2:14:55was to bypass their own hiring
2:14:57and instead go direct to private organizations.
2:15:00So naturally the government contracted with the companies
2:15:04that they already had secure contracts with, Boeing,
2:15:08Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Khaki, you know, you name it.
2:15:12And then over time, from 2001 to now,
2:15:15or I guess that started really in 2004,
2:15:17when they started significantly increasing
2:15:19the presence of private intelligence officers.
2:15:23From then until now,
2:15:24it's become a budgetary thing.
2:15:27It's become a continuity of operations thing.
2:15:30And now the reason Northern Virginia
2:15:33has become one of the wealthiest zip codes in America is
2:15:37because of the incredible concentration
2:15:40of private intelligence that is supporting
2:15:42CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI, and all the slew of IC partners.
2:15:46- By the way, does Palantir play a role in this?
2:15:49- Palantir is one of those organizations that was trying
2:15:53to pitch their product to an intelligence community
2:15:56because it's a fantastic product on paper.
2:16:01But the challenge was the proprietary services,
2:16:05the proprietary systems
2:16:07that we used in CIA prior to Palantir,
2:16:10continued to outperform Palantir.
2:16:13So just like any other business decision,
2:16:16if you've got homegrown systems
2:16:18that outperform external systems
2:16:20and it's not worth it to share the internal information.
2:16:23- Got it, so the close connection
2:16:28between Peter Thiel and Donald Trump,
2:16:31did that have a role to play
2:16:36in Donald Trump's leveraging of private intelligence?
2:16:38Or is that completely disjoint?
2:16:40- I think that they're related, but only circumstantially
2:16:45because remember Donald Trump wasn't really investing
2:16:47in CIA, so the last thing he wanted to do was spend
2:16:53his network wasta.
2:16:54Wasta is a term that we call influence.
2:16:56It's an Arabic term for influence.
2:16:58Trump didn't want to use his wasta putting Thiel into CIA
2:17:02only to lose Thiel's contract as soon as Trump left office.
2:17:04So instead, it was more valuable to put Peter Thiel's tool
2:17:08to use in private intelligence.
2:17:09And then of course, I think he nominated Peter Thiel
2:17:11to be his Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State.
2:17:15At some point in time, he tried to like
2:17:17presidentially appoint Peter Thiel into a position
2:17:21of government authority.
2:17:23- What do you think of figures like Peter Thiel?
2:17:29And I'm sure there's figures of similar scale
2:17:33and reach and power in private intelligence.
2:17:37What do you think about their role
2:17:39and power in this whole,
2:17:41like without public accountability
2:17:44that you would think directors of CIA perhaps have?
2:17:47- So this is where private intelligence
2:17:49has both a strength and a weakness.
2:17:53The ultimate law overriding
2:17:56that's overseeing private intelligence
2:17:59is not government legislation.
2:18:03It's the law of economics.
2:18:05If they produce a superior product,
2:18:07then they will have a buyer.
2:18:09If they do not produce a superior product,
2:18:11they will not have a buyer.
2:18:13And that's a very simple business principle.
2:18:16Whereas in the current national security infrastructure,
2:18:20you can create a crap product,
2:18:22but the taxpayer dollars are always going to be spent.
2:18:25So it's really thrown things for a loop,
2:18:28especially during the Trump administration.
2:18:29And this is one of the things that I will always say I liked
2:18:32about the Trump administration.
2:18:35It put a big blazing bright light on all
2:18:39of the flaws within our system.
2:18:41One of those flaws being this executive power
2:18:45over the intelligence organizations
2:18:47and the lack of accountability
2:18:50for intelligence organizations
2:18:51to produce a superior product.
2:18:54When that light got shown down,
2:18:59that's when you also saw Trump start to go after.
2:19:01If you remember, there was a period
2:19:02where he was taking security clearances away
2:19:04from retiring officers.
2:19:06That became a big, hot issue.
2:19:08That became something that people were very opposed to
2:19:11when they didn't realize that that process
2:19:14of taking security clearances away,
2:19:17that incentivized seasoned senior officers
2:19:19to stay in service.
2:19:21Because with private intelligence paying a premium
2:19:24during the Trump administration,
2:19:25because Trump was paying a premium
2:19:26to the private intelligence world.
2:19:30When senior officers found that it was more profitable
2:19:33to retire early, keep their clearance
2:19:35and go work for Raytheon, Trump saw that
2:19:38as bypassing service to the American people.
2:19:41You've made a career in CIA, you've made a career in NSA,
2:19:44you should stay there.
2:19:44If you leave, you lose your clearance
2:19:46because you no longer have a need to know.
2:19:49He upset the apple cart with that.
2:19:51And unfortunately, the narrative that came out in many ways
2:19:54was a negative narrative against Trump,
2:19:56when in fact he was actually doing quite a service
2:20:00to the American people trying to take away the incentive
2:20:04of senior officials leaving their service in order
2:20:08to just profiteer in the private intelligence world.
2:20:10- So in that way, he was kind of supporting the CIA
2:20:16in making sure that competent people
2:20:19and experience people stay and say are incentivized
2:20:23to stay there.
2:20:24- Correct, I think that there was definitely,
2:20:27he understood incentives.
2:20:29I mean, Donald Trump understands incentives.
2:20:32So he was trying to incentivize them to stay,
2:20:34but I think he was also playing a safety card
2:20:36because he didn't want former CIA officials
2:20:40who were not listening to him
2:20:42to then move into private intel organizations
2:20:44that he may be hiring only
2:20:46to then have them undermine him from both sides
2:20:48of the coin.
2:20:49So there was a little bit of offensive calculation
2:20:53in there as well.
2:20:54- But do the dynamics
2:20:55and the incentives of economics that you refer to,
2:20:57that the private intelligence operates under,
2:21:00is that more or less ethical than the forces
2:21:03that maybe government agencies operate under?
2:21:07Like what's your intuition? Is capitalism lead?
2:21:11So you mentioned it leads to maximizations of efficiency
2:21:15and performance, but is that correlated with
2:21:19ethical behavior when we're talking about
2:21:22such hairy activities like collection of intelligence?
2:21:26- The question of ethics is a great question.
2:21:27So let me start this whole thing out by saying,
2:21:31CIA hires people on a spectrum
2:21:36of our ability to be morally flexible, ethically flexible.
2:21:41All people at their heart are ethically flexible.
2:21:45I would never punch somebody in the face. Right?
2:21:48Some people out there would say,
2:21:48"I would never hurt another human being."
2:21:51But as soon as a human being posed a direct threat
2:21:53to their daughter or their son
2:21:55or their mother, now all of a sudden they're gonna change
2:21:58their ethical stance in self-defense. Right?
2:22:01But at the end of the day, it's still
2:22:03hurting another person.
2:22:05So what CIA looks for is people who are able to swing across
2:22:09that spectrum for lesser offenses.
2:22:15More flexibility, I do not believe that private intelligence
2:22:21and the laws of economics lend themselves
2:22:24to increased ethics
2:22:26or increased ethical behavior in the short term.
2:22:30But what ends up happening is that in the long term,
2:22:34in order to scale economic benefits, you are forced
2:22:38to act within norms of your customer base.
2:22:43So as the norms of that customer base
2:22:45dictates certain requirements,
2:22:48the company has to adapt to those requirements
2:22:50in order to continue to scale.
2:22:52So if a company tries to ostracize
2:22:57LGBTQ, or if they try to ostracize men
2:23:01or ostracized women, they're limiting their ability
2:23:03to grow economically.
2:23:05They have to adapt
2:23:07to whatever is the prevailing ethical requirement
2:23:10of their customer base.
2:23:12- That's such an interesting question
2:23:13'cause you look at big pharma and pharmaceutical companies
2:23:17and they have a quite a poor reputation in the public eye.
2:23:23And some of it, maybe much of it is deserved,
2:23:27at least historically speaking.
2:23:29And so you start to wonder, well, can intelligence agencies
2:23:34use some of the same technique to manipulate the public,
2:23:40like what they believe about those agencies in order
2:23:43to maximize profit as well, sort of finding shortcuts
2:23:46or unethical paths that allow you
2:23:51to not be ultimately
2:23:53responsible to the customer.
2:23:55- Absolutely and I would go a step further to say that
2:23:58the covert nature of intelligence operations
2:24:03is really attractive when it comes to the private sector
2:24:07because now they have all the same money with
2:24:10none of the oversight, and all they have to do is deliver.
2:24:14So without the oversight, what's holding you back?
2:24:18And for anybody who's ever run a business,
2:24:21anybody who's ever started a startup
2:24:22or tried to make something succeed,
2:24:24we all know that there come those times where you have
2:24:27to skirt the boundaries of proprietary
2:24:33or morality or commitments or promises to other people.
2:24:36Because at the end of the day,
2:24:38if your business fails, it's on you.
2:24:41So if you promise to deliver something to a client,
2:24:45you've gotta deliver it to the client.
2:24:46Even if that means you stay up late
2:24:48or if you lie on your taxes, whatever it might be,
2:24:51there's a certain level of do or die.
2:24:53- Yeah, I personally have a sort of optimistic view
2:24:56that ultimately the best way is
2:24:59to stay within the ethical bounds,
2:25:01kind of like what you suggested, if you want to be a company
2:25:04that's extremely successful, is win with competence,
2:25:08not with cheating.
2:25:09'Cause cheating won't, I believe, win in the long term.
2:25:15But in terms of being publicly responsible
2:25:21to your decisions,
2:25:22I mean, I've already been supposed to talk
2:25:25to Peter Thiel twice on this podcast,
2:25:27and it's just been complicated.
2:25:28(Andrew laughing)
2:25:29If I were to put myself into his shoes,
2:25:33why do podcasts?
2:25:36The risk is too high to be a public person at all.
2:25:40And so I totally understand that.
2:25:41At the same time, I think if you are doing things
2:25:47by the book and you're the best
2:25:51in the world at your job,
2:25:55then you have nothing to worry about.
2:25:56And you can advertise that
2:25:57and you help recruit.
2:25:59I mean, that's the work of capitalism
2:26:02is you want to advertise that this is the place
2:26:07where the best people in the world at this thing work.
2:26:10- True. I think that your point of view is accurate.
2:26:14I would also say that
2:26:18the complexities of what makes somebody make a decision
2:26:22can only really be properly calculated with a baseline.
2:26:26So because there is no baseline
2:26:27that you or I have on Peter Thiel,
2:26:29it's difficult to really ascertain
2:26:31why he does or doesn't accept invites
2:26:34or why he does or doesn't appear.
NSA and Snowden
2:26:35- Well, let me ask your opinion on the NSA
2:26:41and then maybe we could mention about bulk collection
2:26:45in general in the CIA,
2:26:46but, you know, let's look at some history
2:26:49with the NSA and Snowden.
2:26:51What's your opinion on the mass surveillance
2:26:55that is reported to have been conducted
2:27:00by the NSA?
2:27:02We talked about ethics.
2:27:04Are you troubled from of a public perception,
2:27:11the unethical nature
2:27:13of mass surveillance of especially American citizens?
2:27:18- This is a topic that I never get tired of talking about,
2:27:21but it's very rare that anyone ever really agrees with me.
2:27:25Just so you know.
2:27:26(both laughing)
2:27:29- I think there's a nuance thing here.
2:27:31Maybe we'll find some agreement.
2:27:32- The truth is that the American experience
2:27:36after 9/11 is nothing like the American experience now.
2:27:40So all the terminology, all this talk about privacy
2:27:45and privacy laws and mass surveillance
2:27:47and all this other stuff, it was a completely
2:27:49different time then.
2:27:50And that's not to say it was an excuse,
2:27:52because to this day, I will still say mass collection,
2:27:57bulk collection of data that allows
2:28:00for an expedient identification of a threat
2:28:02to national security benefits all of us.
2:28:06But people don't understand what they want.
2:28:09Like people don't understand what the value
2:28:11of their own privacy is.
2:28:13First of all, the fact that people think
2:28:14they have personal privacy is laughable.
2:28:17You have no privacy.
