Full transcript
0:01Respected ISTE panel, we're team
0:04Operation Crossroads from MIT
0:06University. Our case addresses a
0:08scenario where the Strait of Hormuz is
0:10disrupted, forcing critical cargo to
0:13move through an alternative land bridge
0:15corridor.
0:16Our proposed solution is the
0:17trans-regional multimodal land bridge,
0:20or TRMLC.
0:22Our focus is not only on keeping cargo
0:24moving during the crisis, but on
0:26building a corridor that remains
0:28resilient against future cyber, energy,
0:31technology, and infrastructure
0:33disruptions.
0:34We'll walk you through the crisis, the
0:36system dependencies, our solutions to
0:38the five compulsory questions, and
0:40finally, our 2026 to 2030 resilience
0:43roadmap.
0:47The corridor is facing three
0:48simultaneous shocks, and the important
0:50point is that these shocks don't happen
0:52independently. They compound each other.
0:56First, we have the cyber and kinetic
0:58shock.
0:5940% of cargo handling equipment is
1:02affected, while GPS and AIS are
1:05disrupted. At the same time, the
1:07terminal turnaround increases
1:09dramatically from 14 hours to 58 hours.
1:13So, the problem isn't simply that some
1:15equipment stops working. The loss of
1:17trust in the systems that tell us where
1:19cargo is and how equipment should
1:21operate directly affects throughput.
1:25Second is the energy shock. 17% of
1:28global LNG throughput last year is lost.
1:31Gas prices increase by 110%,
1:34and industrial electricity availability
1:36is reduced by 4,200 megawatts. This
1:40creates a second dependency. Even if we
1:42solve the logistics problem, we cannot
1:44operate the corridor if critical
1:47infrastructure and manufacturing don't
1:49have enough electricity.
1:52Third is the technology and data shock.
1:54Around 60% of relevant infrastructure is
1:57linked to East Asian technology
1:59infrastructure. While restrictions
2:02create access and compliance concerns.
2:04So, we have to continue using physical
2:06infrastructure without allowing
2:08sensitive information or critical
2:10systems to become unnecessarily exposed.
2:13That gives us one central challenge,
2:15keeping cargo, energy, technology, data,
2:18and manufacturing working as one system.
2:23To understand our solution, we first
2:25need to look at the corridor as one
2:27interconnected system. Physically, cargo
2:30moves from