2:28:19The cell phone that you carry in your pocket,
2:28:20you're giving permission to those apps constantly.
2:28:22You're giving commercial organizations, what you and I
2:28:24have already said are less tied
2:28:27to ethical responsibility.
2:28:28You're giving them permission to collect enormous amounts
2:28:31of private data from you all the time.
2:28:34And do you know what happens if AT&T or Verizon sees
2:28:39some nefarious activity on your account?
2:28:40They do nothing.
2:28:42They might send a note to FBI
2:28:44because they have to according to some checklist.
2:28:47But when NSA was collecting intelligence on metadata
2:28:50from around the United States, they were very specifically
2:28:53looking for terrorist threats
2:28:55that would harm American lives.
2:28:58Man, NSA can clone my phone.
2:29:00I will give them my children's phone.
2:29:02I will give them the passwords to every one of my accounts
2:29:04if it means that there's a likelihood
2:29:07that my family will be safer from a nefarious actor
2:29:10whose intent on hurting us.
2:29:13NSA doesn't care about your affair.
2:29:15NSA doesn't care if you're cheating on your taxes.
2:29:17NSA doesn't care if you talk about shit your boss
2:29:20or if you hate the US President, nobody cares about that.
2:29:24Your intelligence community is there to find threats
2:29:28to national security.
2:29:29That's what they're there to do.
2:29:31What Snowden did when he outed that whole program,
2:29:36the fact that the court, the justice system,
2:29:39the civilian justice system went back
2:29:41and essentially overruled the ruling
2:29:44of the intelligence courts before them, just goes to show
2:29:48how the general mass community really shouldn't have a say
2:29:53in what happens in the intelligence community.
2:29:55They really shouldn't.
2:29:56You have politicians and you have the opportunity
2:30:00to elect people to a position and then you trust them.
2:30:03That's what a representative republic is.
2:30:05You vote the people in, you trust them
2:30:08to work on your behalf.
2:30:09They make decisions without running 'em by you.
2:30:11They make decisions that they believe
2:30:14are in the best interest of their constituency.
2:30:16And that's how our form of democracy works.
2:30:21It worked. We were safer.
2:30:23Now that we don't have that information
2:30:25and now that there's this giant looming question of whether
2:30:27or not NSA is there to serve people
2:30:28or is collecting mass surveillance
2:30:31against all American people,
2:30:33that's not really a true accurate representation
2:30:35of what they were ever doing.
2:30:36They were looking for the needle in a haystack
2:30:40of the series of transactions in metadata that was going
2:30:43to lead to American deaths.
2:30:45We are now less secure because they can't do that.
2:30:49And that bothers me.
2:30:50- So you said a few really interesting things there.
2:30:53So because you are kind of an insider, at war for a time,
2:30:57an insider, meaning you were able
2:30:59to build up an intuition about the good, the bad,
2:31:02and the ugly of these institutions, specifically the good.
2:31:07A lot of people don't have a good sense of the good.
2:31:09They know the bad and the ugly
2:31:11or can infer the bad and the ugly.
2:31:14You mentioned that the one little key little thing there
2:31:18at the end saying the NSA doesn't care
2:31:22about whether you hate the president or not.
2:31:25Now that's what people really worry about,
2:31:28is they're not sure they can trust the government
2:31:32to not go into full dictatorial mode.
2:31:36And based on your political preference, your oppositions,
2:31:40your basically one of the essential powers
2:31:45the freedom of speech in the United States
2:31:47is the ability to criticize your government.
2:31:50And they worry well,
2:31:54can't the government get ahold of the NSA
2:31:57and start to ask the basic question,
2:31:59well, can you gimme a list of people
2:32:02that are criticizing the government?
2:32:04- So let's just walk through
2:32:05that exact example, right?
2:32:06Because it's a preponderance.
2:32:08It's a preponderance fear.
2:32:10It's a ridiculous fear
2:32:12because you would have to tap on multiple elements
2:32:15of government for anything to happen.
2:32:16So for example, let's just say that somebody goes to the NSA
2:32:20and says, "Hey, can you give us a readout on all the people
2:32:23who are tweeting terrible things about the president?"
2:32:26Okay, cool, here's your a hundred million people,
2:32:28whatever it is, right?
2:32:30Here's all the people saying negative things
2:32:31about the government.
2:32:32So now they have a list. What do they do next?
2:32:35Well, let's just make it simple.
2:32:37They stay with NSA and they say, "Surveil them even more.
2:32:40Tap their phones, tap their computers.
2:32:42I wanna know even more."
2:32:43So then they get this preponderance of evidence.
2:32:46What do you do with evidence? You take it to a court.
2:32:49Well, guess what?
2:32:50No court is going to support anything
2:32:53that goes against the freedom of speech.
2:32:56So the court is not going to support
2:32:58what the executive is asking them to do.
2:33:01Even before you take somebody to court,
2:33:03you have to involve law enforcement.
2:33:05Essentially you have to send some sort of police force
2:33:08to go apprehend the individual who's in question.
2:33:11Well, guess what doesn't meet criteria
2:33:13for any police force anywhere in the United States?
2:33:16Arresting people who say negative things
2:33:20about the president.
2:33:21Now, if somebody poses a threat to the life
2:33:25of a public figure or the threat to life of a politician,
2:33:27that's a completely different case.
2:33:29Which means the standards of evidence are much higher
2:33:31for them to arrest that person.
2:33:32So unless you create a secret police force,
2:33:36then your actual public police force
2:33:37is never gonna take action.
2:33:39So all these people who are afraid of
2:33:41this exact situation that you're outlying,
2:33:43they need the creation of a secret police force.
2:33:46The creation of a secret court that operates
2:33:48outside the judicial system, the creation
2:33:50of a secret intelligence service that operates outside
2:33:53of foreign intelligence collection.
2:33:54All so that a handful of people who don't like the president
2:33:59get what whisked away, assassinated, put in prison,
2:34:02who knows what.
2:34:04Think about the resources, the amount of money and time
2:34:08and how hard would it be to keep that secret,
2:34:10to have all of those things in motion.
2:34:13The reason it worked in Russia and Soviet, Germany
2:34:15or Russia and Communist Germany was
2:34:17because everybody knew there was a secret police.
2:34:21Everybody knew that like, that there was a threat to work
2:34:24to speaking out against the government.
2:34:25It's completely different here.
2:34:26- Well, so there's a lot to say.
2:34:28So one is yes, if I was a dictator and I wanted to,
2:34:33and just looking at history,
2:34:36let me take myself out of it.
2:34:38But I think one of the more effective ways
2:34:41is you don't need the surveillance.
2:34:43You can pick out a random person
2:34:45and in a public display, semi-public display,
2:34:50you know, basically put 'em in jail
2:34:52for opposing the government, whether they oppose it or not.
2:34:56And the fear that sends a message to a lot of people.
2:34:59- That's exactly what you see happening in China.
2:35:02What you just laid out. It's genius.
2:35:04And that is the standard bottle.
2:35:06- You don't need the surveillance for that.
2:35:09But that said, if you did do the surveillance,
2:35:13so that's the support,
2:35:15the sort of the incentives aren't aligned.
2:35:17It seems like a lot of work to do
2:35:18for the thing you could do without the surveillance.
2:35:21But you know, yes, the courts wouldn't,
2:35:26if you were to be able to get a list of people,
2:35:29which I think that part you could do.
2:35:33That opposed the government, you could do that
2:35:35just like you said on Twitter publicly,
2:35:36you could make a list.
2:35:38And with that you can start to,
2:35:41especially if you have a lot of data on those people
2:35:43find ways in which they did violate the law.
2:35:46Not because they opposed the government,
2:35:48but because in some other way the parking tickets
2:35:51or didn't pay the taxes.
2:35:53That's probably a common one.
2:35:55Or like screwed up something about the taxes.
2:35:57I just happen to know Russia and Ukraine,
2:36:00they're very good at this kind of stuff.
2:36:03Knowing we how the citizens screwed everything up.
2:36:06Because especially in those countries,
2:36:08everybody's breaking the law
2:36:11because in a corrupt nation,
2:36:13you have to bend the law to operate.
2:36:15Like the number of people that pay taxes fully
2:36:18in those nations is just very low, if not zero.
2:36:22And so they then use that breaking of the law to come up
2:36:27with an excuse to actually put you in jail based on that.
2:36:31So it is possible to imagine.
2:36:33But yes, I think
2:36:37that's the ugly part of surveillance.
2:36:39But I do think, just like you said,
2:36:41the incentives aren't correct.
2:36:43Like you really don't need to get all of the secret police
2:36:47and all of these kinds of organizations working.
2:36:49If you do have a charismatic, powerful leader
2:36:53that built up a network that's able to control
2:36:55a lot of organizations to a level of authoritarianism
2:37:00in a government,
2:37:01they're just able to do the usual thing.
2:37:03One, have propaganda machine to tell narratives.
2:37:06Two, pick out, you know, people that they can put in jail
2:37:10for opposing the state
2:37:12and maybe loud members of the press
2:37:15start silencing the press.
2:37:17There's a playbook to this thing,
2:37:19and that doesn't require the surveillance.
2:37:21The surveillance, you know, what is useful
2:37:24for the surveillance is the thing you mentioned in China,
2:37:27which is encourage everybody
2:37:32in the citizenry to watch each other to say there's enemies
2:37:36of the state everywhere.
2:37:38And then you start having children reporting
2:37:40on their parents and that kind of stuff.
2:37:42Again, don't need a surveillance state for that.
2:37:46Now, the good of a surveillance system,
2:37:49if it's operating within ethical bounds, is that yes,
2:37:53it could protect the populace.
2:37:55So you're saying like the good, given on your understanding
2:37:59of these institutions, the good outweighs the bad?
2:38:03- Absolutely. So lemme give you just a practical example.
2:38:06So people don't realize this,
2:38:07but there's multiple surveillance states that are out there.
2:38:10There are surveillance states
2:38:11that are close allies with the United States.
2:38:13One of those surveillance states
2:38:15is the United Arab Emirates, the UAE.
2:38:18Now I lived in the UAE from 2019 to 2020.
2:38:23Came back on a repatriation flight after Covid broke out.
2:38:27But we were there for a full year.
2:38:28We were residents, we had IDs, we had everything.
2:38:31Now, when you get your national ID in the Emirates,
2:38:35you get a chip and that chip connects you to everything.
2:38:39It connects you to cameras, it connects you
2:38:41to your license plate on your car,
2:38:44to your passport, to your credit card, everything.
2:38:46Everything is intertwined.
2:38:47Everything is interlinked.
2:38:49When you drive, there are no police,
2:38:51there are no police on the roads.
2:38:52Every 50 to 100 meters you cross a camera
2:38:56that reads your license plate,
2:38:58measures your speed,
2:38:59and if you're breaking the speed limit,
2:39:00it just immediately charges your credit card
2:39:02because it's all tied together, totally surveillance.
2:39:05That technology was invented
2:39:07by the Israelis who use it in Israel.
2:39:13When I was in Abu Dhabi,
2:39:14and I was rear-ended at high speed by what turned out
2:39:17to be an Emirati official,
2:39:19a senior ranking official of one of the Emirates.
2:39:23It was caught on camera.
2:39:25His ID was registered, my ID was registered,
2:39:27everything was tied back to our IDs.
2:39:28The proof and the evidence was crystal clear.
2:39:31Even still, he was Emirati. I was not.
2:39:34So when I went to the police station to file the complaints,
2:39:37it was something that nobody was comfortable with
2:39:39because generally speaking,
2:39:41Emiratis don't accept legal claims
2:39:45against their own from foreigners.
2:39:46But the difference was that I was an American
2:39:48and I was there on a contract
2:39:50supporting the Emirati government.
2:39:51So I had these different variances, right?
2:39:54Long story short, in the end, the surveillance states
2:39:59is what made sure that justice was played
2:40:01because the proof was incontrovertible.
2:40:07There was so much evidence collected
2:40:09because of the surveillance nature of their state.
2:40:11Now why do they have a surveillance state?
2:40:12It's not for people like me.
2:40:14It's because they're constantly afraid
2:40:16of extremist terrorist activity happening
2:40:19inside Abu Dhabi or inside the UAE
2:40:22because they're under constant threat from Islam
2:40:25or from extremists.
2:40:27And they're under constant threat from Iran.
2:40:28So that's what drives the people to want a police state
2:40:32to want a surveillance state.
2:40:33For them, their survival is paramount
2:40:36and they need the surveillance to have that survival.
2:40:38For us, we haven't tasted that level of desperation
2:40:42and fear yet, or hopefully never.
2:40:45But that's what makes us feel like there's something
2:40:46wrong with surveillance.
2:40:49Surveillance is all about the purpose.
2:40:50It's all about the intent.
2:40:52- Well, and like you said,
2:40:54companies do a significant amount of surveillance
2:40:56to provide us with services that we take for granted.
2:41:00For example, just one of the things to give props
2:41:04to the digital efforts
2:41:06of the Zelensky administration in Ukraine,
2:41:08I don't know if you're aware,
2:41:09but they have this digital transformation efforts
2:41:12where you could put, like,
2:41:18it's laughable to say in the United States,
2:41:20but they actually did a really good job
2:41:22of having a government app that has your passport on it.
2:41:25It's all the digital information you can get a doctor.
2:41:28It's like everything
2:41:30that you would think America would be doing, you know,
2:41:33like license, like all that kind of stuff.
2:41:35It's in an app, you could pay each other.
2:41:37There's payment to each other, and that's all coming.
2:41:41I mean, there's probably contractors somehow connected
2:41:43to the whole thing,
2:41:44but that's like under the flag of government.
2:41:46And so that's an incredible technology.
2:41:49And I didn't, I guess,
2:41:50hear anybody talk about surveillance in that context,
2:41:53even though it is.
2:41:55But they all love it and it's super easy.
2:41:57And frankly already, it's so easy and convenient
2:42:00they've already taken for granted that
2:42:02of course, this is what you do.
2:42:04Of course your passport is on your phone.
2:42:06- Yep, for everybody to have,
2:42:08housed in a server that you have no idea where it's at.
2:42:11That could be hacked at any time by a third party.
2:42:13- They don't ask these kinds of questions
2:42:14because it's so convenient.
2:42:16As we do for Google,
2:42:20Facebook, Twitter, Apple,
2:42:23Microsoft products we use.
2:42:27- Security and convenience are on two opposite sides
2:42:29of another spectrum.
2:42:30The more convenient something is, the less secure.
2:42:33And the more secure something is the less convenient.
2:42:36And that's a battle that
2:42:38we're always working with as individuals
2:42:40and then we're trying to outsource
2:42:42that battle to our politicians.
2:42:43And our politicians are frankly just more
2:42:44interested in being politicians.
2:42:46- Yeah, that said, I mean, people are really worried about
2:42:50giving any one institution a large amount of power,
2:42:54especially when it's a federal government institution
2:43:00given some history.
2:43:02First of all, just history of the corruption,
2:43:05of power corrupting individuals and institutions.
2:43:08And second of all, myth or reality
2:43:13of certain institutions like the CIA misbehaving.
2:43:17Well, let me actually ask you about the Edward Snowden.
2:43:20So outside of the utility that you're arguing
2:43:25for of the NSA surveillance program,
2:43:29do you think Edward Snowden is a criminal or a hero?
2:43:34- In terms in the eyes of the law?
2:43:36He's a criminal. He broke the law.
2:43:40He broke the confidence.
2:43:42He was under security obligation.
2:43:43And then when he ran away, he ran away to all
2:43:45of the worst villains in the world from the US perspective
2:43:50to basically seek protection.
2:43:55How you act in the face of accusation
2:43:59is in essence part of the case
2:44:01that you build for yourself.
2:44:03So running away to China, Russia, Cuba,
2:44:07there was a Latin Ecuador I think,
2:44:09that just paints a very negative picture
2:44:11that does not suggest that you were doing anything
2:44:13that was ethical and upright
2:44:14and in favor of the American people
2:44:16if you're gonna run to American enemies to support yourself.
2:44:19So for sure in the eyes of law, he's a criminal.
2:44:22In the eyes of a group of people
2:44:26who are largely ignorant to what they lost.
2:44:30To them, he's a hero.
2:44:32To me, he's just kind of a sad case.
2:44:35I personally look at Snowden as a sad, unfortunate case.
2:44:41His life is ruined. His family name is tarnished.
2:44:46He's forever going to be a desperate pawn.
2:44:51And that's all because of the decisions that he made
2:44:54and the order that he made them.
2:44:55- I'm not sure his name is tarnished.
2:44:57I think the case you're making is a difficult case to make.
2:45:01And so I think his name represents
2:45:04fighting one man.
2:45:08It's like Tiananmen Square standing before the tank.
2:45:11Is like one man fighting the government.
2:45:15And I think that there is some aspect to which taking
2:45:19that case aside, that is the American spirit,
2:45:24which is hold the powerful accountable.
2:45:28So whenever there's somebody in power,
2:45:31one individual can change can...
2:45:38- One man can make a difference.
2:45:39- [Lex] Can make a difference.
2:45:40- It's very "Night Rider" of you.
2:45:41(Andrew laughing) - It's powerful.
2:45:42Well, I mean that's the American individualism.
2:45:45And so he represents that.
2:45:46And I think there's a huge skepticism
2:45:49against large federal institutions.
2:45:53And I think if you look at the long arc of history,
2:45:56that actually is a forcing function for the institutions
2:45:59to behave their best.
2:46:02So basically hold them accountable.
2:46:08- What's nice about this is that we can agree to disagree
2:46:11and history will be the one that decides.
2:46:14But like there's a reason
2:46:17that Edward Snowden needs to do something new
2:46:20every 16 or 18 months to remain relevant.
2:46:25Because if he didn't, he would just be forgotten.
2:46:28Because he was not a maverick
2:46:30who changed history for the better.
2:46:32He was a man who broke a law and now he's on the run.
2:46:37And to some people, he is a hero.
2:46:41To other people, he's a criminal.
2:46:42But to the vast majority, he's just a blip on a radar
2:46:47of their everyday life that really
2:46:48makes no difference to them at all.
2:46:50- So actually let's linger on that.
2:46:52So just to clarify,
2:46:56are you making the difficult case
2:46:57that the NSA mass surveillance program was one, ethical
2:47:02and two, made a better world for Americans?
2:47:05- I am making the case that at the time it was exactly
2:47:09what we needed to feel safe in our own homes.
2:47:13- But what about to be safe, actually be safe?
2:47:16- So this is what's difficult
2:47:17because any proof that they collected
2:47:20that actually prevented an attack from happening
2:47:23is proof we'll never know about.
2:47:24This is the really unfortunate side
2:47:27of intelligence operations,
2:47:28and I've been at the front end of this.
2:47:30You work your ass off, you take personal risk,
2:47:33you make personal sacrifice to make sure
2:47:35that something terrible doesn't happen.
2:47:38Nobody knows that that ever happens.
2:47:40- Does that have to be that way?
2:47:43Does it have to remain secret every time the NSA
2:47:46or the CIA saves the lives of Americans?
2:47:51- It does for two reasons. It has to be secret first.
2:47:54The mythos, the same thing we were talking about
2:47:57with General Petraeus.
2:47:58You can't brag about your victories
2:48:01if you want to let the myth shape itself, you can't do that.
2:48:06The second thing is,
2:48:11once a victory is claimed,
2:48:14the danger comes from letting your enemy know
2:48:17that you claimed the victory.
2:48:19Because they can reverse engineer
2:48:20and they can start to change how they did things.
2:48:24If a terrorist cell tries to execute an operation,
2:48:26the operation fails.
2:48:27From their point of view, they don't know why it failed.
2:48:29They just know that it failed.
2:48:30But then if the US
2:48:31or if the American government comes in
2:48:33and says, "We took apart this amazing attack",
2:48:37now they have more information.
2:48:39The whole power of secrets, like we talked about before,
2:48:41the power of secrets is in knowing
2:48:43that not everybody has them.
2:48:44There's only a shelf life.
2:48:46So take advantage of the shelf life.
2:48:48You get space. So you gotta keep it a secret.
2:48:51There is no tactical advantage from sharing a secret
2:48:56unless you are specifically trying
2:48:59to achieve a certain tactical advantage from sharing
2:49:01that secret, which is what we've seen so much of
2:49:03with US intel sharing with Ukraine.
2:49:05There's a tactical advantage from sharing a secret about
2:49:07Russian military movements or weaknesses in tanks
2:49:10or, you know, supply chain challenges, whatever it might be.
2:49:14- Well, let me argue that there might be an advantage
2:49:16to share information with the American public
2:49:19when a terrorist attack
2:49:24is averted or the lives of Americans are saved.
2:49:28Because what that does...
2:49:30- Is make every American think that they're not that safe.
2:49:34There is no tactical advantage there.
2:49:36- [Lex] You think so? - Absolutely.
2:49:40If the Austin PD started telling you every day about
2:49:45these crazy crimes that they prevented,
2:49:48would that make you feel more safe?
2:49:49It would make you feel like they're doing their job.
2:49:51- Is that obvious to you?
2:49:52Make us feel less safe?
2:49:53'Cause if we see competence that there is
2:49:57extremely competent defenders of this territory,
2:50:01of these people, wouldn't that make us feel more safe or no?
2:50:05- The human nature is not to assign competence.
2:50:08So empirically humans overvalue
2:50:13losses and undervalue gains.
2:50:17That's something that we've seen
2:50:18from finance to betting and beyond.
2:50:21If the Austin Police Department starts telling you
2:50:23about all these heinous crimes that were avoided
2:50:26because of their hard work,
2:50:29the way that your brain is actually going to process
2:50:31that information is you are going to say,
2:50:33if this is all the stuff that they've stopped,
2:50:36how bad must this place be?
2:50:39How much more haven't they stopped?
2:50:41- I take your point.
2:50:43It's a powerful psychological point,
2:50:45but I, looking at the other picture of it,
2:50:49looking at the police force, looking at the CIA, the NSA,
2:50:53those people and now with the police,
2:50:58there's such a negative feeling
2:51:00amongst Americans towards these institutions.
2:51:03Who the hell wants to work for the CIA now
2:51:06and the police force?
2:51:07Like you're gonna be criticized.
2:51:12Like that's really bad for the CIA.
2:51:17- [Andrew] It's terrible.
2:51:18- Like, as opposed to being seen as a hero.
2:51:20Like for example, currently soldiers are
2:51:24for the most part seen as heroes
2:51:25that are protecting this nation.
2:51:30That's not the case for the CIA
2:51:32- Soldiers weren't seen as heroes in the Vietnam War.
2:51:36You've gotta remember that when you, so first of all,
2:51:40public service is a sacrifice.
2:51:43We oftentimes forget that.
2:51:45We start to think, oh, government jobs are cushy
2:51:47and they're easy.
2:51:48And it must be so easy to be the president
2:51:49'cause then you're basically a celebrity overnight.
2:51:53Public service is a sacrifice.
2:51:55It's a grind.
2:51:57For all of the soldiers, the submariners, the missiles,
2:52:03the police officers, intelligence specialists,
2:52:06they all know what it's like to give things up
2:52:09to serve a public that can turn its opinion
2:52:12at any given time.
2:52:14And history is what defines it.
2:52:16The more important thing is to understand
2:52:18that if you want a true open and fair democracy,
2:52:22you cannot control a narrative
2:52:25and starting to share all of your victories
2:52:27or starting to share your biggest victories
2:52:29with the intent of shaping public opinion,
2:52:31to be supportive of the police force or supportive of CIA
2:52:35or supportive of you name it, is shaping a narrative
2:52:39that is intentional, operational use of influence
2:52:43to drive public opinion.
2:52:45That is something nobody wants to get into.
2:52:47It is much more professional to be a silent sentinel,
2:52:50a silent servant, humbly carrying the burden
2:52:54of public service in the United States
2:52:56where we are AU, bear and open democracy.
2:53:00- Why not celebrate (Andrew laughing)
2:53:03the killing of Bin Laden? - [Andrew] We did.
2:53:05- The search, discovery and the capture
2:53:06and the killing of Bin Laden.
2:53:09Actually the details of that,
2:53:10how much of the details of that,
2:53:12how he was discovered were made public?
2:53:15I think some of it was made public enough.
2:53:17Why not do that?
2:53:19Doesn't that make heroes out of the people
2:53:21that are servants?
2:53:24Do people who serve, do service for this nation,
2:53:28do they always have to operate
2:53:30in a thankless manner in the shadows?
2:53:35- I think that's a very good question.
2:53:37The folks who I left behind when I left CIA,
2:53:41who continue to serve as faceless,
2:53:45nameless heroes every day, I am grateful to them.
2:53:51The truth is that if they were motivated
2:53:55by something else, they wouldn't be as good
2:53:57as they are at doing what they do.
2:53:59And I see your point about shouldn't we
2:54:04be celebrating our victories?
2:54:07But when celebrating our victories runs the risk
2:54:09of informing our enemies,
2:54:14how we operate, giving away our informational advantage,
2:54:17giving away our tactical battlefield advantage,
2:54:19and running the risk of shaping a narrative intentionally
2:54:22among our own American people.
2:54:24Now all of a sudden we're turning into exactly the thing
2:54:27that the American people trust us not to become.
2:54:32- Yeah. but then you operate in the secrecy,
Conspiracy theories
2:54:34and then there's corrupt and douchebag people everywhere.
2:54:39So when they, even inside the CIA
2:54:41and criminals inside the CIA,
2:54:43there's criminals in all organizations,
2:54:45in all walks of life.
2:54:47Human nature is such that this is always the case.
2:54:50Then it breeds conspiracy theories.
2:54:53- It does and sometimes those conspiracy theories
2:54:56turn out to be true, but most times they don't.
2:54:59That's just part of the risk of being a myth.
2:55:04- Can you speak to some of the myths? So MKUltra...
2:55:08- Not a myth.
2:55:09- Not a myth, so this is a fascinating human experimentation
2:55:13program undertaken by the CIA to develop procedures
2:55:17for using drugs like LSD to interrogate people through,
2:55:22let's say, psychological manipulation
2:55:24and maybe even torture.
2:55:26The scale of the program is perhaps not known.
2:55:29How do you make sense that this program existed?
2:55:32- Again, you've gotta look through the lens of time.
2:55:33You've gotta look at where we were
2:55:34historically at that time.
2:55:36There was the peak of the Cold War.
2:55:38Our enemies were doing the same kind of experimentation.
2:55:41It was essentially another space race.
2:55:44What if they broke through a new weapon technology
2:55:49faster than we did?
2:55:50What would that mean for the safety
2:55:51and security of the American people?
2:55:54So right decision or wrong decision, it was guided by
2:55:59and informed by national security priorities.
2:56:02So from this program that was designed to use drugs
2:56:06to drive interrogation and torture people,
2:56:08was born something very productive, Operation Stargate,
2:56:12which was a chance to use remote viewing
2:56:15and metaphysics to try to collect intelligence.
2:56:19Now, even though in the end the outcome of MKUltra
2:56:23and the outcome of Stargate were mixed,
2:56:25nobody really knows if they did
2:56:26or didn't do what they were supposed to do.
2:56:28We still know that to this day, there's still a demand
2:56:32in the US government and in CIA for people
2:56:34who have sensitivities to ethereal energies.
2:56:39- By the way, is there any proof
2:56:40that that kind of stuff works?
2:56:43It shows that there's interest,
2:56:46it shows that there's openness
2:56:47to consider those kinds of things.
2:56:49But is there any evidence that that kind of stuff works?
2:56:51- If there's evidence, I haven't seen it.
2:56:54Speaking from a science-based point of view only,
2:56:58if energy and matter can always be exchanged,
2:57:03then a person who can understand
2:57:05and become sensitive to energy is a person who could
2:57:10become sensitive to what does become matter.
2:57:13- Yeah, I mean, the basics of the physics might be there,
2:57:17but a lot of people probably are skeptical.
2:57:20- I'm skeptical too, but I'm just trying to remain...
2:57:21- But you should be open-minded, right?
2:57:23I mean, that's actually, you know,
2:57:26that's what science is about, is remain open-minded,
2:57:28even for the things that are long shots,
2:57:30because those are the things
2:57:31that actually define scientific revolutions.
2:57:34What about Operation Northwoods?
2:57:37It was a proposed 1962 false flag operation
2:57:41by the DOD and the CIA to be carried out by the CIA
2:57:46to commit acts of terrorism on Americans
2:57:50and blame them on Cuba.
2:57:52So JFK, the president rejected the proposal.
2:57:55What do you make that this
2:57:57was on the table, Operation Northwoods.
2:57:59- So it's interesting. First I'm glad that JFK rejected it.
2:58:04That's a good sign.
2:58:05So we have to understand
2:58:07that good ideas are oftentimes born from bad ideas.
2:58:12I had a really good friend of mine who actually went on
2:58:15to become a pastor, and he used to say all the time
2:58:18that he wanted all the bad ideas on the table.
2:58:20Like "Gimme all your bad ideas"
2:58:21every time we had any kind of conversation.
2:58:24And I was always one of those people who was like,
2:58:25isn't a bad idea just a waste of time?
2:58:28And he was like, "No 'cause the best ideas oftentimes
2:58:30come from bad ideas."
2:58:31So again, Cuban Missile Crisis,
2:58:35mass hysteria in the United States about nuclear war
2:58:37from Cuba, missiles blowing up American cities
2:58:40faster than we could even see them coming.
2:58:43It makes sense to me that a president would go to,
2:58:46especially the part of CIA,
2:58:48which is the special activities division.
2:58:51It makes perfect sense to me that a president would go
2:58:53to a division called special activities,
2:58:55whose job it is to create, you know, crazy ideas
2:58:59that have presidential approval,
2:59:02but nobody knows they exist.
2:59:04So it makes sense that he would challenge a group like that
2:59:07to come up with any wacky idea, right?
2:59:09Come up with anything. Just let's start with something.
2:59:11'Cause we can't bring nothing to the table.
2:59:13We have to do something about this Cuban issue.
2:59:15And then that's how an operation like that
2:59:17could reasonably be born.
2:59:19Not because anybody wants to do it,
2:59:20but because they were tasked by the president to come up
2:59:22with five ideas.
2:59:24And it was one of the ideas.
2:59:27That still happens to this day.
2:59:29The president will still come in,
2:59:31but it'll basically send out a notice
2:59:33to his covert action arm and he will say,
2:59:36"I need this and I need it on Wednesday."
2:59:39And people have to come back with options
2:59:41for the thing he asked for, a finding.
2:59:44He will issue a presidential finding,
2:59:46and then his covert action arms have to come back
2:59:48and say, "Here's how we would do this."
2:59:49And hide the hands of the Americans.
2:59:52- How gangster was it of JFK to reject it though?
2:59:55- It was baller, right? (Lex laughing)
2:59:59That is a mic drop right there.
3:00:00Nope, not doing that. Yep, doing that.
3:00:03- You know, a thing that crosses an ethical line,
3:00:07even in a time where the entirety
3:00:11of human civilization hangs in a balance,
3:00:13still forfeit that power.
3:00:17That's a beautiful thing
3:00:18about the American experiment.
3:00:21A few times throughout its history
3:00:22that's has happened, including
3:00:24with our first President George Washington.
3:00:28Well, let me ask about JFK.
3:00:30(Andrew laughing)
3:00:31- 25 times two, and they still keep that stuff classified.
3:00:37- So do you think
3:00:40the CIA had a hand in the assassination of JFK?
3:00:45- I cannot imagine in any reasonable point of view
3:00:50that the organization of CIA had anything to do
3:00:53with the assassination of JFK.
3:00:55- So it's not possible to infiltrate
3:00:59a small part of the CIA in order to attain political
3:01:05or criminal gains or financial?
3:01:10- Yeah, absolutely it's possible to infiltrate CIA,
3:01:14there's a long history of foreign intelligence services
3:01:17infiltrating CIA from Aldrich Ames to Jerry Lee,
3:01:22recently with China.
3:01:23So we know CIA can be infiltrated.
3:01:27Even if they are infiltrated,
3:01:29and even if that's interlocutor executes
3:01:32on their own agenda
3:01:35or the agenda as directed by their foreign adversary,
3:01:39their foreign handler, that's different
3:01:41than organizational support for an event.
3:01:45So I do think it's possible they could have been infiltrated
3:01:48at the time, especially, it was a massive,
3:01:51a major priority for the Cubans and the Russians
3:01:54to infiltrate some aspect of US intelligence.
3:01:58Multiple moles were caught in the years following.
3:02:03So it's not surprising
3:02:05that there would be a priority for that.
3:02:07But to say that the organization of CIA
3:02:09was somehow in cahoots
3:02:12to independently assassinate their own executive,
3:02:15that's a significant stretch.
3:02:16I've seen no evidence to support that.
3:02:18And it goes contrary
3:02:20to everything I learned from my time at CIA.
3:02:24- Well, let me ask you,
3:02:26do you think CIA played a part in enabling drug cartels
3:02:29and drug trafficking, which is another big
3:02:32kind of shadow
3:02:36that hangs over the CIA.
3:02:37- At the beginning of the drug war,
3:02:39I would imagine the answer is yes.
3:02:42CIA has its own counter-narcotics division.
3:02:45A division that's dedicated to fighting
3:02:47and preventing narcotics from coming into the United States.
3:02:51So when you paint a picture for me,
3:02:53like do you think the CIA was complicit
3:02:55in helping drug trafficking or drug use?
3:02:59When I say yes, my exception is I don't think they did that
3:03:03for Americans inside the United States.
3:03:05If the CIA can basically set it up so
3:03:07that two different drug cartels shoot each other
3:03:10by assisting in the transaction
3:03:14of a sale to a third country
3:03:18and then leaking that that sale happened
3:03:20to a competing cartel,
3:03:21that's just letting cartels do what they do.
3:03:23That's them doing the dirty work for us.
3:03:25So, especially at the beginning of the drug war,
3:03:27I think there was tons of space, lots of room for CIA
3:03:30to get involved in the economics of drugs
3:03:33and then let the inevitable happen.
3:03:35And that was way more efficient,
3:03:36way more productive than us trying to send our own troops
3:03:40in to kill a bunch of cartel warlords.
3:03:44So that makes a ton of sense to me.
3:03:45It just seems efficient, it seems very practical.
3:03:47I do not believe that CIA would like,
3:03:49I don't think all the accusations out there
3:03:50about how they would buy drugs and sell drugs
3:03:53and somehow make money on the side from it.
3:03:55That's not how it works.
3:03:56- So do you think, on that point, a connection
3:04:00between Barry Seal, the great governor,
3:04:04and then President Bill Clinton, Oliver North
3:04:06and vice president, former CA director George H.W. Bush
3:04:10in a little town with a little airport
3:04:12called Mena, Arkansas.
3:04:14- So I am outta my element now.
3:04:17This is one I haven't heard many details about.
3:04:20- So your sense is any of the drug trafficking
3:04:26has to do with criminal operations outside the United States
3:04:30and the CIA just leveraging that
3:04:32to achieve its end, but nothing to do with American citizens
3:04:37and American politicians
3:04:39- With American citizens, again, speaking organizationally.
3:04:43So that would be my sense. Yes.
3:04:47- Let me ask you about, so back to Operation Northwoods,
3:04:50because it's such a powerful tool,
3:04:55sadly powerful tool used by dictators throughout history,
3:05:00the false flag operation.
3:05:04So I think there's,
3:05:06and you said the terrorist attacks in 9/11
3:05:12changed a lot for us,
3:05:16for the United States, for Americans.
3:05:18It changed the way we see the world.
3:05:19It woke us up to the harshness of the world.
3:05:22I think there's, to my eyes at least, there's nothing
3:05:26that shows evidence that 9/11 was a quote "inside job."
3:05:30But is the CIA
3:05:34or the intelligence agencies
3:05:37or the US government capable of something like that?
3:05:40(Andrew laughing)
3:05:41I mean, that's the question. - I get it, yeah.
3:05:43- So there's a bunch of shadiness
3:05:46about how was reported on.
3:05:47I just can't, that's the thing I struggle with.
3:05:53While there's no evidence that there was an inside job,
3:05:57it raises the question to me,
3:05:59well, could something like this be an inside job?
3:06:02'cause it's sure as heck, now, looking back 20 years,
3:06:06the amount of money that was spent on these wars,
3:06:09the military industrial complex,
3:06:11the amount of interest in terms of power
3:06:13and money involved,
3:06:17organizationally, can something like that happen?
3:06:22- You know Occam's razor.
3:06:24So the harems razor is that you can never prescribe
3:06:28to conspiracy what could be explained through incompetence.
3:06:34Those are two fundamental guidelines
3:06:37that we follow all the time.
3:06:38The simplest answer is oftentimes the best
3:06:40and never prescribe to conspiracy
3:06:43what can be explained through incompetence.
3:06:45- Can you elaborate what you mean by we? As human beings?
3:06:47- [Andrew] We, as intelligence professionals.
3:06:51- So you think there's a deep truth to that second razor?
3:06:55- There us more than a deep truth.
3:06:58There's ages of experience for me and for others.
3:07:01- So in general, people are incompetent.
3:07:04If left to their own means,
3:07:07they're more incompetent than they are malevolent
3:07:11at a large organizational scale.
3:07:13- People are more incompetent of executing a conspiracy
3:07:18than they are of competently,
3:07:21yeah, than they are of competently executing a conspiracy.
3:07:25That's really what it means, is that it's so difficult
3:07:28to carry out a complex lie
3:07:30that most people don't have the competency to do it.
3:07:33So it doesn't make any sense to lead thinking of conspiracy.
3:07:36It makes more sense to lead assuming incompetence.
3:07:40When you look at all of the outcomes,
3:07:41all the findings from 9/11, it speaks to incompetence,
3:07:45it speaks brashly and openly to incompetence,
3:07:48and nobody likes talking about it.
3:07:51FBI and CIA to this day hate hearing about it.
3:07:53The 9/11 commission is gonna go down in history
3:07:56as this painful example of the incompetence
3:07:58of the American intelligence community.
3:08:01And it's going to come back again and again.
3:08:02Every time there's an intel flap,
3:08:04it's gonna come back again and again.
3:08:06What are you seeing?
3:08:07Even right now, we missed the US intelligence infrastructure
3:08:12misjudged Afghanistan, misjudged Hong Kong,
3:08:16misjudged Ukraine's, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
3:08:20Those were three massive misjudgments in a few years.
3:08:24- It's just embarrassing to the end.
3:08:25- It's just embarrassing. Exactly right.
3:08:28- So all the sort of coverup looking things
3:08:32around 9/11 is just people being embarrassed
3:08:35by their failures.
3:08:36- If they're taking steps to cover anything up,
3:08:39it's just their own.
3:08:41It's a painful reminder of their lack
3:08:44of competency at the time.
3:08:46Now, I understand that conspiracy theorists want
3:08:49to take inklings of information
3:08:51and put them together in a way
3:08:54that is the most damning.
3:08:55But that goes back to our point about overvaluing losses
3:08:59and undervaluing gains.
3:09:00It's just predictable human behavior.
3:09:04- Let me ask you about this, because it comes up often.
3:09:08So I'm from MIT
3:09:09and there's a guy by the name of Jeffrey Epstein
3:09:12that still troubles me to this day.
3:09:15That some of the people I respect were interacted
3:09:19with this individual
3:09:20and fell into his
3:09:25influence, charm, charisma,
3:09:28whatever the hell he used to delude these people.
3:09:34He did so successfully.
3:09:36I'm very open-minded about this thing.
3:09:39I would love to learn more,
3:09:40but a lot of people tell me, a lot of people outta respect
3:09:44that there's intelligence agencies behind this individual.
3:09:47So they were using Jeffrey Epstein for getting access
3:09:52to people and then to control
3:09:55and manipulate those powerful people.
3:09:57The CIA, I believe is not brought up as often as Mossad.
3:10:01And so this goes back to the original aspect
3:10:04of our conversation is
3:10:05how much each individual intelligence agency is willing
3:10:08to go to control, to manipulate,
3:10:11to achieve its means.
3:10:13Do you think there is, can you educate me if
3:10:18obviously you don't know, but you can bet.
3:10:21What are the chances the intelligence agencies are involved
3:10:24with the character of Jeffrey Epstein
3:10:26- In some way, shape or form with the character of Epstein?
3:10:29It's 100% guaranteed. - [Lex] Ah dammit.
3:10:31- That some intelligence organization was involved.
3:10:34But let's talk about why.
3:10:36Let's talk about why, okay?
3:10:38There's multiple types of intelligence assets,
3:10:41just like we were talking earlier.
3:10:43There's foreign intelligence reporting assets,
3:10:47there's access agents, and then there's agents of influence.
3:10:51Three different categories of intelligence, right?
3:10:54One is a, when you talk
3:10:56about foreign intelligence reporters,
3:10:58these are people who have access to secrets
3:10:59and their job is to give you their secrets in exchange
3:11:02for gold or money or alcohol
3:11:03or prostitution or whatever else, right?
3:11:05Their job is to give you secrets
3:11:07and then you pay them for the secrets.
3:11:09Access agents, their job is to give you physical access
3:11:13or digital access to something of interest to you.
3:11:17So maybe they're the ones that open a door
3:11:19that should have been locked and let you come in
3:11:21and stick your thumb drive in the computer.
3:11:23Or maybe they're the ones
3:11:24that share a phone number with somebody
3:11:26and then they're just like,
3:11:27just don't tell 'em you got the phone number from me.
3:11:29Their job is to give you access.
3:11:31Then you have these agents of influence.
3:11:33An agent of influence's job
3:11:35is to be part of your effort
3:11:39to influence the outcomes in some way
3:11:42that benefits your intelligence requirements, right?
3:11:46Of these three types of people,
3:11:48the least scrupulous
3:11:50and the most shady is your agent of influence.
3:11:54Because your agent of influence
3:11:55understands exactly what they're doing.
3:11:57They know they're working with one guy,
3:11:59and they know they're using the influence
3:12:02to manipulate some other guy.
3:12:05When it comes to powerful people,
3:12:07especially wealthy, powerful people,
3:12:10the only thing that interests them is power.
3:12:14Money is not a challenge anymore.
3:12:16Prestige, notoriety, none of those things are a challenge.
3:12:19The rest of us, we're busy trying to make money.
3:12:21We're busy trying to build a reputation.
3:12:23We're busy trying to build a career,
3:12:24keep a family afloat.
3:12:25At the highest levels, they're bored.
3:12:27They don't need any of that.
3:12:28The only thing that they care about is being
3:12:30able to wield power.
3:12:32So a character like Jeffrey Epstein is exactly
3:12:36the kind of character that the Chinese would want,
3:12:39the Russians would want, Mossad would want,
3:12:42the French would want.
3:12:44It's too easy
3:12:45because the man had access to a wide range
3:12:49of American influential people for corporate espionage uses,
3:12:54for economic espionage uses,
3:12:56for national security espionage uses.
3:12:59It doesn't make any sense that a person like that
3:13:02wouldn't be targeted. It doesn't.
3:13:04- So the question is who
3:13:08and whether I think
3:13:13the really important distinction here is,
3:13:16was Jeffrey Epstein created, or once he's achieved
3:13:20and built his network, was he then infiltrated?
3:13:23And that's a really sort of important difference.
3:13:26Like at which stage do you connect a person like that?
3:13:29You start to notice maybe they're effective
3:13:32of building a network
3:13:33and then you start building a relationship
3:13:37to where at some point it's a job, they're working for you.
3:13:41Or do you literally create a person like that?
3:13:43- Yeah, so intelligence organizations
3:13:45have different strategies here.
3:13:47In the United States, we never create,
3:13:49we don't have a budget cycle that allows us to create,
3:13:53I mean, the maximum budget cycle in the United States
3:13:55is five years.
3:13:57So even if we were to try to invest in some seed operation
3:14:00or create some character of influence,
3:14:03essentially every year you have
3:14:05to justify why you're spending budget.
3:14:07And that becomes very difficult in a democracy like ours.
3:14:10However, Russia and China are extremely adept
3:14:13at seed operations, long-term operations.
3:14:17They are willing to invest and develop
3:14:21and create an agent that serves their purposes.
3:14:26Now, to create someone from scratch, like Jeffrey Epstein,
3:14:31the probabilities are extremely low.
3:14:34They would've had to start
3:14:35with like a thousand different targets
3:14:37and try to grow a thousand different, if you will,
3:14:39influencers, and then hope that one of them hits
3:14:42kind of like a venture capital firm, right?
3:14:44Invest in many hope that a few hits.
3:14:47More likely they observed him
3:14:50at some point in his own natural rise.
3:14:53They identified his personal vulnerability,
3:14:55very classic espionage technique.
3:14:57And then they stepped in, introduced themselves mid-career
3:15:01and said, "Hey, we know you have this thing that you like,
3:15:04that it's frowned upon by your own people,
3:15:07but we don't frown upon it, and we can help you both succeed
3:15:10and, you know, have an endless supply
3:15:12of ladies along the way."
3:15:14- I've recently talked to Ryan Graves, who's a lieutenant,
3:15:18Ryan Graves, who's a fighter jet pilot
3:15:24about many things.
3:15:26He also does work on autonomous weapon systems, drones
3:15:30and that kind of thing, and including quantum computing.
3:15:32But he also happens to be one of the very few pilots
3:15:37that were willing to go on record
3:15:38and talk about UFO sightings.
CIA and UFOs
3:15:43Does the CIA
3:15:44and the federal government have interest in UFOs?
3:15:47- In my experience at CIA, that is an area
3:15:51that remains very compartmented.
3:15:54And that could be one of two reasons.
3:15:57It could be because there is significant interest
3:15:59and that's why it's so heavily compartmented.
3:16:02Or it could be because it's an area
3:16:06that's just not important.
3:16:06It's a distraction.
3:16:08So they compartment it so it doesn't distract
3:16:11from other operations.
3:16:13One of the areas that I've been quite interested in
3:16:17and where I've done a lot of research,
3:16:19and I've done some work in the private intelligence
3:16:20and private investigation side, is with UFOs.
3:16:24The place where UFOs really connect
3:16:27with the federal government is when it comes to
3:16:29aviation safety and predominance of power.
3:16:33So FAA and the US Air Force
3:16:36and the US military are very invested in knowing
3:16:38what's happening in the skies above the United States.
3:16:41And that's of primary interest to them.
3:16:43When they can rule out the direct threat
3:16:46to national security of UFOs,
3:16:48then they become less interested.
3:16:50That said, when you have unexplained aerial phenomenon
3:16:54that are unexplained, that can't directly be tied
3:17:00to anything that is known of the terrestrial world,
3:17:04then they're left without an answer to their question.
3:17:07They don't know if it's a threat or not a threat.
3:17:10But I think the scarier concern
3:17:12for the US national government
3:17:13or for the US federal government, the scarier concern
3:17:16that nobody talks about is what if the UFO isn't alien?
3:17:20What if it is actually a cutting edge
3:17:24war machine that we are eons
3:17:27behind ever being able to replicate?
3:17:29- Or the other concern is that it's a system,
3:17:34it's a machine from a foreign power
3:17:36that's doing intelligence collection.
3:17:38- [Andrew] Correct. - So it's not
3:17:39just military purposes, it's actually collecting data.
3:17:43- Well, a lot of times the federal government will see
3:17:46the two as the same.
3:17:47It's a hostile tool from a foreign government.
3:17:49- Oh, so collection of information is a hostile act.
3:17:53- Absolutely. That's why the Espionage Act exists.
3:17:56That's why it's a criminal offense if you're committing
3:17:58espionage in the United States
3:18:00as a US citizen or a foreign citizen.
3:18:03- So I guess they keep digging
3:18:04until they can confirm it's not a threat.
3:18:09And you're saying that there's not,
3:18:10from your understanding much evidence that they're doing,
3:18:12so it could be because they're compartmentalized,
3:18:17but you're saying private intelligence institutions
3:18:21are trying to make progress on this?
3:18:25Yeah, it's really difficult to know the scale.
3:18:29- Yeah, there's an economic interest
3:18:32in the private intelligence world.
3:18:33Because for example,
3:18:35if you understand why certain aerial phenomenon
3:18:37are happening over a location, then you can use that
3:18:41to inform investors whether to invest in that location
3:18:44or avoid investment in that location.
3:18:47But that's not a national security concern.
3:18:48So it doesn't matter to the federal government.
3:18:52- Could these UFOs be aliens?
3:18:54Now I'm going into a territory of you
3:18:56as a human being wondering
3:18:58about all the alien civilizations that are out there.
3:19:02The humbling question.
3:19:03- We are not alone.
3:19:05- [Lex] You think we're not alone?
3:19:07- It's an improbability that we are alone.
3:19:10If by virtue of the fact that sentient human life exists,
3:19:15intelligent human life exists, all the probabilities
3:19:18that would have to be destroyed for that to be true,
3:19:20simply speak over the galaxies that exist
3:19:23that there's no possible way we're alone.
3:19:26It's a mathematical equation. It's a one or a zero.
3:19:30And for me, it has to exist.
3:19:32It's impossible otherwise, rationally for me to think
3:19:35that we are truly the only intelligent life form
3:19:37in all of the universe.
3:19:40But to think that
3:19:42an alien life form is anything like us at all, is equally
3:19:47as inconceivable to think that there are carbon-based,
3:19:51bipedal, humanoid, alien species that just happen
3:19:56to fly around in metal machines
3:19:58and visit alien planets in a way that they become observed,
3:20:04it's just silly.
3:20:05It's the world of sci-fi.
3:20:07- [Lex] Well, let me push...
3:20:08- What does every good scientist...
3:20:09'Cause we always assume
3:20:10that they're superior to us in intelligence.
3:20:13When any scientist carries out an experiment,
3:20:16the whole objective of the experiment is to observe
3:20:19without being disclosed or being discovered.
3:20:23So why on earth would we think
3:20:24that the superior species makes the mistake
3:20:27of being discovered over and over again?
3:20:31- So, to push back on that idea, if we were
3:20:33to think about us humans trying to communicate with ants.
3:20:37First, we observe for a while, there'll be a bunch
3:20:40of PhDs written, a bunch of people just
3:20:43sort of collecting data, taking notes,
3:20:45trying to understand about this thing that you detected
3:20:49that seems to be a living thing,
3:20:51which is a very difficult thing
3:20:52to define from an alien perspective.
3:20:54Or from our perspective,
3:20:55we find life on Mars or something like that.
3:20:57Okay, so you observe for a while,
3:20:59but then if you want to actually interact with it,
3:21:02how would you interact with the ants?
3:21:04If I were to interact with the ants, I would try to
3:21:08infiltrate, I would try to put, like, figure out
3:21:14what is the language they used
3:21:15to communicate with each other.
3:21:17I would try to operate at their physical scale, at like,
3:21:22in terms of the physics of their interaction, in terms
3:21:25of the information methods, mediums of information exchange
3:21:30with pheromones or whatever, however the heck ants.
3:21:33So I would try to mimic them in some way.
3:21:36So in that sense, it makes sense that
3:21:41the objects we would see, you mentioned bipedal.
3:21:44Yes, of course it's ridiculous that aliens
3:21:46would actually be very similar to us,
3:21:50but maybe they create forms in order to be like,
3:21:54here, the humans will understand it.
3:21:58And this needs to be sufficiently different from humans
3:22:00to know that there's something weird.
3:22:02I don't know., I think it's actually an incredibly
3:22:05difficult problem of figuring out how to communicate
3:22:08with a thing way dumber than you.
3:22:11And people assume, like if you're smart,
3:22:14it's easy to talk to the dumb thing.
3:22:16But I think it's actually extremely difficult when the gap
3:22:20in intelligence is just orders of magnitude.
3:22:23And so of course you can observe,
3:22:26but once you notice the thing is sufficiently interesting,
3:22:30how do you communicate with that thing?
3:22:32- So this is where one of the things I always try
3:22:35to highlight is how conspiracies are born.
3:22:38Because many people don't understand how easy it is
3:22:41to fall into the conspiratorial cycle.
3:22:44So the first step to a conspiracy being born is
3:22:47to have a piece of evidence that is true.
3:22:52And then immediately following the true evidence
3:22:55is a gap in information.
3:22:57And then to fill in the gap of information,
3:23:00people create an idea,
3:23:03and then the next logical outcome is based on the idea
3:23:06that they just created,
3:23:08which is an idea that's based on something
3:23:10that was imagined in the first place.
3:23:12So the idea, the factual thing is now two steps away,
3:23:15and then three steps away,
3:23:16four steps away as the things go on.
3:23:18And then all of a sudden you have this kernel of truth
3:23:20that turned into this wild conspiracy.
3:23:23So in our example,
3:23:25you talked about humans trying to communicate with ants.
3:23:27Ants are not intelligent.
3:23:29Ants are not an intelligent species.
3:23:30They're drone species that's somehow commanded
3:23:33through whatever technology, whatever...
3:23:36- Spoken like a typical human, but yes.
3:23:37- Whatever biological thing is in the queen, right?
3:23:40But it's not a fair equivalent.
3:23:42But let's look at gorillas or let's look at something
3:23:43in the monkey family, right?
3:23:45Where largely we agree that there is some
3:23:48sort of intelligence there, or dolphins,
3:23:50some sort of intelligence, right?
3:23:54It is A human thing to want to observe
3:23:59and then communicate and integrate.
3:24:02That's a human thing, not an intelligent life thing.
3:24:06So for us to even think that a foreign
3:24:09and intelligent alien species would want
3:24:11to engage in communicate at all,
3:24:13is an extremely human assumption.
3:24:17And then from that assumption,
3:24:18then we started going into all the other things you said.
3:24:20If they wanted to communicate, wouldn't they wanna mimic.
3:24:23If they wanted to mimic,
3:24:24wouldn't they create devices like ours?
3:24:26So now we're three steps removed from the true fact
3:24:29of there's something unexplainable in the skies.
3:24:34- Yeah, so the fact is there's something unexplainable
3:24:37in the skies, and then we're filling in the gaps
3:24:40with our basic human biases.
3:24:44But the thing is...
3:24:45- Now we're getting right back to project Northwood.
3:24:47We need some plan.
3:24:48I don't care how crazy the idea is, guys, give me some plan.
3:24:51So that's where we come up with,
3:24:53well, maybe it's an alien species trying to communicate
3:24:55or maybe it's an alien, a hostile threat that's trying
3:24:58to take over the world or who knows what, maybe it's...
3:25:01- I mean, but you have to somehow construct hypotheses
3:25:07and theories for anomalies.
3:25:10And then from that
3:25:13amidst giant pile of the ridiculous emerges
3:25:17perhaps a deeper truth
3:25:19over period of decades.
3:25:21And at first that truth is ridiculed
3:25:24and then it's accepted.
3:25:25You know, that whole process.
3:25:29- The earth revolving around the sun.
3:25:30- Yeah, the earth revolving around the sun.
3:25:32But you know, to me it's interesting
3:25:34because it's asks us looking out there with SETI,
3:25:39just looking for alien life is forcing us
3:25:43to really ask questions about ourselves, about what is life,
3:25:46how special, first of all, what is intelligence?
3:25:50How special is intelligence in the cosmos?
3:25:52And I think it's inspiring
3:25:55and challenging to us as human beings,
3:25:57both on a scientific and engineering level,
3:26:00but also on a philosophical level.
3:26:01I mean, all of those questions that are laid
3:26:03before us when you start to think about alien life.
3:26:06- So you interviewed Joe Rogan recently.
3:26:09And he said something that I thought was really,
3:26:12really brilliant during the podcast interview.
3:26:14He said that you...
3:26:16- He's gonna love hearing that.
3:26:17(both laughing)
3:26:17- Well, go ahead, sorry.
3:26:19- But he said that he realized at some point
3:26:22that the turn in his opinion about UFOs happened
3:26:25when he realized how desperately he wanted it to be true.
3:26:30This is the human condition.
3:26:34Our pink matter works the same way
3:26:35as everybody's pink matter.
3:26:36And one of the ways that our pink matter works is
3:26:39with what's known as a cognitive bias.
3:26:41It's a mental shortcut.
3:26:42Essentially, your brain doesn't want to process
3:26:45through facts over and over again.
3:26:46Instead, it wants to assume certain facts are in place
3:26:48and just jump right to the conclusion.
3:26:50It saves energy, it saves megabytes.
3:26:52So what Joe Rogan,
3:26:56I feel weird calling him Joe, I don't know him.
3:26:57But what Joe identified on his own...
3:26:59- Mr. Rogan, - What Mr. Rogan
3:27:01identified on his own
3:27:04was his own cognitive loop.
3:27:06And then he immediately grew suspicious of that loop.
3:27:10That is a super powerful tool.
3:27:11That is something that most people never become
3:27:13self-actualized enough to realize
3:27:15that they have a cognitive loop,
3:27:17let alone questioning their own cognitive loop.
3:27:20So when it came to this topic specifically,
3:27:23that was just something that I thought was really powerful
3:27:25because you learned to not not trust your own mind.
3:27:30- Just for the record, after he drinks one whiskey,
3:27:34all that goes out.
3:27:36I think that was just in that moment in time,
3:27:39like, you know...
3:27:41- [Andrew] A moment of brilliance.
3:27:42- A moment of brilliance.
3:27:43Because I think he still is...
3:27:49One of the things that inspires me about Joe is
3:27:51how open-minded he is, how curious he is.
3:27:53He refuses to let sort of the conformity
3:27:55and the conventions of any one community,
3:27:58including the scientific community, be a kind of thing
3:28:02that limits his curiosity of asking what if,
3:28:06like the whole, it's entirely possible.
3:28:08I think that's a beautiful thing,
3:28:10and it actually represents what the best of science is,
3:28:13that childlike curiosity.
3:28:15So it's good to sort of balance those two things,
3:28:18but then you have to wake up to it, like,
3:28:22is there a chance this is true
3:28:24or do I just really want it to be true?
3:28:27- Like the hot girl that talks to you overseas.
3:28:29- Yeah, yeah. (Andrew laughing)
3:28:33For a brief moment. (Andrew laughing)
3:28:35There's a actually a deeper explanation for it
3:28:37that I'll tell you off the mic that perhaps
3:28:41a lot of people can kind of figure out anyway...
3:28:43- Just to take it one step further
3:28:44'cause I love this stuff.
3:28:45Personally, I love pink matter stuff.
3:28:48In your interview with Jack Barsky,
3:28:50Jack's a good friend of mine.
3:28:51- A good dude. - [Lex] Incredible person.
3:28:53And your conversation with Jack Barsky,
3:28:56he started talking to you about
3:28:58how his recruiters were feeding back to him
3:29:01his own beliefs, his own opinions about himself,
3:29:04how smart he was, how good he was,
3:29:06how uniquely qualified he was.
3:29:08That's all pink matter manipulation.
3:29:10Feeding right back to the person,
3:29:12what they already think of themselves
3:29:14is a way to get them to invest and trust you faster,
3:29:17because obviously you value them for all the right reasons,
3:29:21because that's how they see themselves.
3:29:23So that loop that the KGB was using with Jack,
3:29:28Jack did not wake up to that loop at the time.
3:29:31He woke up to it later. So it happens to all of us.
3:29:35We're all in a loop.
3:29:37It's just, whether it's about oat milk
3:29:39or whether it's about aliens
3:29:41or whether it's about, you know, the Democrats trying
3:29:44to take your guns, whatever it is, everybody's in a loop.
3:29:47And we've gotta wake up to ask ourselves,
3:29:49just like you said, is it true
3:29:51or do we just really want it to be true?
3:29:53And until you ask yourself that question,
3:29:55you're just one of the masses trapped in the loop.
3:29:59- That's the Nietzsche gaze into the abyss.
3:30:03It's a dangerous thing,
3:30:04hat's the past insanity is to ask that question.
3:30:08You wanna be doing it carefully,
3:30:11but it's also the place where you can truly discover
3:30:14something fundamental about this world
3:30:15that people don't understand
3:30:18and lay the groundwork for progress, scientific,
3:30:23cultural, all that kind of stuff.
Spy tricks
3:30:27"What is one spy trick?"
3:30:28This is from a Reddit that I really enjoy.
3:30:31What's one spy trick?
3:30:33And you're full of a million spy tricks.
3:30:36People should follow you. You did an amazing podcast.
3:30:39You're just an amazing person.
3:30:42What is the one spy trick you would teach everyone
3:30:45that they can use to improve their life instantly?
3:30:48Now, you already mentioned quite a few,
3:30:50but what else could jump to mind?
3:30:54- My go-to answer for this is not really changed
3:30:56much over the last few years.
3:30:57So the first, the most important spy trick
3:31:00to change everything immediately is something called
3:31:03perception versus perspective.
3:31:06We all look at the world through our own perception.
3:31:10My dad used to tell me, my stepdad used to tell me
3:31:12that perception is reality.
3:31:13And I was arguing this with him
3:31:15when I was 14 years old,
3:31:17"I told you so, dad, you're still wrong."
3:31:20But perception is your interpretation
3:31:22of the world around you.
3:31:23But it's unique only to you.
3:31:26There's no advantage in your perception.
3:31:28That's why so many people find themselves arguing
3:31:30all the time trying to convince other people
3:31:33of their own perception.
3:31:35The way that you win any argument,
3:31:37the way that you get ahead in your career,
3:31:39the way that you outsell or out race anybody,
3:31:45is when you move off of perception
3:31:47and move into perspective.
3:31:49Perspective is the act
3:31:51or the art of observing the world from outside of yourself.
3:31:56Whether that's outside of yourself
3:31:58as like an entity just observing
3:32:01from a different point of view.
3:32:02Or even more powerful, you sit in the shoes,
3:32:05you sit in the seat of the person opposite you,
3:32:07and you think to yourself, what is their life like?
3:32:10What do they feel right now? You know, are they comfortable?
3:32:13Are they uncomfortable? Are they afraid?
3:32:15Are they scared?
3:32:16What's the stressor that they woke up to this morning?
3:32:18What's the stressor that they're
3:32:19gonna go to sleep with tonight?
3:32:21When you shift places and get out of your own perception
3:32:24and into someone else's perspective,
3:32:27now you're thinking like them,
3:32:29which is giving you an informational advantage,
3:32:31but you know what they're all doing?
3:32:33Everyone else out there is trapped in their own perception.
3:32:36Not thinking about a different perspective.
3:32:39So immediately you have superior information,
3:32:42superior positioning, you have an advantage
3:32:45that they don't have.
3:32:46And if you do that to your boss,
3:32:48if's gonna change your career.
3:32:50If you do that to your spouse,
3:32:51it's gonna change your marriage.
3:32:52If you do that to your kids,
3:32:53it's gonna change your family legacy
3:32:55because nobody else out there is doing it.
3:32:58- It's so interesting how difficult empathy is
3:33:00for people and how powerful it is.
3:33:03Especially for like you said,
3:33:05the spouse, like intimacy.
3:33:07Like stepping outside of yourself
3:33:10and really putting yourself in the shoes
3:33:11of the other person, considering how they see the world.
3:33:16I really enjoy that
3:33:17because how does that exactly lead to connection?
3:33:22I think when you start
3:33:25to understand the way the other person sees the world,
3:33:30you start to enjoy the world through their eyes.
3:33:32And you start to be able to share, in terms of intimacy,
3:33:35share the beauty they see together
3:33:39because you understand their perspective.
3:33:41And somehow you converge as well.
3:33:43Of course that allows you
3:33:44to gather information better and all that kind of stuff.
3:33:47And like that allows you to work together better,
3:33:50to share in all different kinds of ways.
3:33:53But for intimacy, that's a really powerful thing.
3:33:55And also for actually, like people you really disagree with
3:34:00or people on the internet you disagree with and so on.
3:34:03I find empathy is such a powerful way
3:34:07to resolve any tensions there.
3:34:09Even like people like trolls
3:34:11or all that kind of stuff, I don't deride them.
3:34:14I just kind of put myself in their shoes
3:34:16and it becomes like an enjoyable comradery
3:34:20with that person.
3:34:21- So I wanna draw a pretty hard line
3:34:24between perspective and empathy.
3:34:26Because empathy is frankly an overused term
3:34:32by people who don't really know
3:34:33what they're saying sometimes.
3:34:35I think you know what you're saying,
3:34:36but the vast majority of people listening...
3:34:37- I would argue that, but that's fine.
3:34:39- As soon as you say empathy, they're gonna just be like,
3:34:41oh yeah, I know I've heard this a thousand times.
3:34:44Empathy is about feeling what other people feel
3:34:49or understanding... - It's more about feeling
3:34:51would you say?
3:34:52- It's about feelings.
3:34:53It's about understanding someone else's feelings.
3:34:54Feeling, it's not the same as sympathy
3:34:58where you feel their feelings.
3:34:59Empathy is about recognizing that they have feelings
3:35:01and recognizing that their feelings are valid.
3:35:04Perspective is more than just feelings.
3:35:09It's about the brain, it's about the pink matter,
3:35:11on the left side and the right side of the brain.
3:35:14Yes, I care about feelings.
3:35:16And this goes directly to your point about connection.
3:35:18Yes, I care about feelings,
3:35:20but I also care about objectives.
3:35:24What is your aspirational goal?
3:35:25What was it like to grow up as you, yeah, what was it like
3:35:28to experience this
3:35:29and how did this shape your opinion on that?
3:35:30And you know, what is it that you're going to do next?
3:35:35More than just feelings, actual tactical actions.
3:35:38And that becomes extremely valuable in the operational world
3:35:42because if you can get into someone's head,
3:35:45left brain and right brain, feelings and logic,
3:35:47you can start anticipating
3:35:48what actions they're gonna take next.
3:35:50You can direct the actions that they're going to take next
3:35:52because you're basically telling them
3:35:53the story that's in their own head.
3:35:56When it comes to relationships
3:35:57and personal connection, we talked about it earlier,
3:36:00the thing that people want the most is community.
3:36:05They want someone else who understands them.
3:36:08They want to be with people. They don't want to be alone.
3:36:11The more you practice perspective, empathy or no empathy,
3:36:15the more you just validate that a person is there.
3:36:19I am in this time and space with you in this moment.
3:36:22Feelings aside, right, that is powerful.
3:36:27That is intimate.
3:36:29And whether you're talking about lovers
3:36:31or whether you're talking about a business exchange
3:36:32or whether you're talking about collaborators
3:36:34in a crime, I'm here with you, ride or die,
3:36:38let's do it.
3:36:38Right? That's powerful.
3:36:41- How much of what you've learned in your role at the CIA
3:36:46transfer over to relationships, to business relationship,
3:36:49to other aspects of life?
3:36:51This is something you work closely
3:36:52with powerful people to help them out.
3:36:55What have you learned about the commonalities,
3:36:57about the problems that people face?
3:36:59- Man, I would say about a solid 95%
3:37:04of what I learned at CIA carries over to the civilian world,
3:37:07that 5% that doesn't,
3:37:10it would carry over in a disaster, right?
3:37:13Knowing how to shoot on target
3:37:16with my non-dominant hand really only has one purpose.
3:37:20It's not gonna happen day-to-day, right?
3:37:23Knowing how to do a dead drop that isn't discoverable
3:37:25by the local police force isn't gonna be useful right now,
3:37:28but it could be useful in a disaster.
3:37:30But the 95% of stuff that's useful,
3:37:32it's all tied to the human condition.
3:37:34It's all tied to being able to
3:37:39understand what someone's thinking,
3:37:41understand what someone's feeling, direct their thoughts,
3:37:44direct their emotions, direct their thought process,
3:37:47win their attention, win their loyalty,
3:37:49win influence with them, grow your network,
3:37:52grow your own circle of influence.
3:37:54I mean, all of that is immensely, immensely valuable.
3:37:59As an example, the disguise thing that we talked
3:38:01about earlier, disguise in and of itself has mixed utility.
3:38:06If you're Brad Pitt and you don't want anybody
3:38:08to know your Brad Pitt, you put on a level one disguise
3:38:09and that's great.
3:38:10Or maybe you call me and I walk you
3:38:12through a level two disguise so that you can go to Aruba
3:38:14and nobody's gonna know you're in Aruba, right?
3:38:16Whatever it is.
3:38:18But even there with the 5% that doesn't apply
3:38:21to everyday life, there's still elements that do.
3:38:24For example, when a person looks at a human being's face,
3:38:28the first place they look is the same part of the face
3:38:32as if they were reading a piece of paper.
3:38:34So in English, we start from the top left
3:38:36and we read left to right, top to bottom.
3:38:38So when an English speaking person interacts
3:38:41with another person, the first thing they look at
3:38:44isn't their eyes,
3:38:45it's the upper left, from their point of view,
3:38:48corner of their face.
3:38:52They look there and the information they get is hair color,
3:38:56hair pattern, skin color, right?
3:38:58That's it, before they know anything else about the face.
3:39:01This is one of the reasons why somebody can look at you
3:39:02and then you ask them, "What color are my eyes?"
3:39:05I don't really remember.
3:39:06Because the way they read the face,
3:39:07they read it from left to right, top to bottom.
3:39:10So they're paying a lot of attention
3:39:11to the first few things they see,
3:39:12and then they're paying less attention
3:39:14as they go down the face.
3:39:14The same scrolling behavior that you see on the internet.
3:39:18So when you understand that through the lens of disguise,
3:39:21it allows you to make a very powerful disguise.
3:39:23The most important part of your disguise is here,
3:39:25if you're English speaking.
3:39:27Right here, if you're speaking some foreign languages
3:39:29that read right to left, right?
3:39:31If it's Chinese, you know
3:39:32that they're gonna look from here down
3:39:34'cause they read left down.
3:39:35- So it's so interesting.
3:39:38So yeah, knowing that really helps you sort of configure
3:39:39the things in terms of physical appearance.
3:39:41That's interesting. - Correct. Correct.
3:39:43So when it comes to how to make a disguise,
3:39:45not so useful to the ultra wealthy usually.
3:39:47But when it comes to how to read a face
3:39:50or more importantly how people are going to read your face,
3:39:52that's extremely important
3:39:53because now you know where to find the first
3:39:57signs of deception in a baseline or anything else.
3:39:59- You mentioned that the idea of having privacy
3:40:07is one that we think we can, but we really don't.
3:40:12Is it possible for maybe somebody like me
3:40:15or a regular person to disappear from the grid?
3:40:18- Absolutely and it's not as hard as you might think.
3:40:20It's not convenient.
3:40:21Again, convenience and security.
3:40:24You can disappear tomorrow, right?
3:40:26I can walk you through three steps right now
3:40:27that's gonna help you disappear tomorrow.
3:40:29But none of them are convenient.
3:40:31They're all extremely secure, right?
3:40:33The first thing you do is every piece
3:40:35of digital technology you have that is connected to you
3:40:38in any way, is now dead.
3:40:41You just let the battery run out.
3:40:42- [Lex] forever. - Forever.
3:40:43You never touch it again. Starting at this moment.
3:40:46What you have to do is go out and acquire a new one.
3:40:50Realistically, you will not be able
3:40:51to acquire a new one in the United States by buying it
3:40:55because to do so, you would tie it to your credit card,
3:40:58you would tie it to a location, a time, a place,
3:41:00a registered name, whatever else.
3:41:02So you would have to acquire it essentially by theft
3:41:05or through the black market.
3:41:07So you would want something
3:41:08because you're gonna need the advantage of technology
3:41:11without it being in your name.
3:41:13So you go out and you steal a phone
3:41:15or you steal a laptop, you do whatever you have to do
3:41:17to make sure that you can get on with the password
3:41:19and whatever else that might be,
3:41:20As dirty or as clean as you want that to be,
3:41:22we're all morally flexible here.
3:41:24But now you have a technological device
3:41:27that you can work with, and then from there on,
3:41:31you're just doing whatever you have to do.
3:41:32Whether you're stealing every step of the way
3:41:35or whether you run a massive con.
3:41:38Keep in mind that we often talk about conmen and cons.
3:41:42Do you know the word that con is a root word for confidence.
3:41:48That's what a conman is.
3:41:49A conman is a confidence man.
3:41:51Just somebody who is so brazenly confident that the people
3:41:54around them living in their own perception,
3:41:57not perspective and their perception,
3:41:59they're like, "Well, this guy really knows
3:42:01what he's talking about, so I'm gonna do what he says."
3:42:04So you can run a massive con
3:42:05and that can take care of your finances, that can take care
3:42:07of your lodging, whatever amount, whatever else it is.
3:42:10You are whoever you present yourself to be.
3:42:13So if you wanna be Bill for the afternoon,
3:42:18just go tell people your name is Bill.
3:42:19They're not gonna question you.
3:42:21- So the intelligence,
3:42:24the natural web of intelligence gathering systems
3:42:28we have in the United States and in the world,
3:42:32are they going to believe for long that your Bill?
3:42:37- Until you do something that makes them think otherwise.
3:42:39If you are consistent,
3:42:41we talked about consistency being the superpower.
3:42:43If you are consistent, they will think your Bill forever.
3:42:46- How difficult is that to do?
3:42:49- It's not convenient.
3:42:50It's quite difficult.
3:42:51- Does that like require training?
3:42:53- It does require training.
3:42:55- Because why do criminals always get caught?
3:42:57- Because they stop being consistent.
3:43:05I never hesitate to admit this,
3:43:07but people tell me I should hesitate to admit it.
3:43:09So now I hesitate because of the guidance
3:43:11I've gotten to hesitate, right?
3:43:13I like criminals.
3:43:14I'm friends with a number of criminals
3:43:16because the only people who get me like right away
3:43:18who get me, are criminals
3:43:20because we know what it's like
3:43:23to basically abandon all the rules, do our own thing
3:43:26our own way, and watch the world just keep turning.
3:43:29Most people are so stuck
3:43:32in the trap of normal thought and behavior
3:43:36that when I tell them,
3:43:36they just don't just go tell people your name is Bill.
3:43:39Most people are gonna say, "Psh, that's not gonna work."
3:43:42But a criminal will be like, "Oh yeah, I did that once.
3:43:44I just told everybody my name is Nancy.
3:43:46I'm a dude and they still believe me."
3:43:48Criminals just get it, right?
3:43:50So what happens with criminals
3:43:53is they go to the school of hard knocks.
3:43:57They learn criminal behavior on the job.
3:44:00Spies go to school,
3:44:02we go to the best spy school in the world.
3:44:05We go to Langley's, the farm, right?
3:44:07What's known as Field Tradecraft Course, FTC,
3:44:10in a covert location for a covert period of time.
3:44:12And covert, covert, covert.
3:44:13So if anybody from CIA is watching,
3:44:14I'm not breaking any rules,
3:44:16it's all in Wikipedia, but it's not coming from me.
3:44:19But that's how we do it.
3:44:20They train us from a hundred years of experience
3:44:24in the best ways to carry out covert operations,
3:44:27which are all just criminal activities overseas.
3:44:30We learn how to do it the right way
3:44:32so that we don't get caught.
3:44:33We learn how to be consistent.
3:44:34More importantly, we learn how to create an operation
3:44:37that has a limited lifespan
3:44:39because the longer it lives, the more at risk you are.
3:44:43So you want operations to be short,
3:44:45concise on the X, off the X, limit your room for mistakes.
3:44:49Criminals, they default to wanting
3:44:52these long-term operations
3:44:55'cause they don't wanna have to recreate a new way
3:44:57to make money every 15 days.
3:45:00- You mentioned if anybody from the CIA is watching,
3:45:03so I've seen you talk about the fact that sort of people
3:45:08that are currently working at the CIA would kind of
3:45:12look down at the people who've left the CIA
3:45:14and they deride them.
3:45:15Especially if you go public,
3:45:16especially if there's a book and all that kind of stuff.
3:45:19Do you feel the pressure of that to be quiet,
3:45:28to not do something like this conversation
3:45:30that we're doing today?
3:45:31- I feel the silent judgment. That's very real.
3:45:35I feel it for myself and I feel it for my wife
3:45:36who doesn't appear on camera very often,
3:45:38but who's also former CIA, we both feel the judgment.
3:45:42We know that right now, three days after this is released,
3:45:47somebody's gonna send an email on a closed network system
3:45:50inside CIA headquarters,
3:45:52and there's a bunch of people who are gonna laugh at it.
3:45:53A bunch of people who are gonna say that,
3:45:55who knows what, it's not gonna be good stuff.
3:45:56- A bunch of people you respect probably.
3:45:58- A bunch of people who I'm trying to bring honor to,
3:46:02whether I know them or respect them is irrelevant.
3:46:04These are people who are out there doing the deed every day,
3:46:07and I wanna bring them honor,
3:46:09and I wanna do that in a way that I get to share
3:46:13what they can't share
3:46:14and what they won't share when they leave,
3:46:16because they will also feel the silent pressure,
3:46:18the pressure, the shame, the judgment, right?
3:46:22But the truth is that I've done this now long enough.
3:46:25The first few times that I spoke out publicly,
3:46:29the response to being a positive voice
3:46:32for what the sacrifices that people are making,
3:46:35it's so refreshing to be an honest voice
3:46:39that people don't normally hear
3:46:41that it's too important.
3:46:43One day I'm gonna be gone
3:46:44and my kids are gonna look back on all this
3:46:46and they're gonna see their dad trying
3:46:48to do the right thing for the right reasons.
3:46:51And even if my son or daughter ends up at CIA
3:46:53and even if they get ridiculed for being,
3:46:55"Oh, you're the Bustamante kid, right?
3:46:57Your dad's a total sellout."
3:46:59Whatever it might be.
3:47:01Like, I want them to know, you know, dad was doing
3:47:04what he could to bring honor to the organization
3:47:06even when he couldn't stay in the organization anymore.
3:47:09- So you said when you were 27, I think,
Advice for young people
3:47:12you didn't know what the hell you're doing.
3:47:15So now that you're a few years older and wiser,
3:47:21let me ask you to put on your wise sage hat
3:47:24and give advice to other 27 year olds
3:47:27or even younger, 17, 18 year olds
3:47:30that are just outta high school, maybe going to college,
3:47:34trying to figure out this life,
3:47:35this career thing that they're on.
3:47:37What advice would you give them about how to have a career
3:47:42or how to have a life they can be proud of?
3:47:46- That's a powerful question, man.
3:47:50- [Lex] Have you figured it out yet yourself?
3:47:51- No, I'm a grand total of seven days smarter
3:47:55than I was at 27.
3:47:57Not a good average.
3:47:58- [Lex] Progress. (both laughing)
3:48:00- There's still time. - There's still time.
3:48:02So for all the young people out there deciding what to do,
3:48:08I would just say the same thing
3:48:09that I do say, and I will say to my own kids,
3:48:12you only have one life.
3:48:14You only have one chance.
3:48:16If you spend it doing what other people expect you to do,
3:48:21you will wake up to your regret at some point.
3:48:25I woke up when I was 38 years old.
3:48:29My wife, in many ways is still waking up to it
3:48:32as she watches her grandparents pass
3:48:34and an older generation pass away.
3:48:38The folks that really have a blessed life
3:48:42are the people who learn early on to live
3:48:46with their own rules, live their own way,
3:48:50and live every day as if it's the last day.
3:48:53Not necessarily to waste it by being wasteful or silly,
3:48:58but to recognize that today is a day to be productive
3:49:01and constructive for yourself.
3:49:04If you don't want a career, today's not the day
3:49:06to start pursuing a career just
3:49:08because someone else told you to do it.
3:49:09If you wanna learn a language, today's the day to find a way
3:49:13to buy a ticket to another country
3:49:14and learn through immersion.
3:49:15If you want a date, if you wanna get married,
3:49:17if you want a business, today is the day to just go out
3:49:21and take one step in that direction.
3:49:25And as long as every day, you just make one new step,
3:49:28just like CIA recruited me, just do the next thing.
3:49:32If the step seems like it's too big,
3:49:34then there's probably two other steps
3:49:36that you can do before that.
3:49:37Just make constant progress, build momentum,
3:49:40move forward and live on your own terms.
3:49:43That way you don't ever wake up to the regret.
3:49:47- And it'll be over before you know it.
3:49:50- Whether you regret it or not, it's true.
3:49:53- What do you think is the meaning of this whole thing?
3:49:55What's the meaning of life?
3:49:56- Self-respect. That's a fast answer.
3:50:00There's a story behind it, if you want the story.
3:50:01- I would love to have the story.
3:50:03- There's a covert training base in Alabama in the south
3:50:07and far south in like the Armpit of America,
3:50:10where elite tier one operators go to learn
3:50:13human intelligence stuff.
3:50:16And there's a bar inside this base.
3:50:18And on the wall
3:50:22it's scribbles of opinions.
3:50:25And the question in the middle of the wall says,
3:50:27"What's the meaning of life?"
3:50:29And all these elite operators over the last 25 or 30 years,
3:50:33they all go, they get drunk and they scribble their answer
3:50:35and they circle it with a Sharpie, right?
3:50:37Love, family, America Freedom, right, whatever.
3:50:42And then the only thing they have to do
3:50:43is if they're gonna write something on there,
3:50:45they have to connect it with something else on the wall,
3:50:48at least one other thing.
3:50:49So if they write love,
3:50:50they can't just leave it floating there.
3:50:51They have to write love in a little bubble
3:50:53and connect it to something else,
3:50:54connect it to family, whatever else.
3:50:56When you look at that wall,
3:50:59the word self-respect is on the wall
3:51:02and it's got a circle around it,
3:51:04and then you can't see any other word
3:51:06because of all the things that connect to self-respect.
3:51:10Just dozens of people have written over,
3:51:13have written their words down and been drawn
3:51:16and scribbled over because of all the lines
3:51:17that connect self-respect.
3:51:19So what's the meaning of life?
3:51:20From my point of view, I've never seen a better answer.
3:51:24It's all self-respect.
3:51:25If you don't respect yourself,
3:51:26how can you do anything else?
3:51:27How can you love someone else
3:51:28if you don't have self-respect?
3:51:29How can you build a business you're proud of
3:51:31if you don't have self-respect?
3:51:32How can you raise kids? How can you make a difference?
3:51:34How can you pioneer anything?
3:51:36How can you just wake up
3:51:37and have a good day if you don't have self-respect?
3:51:42- The power of the individual.
3:51:46That's what makes this country great.
3:51:48I have to say, after traveling quite a bit in Europe
3:51:52and especially in a place of war, coming back
3:51:56to the United States makes me really appreciate
3:51:58about the better angels of this nation,
3:52:02the ideals it stands for, the values it stands for.
3:52:04And I'd like, like to thank you for serving this nation
3:52:08for time and humanity for time,
3:52:12and for being brave enough
3:52:15and bold enough to still talk about it
3:52:18and to inspire others, to educate others,
3:52:20for having many amazing conversations
3:52:25and for honoring me by having this conversation today.
3:52:28You're an amazing human.
3:52:30Thanks so much for talking today.
3:52:31- Lex, I appreciate the invite, man, and it was a joy.
3:52:34- Thanks for listening to this conversation
3:52:36with Andrew Bustamante.
3:52:37To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors
3:52:40in the description.
3:52:41And now let me leave you some words
3:52:44from Sun Tzu in the "Art of War."
3:52:47"Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night
3:52:52and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt."
3:52:56Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.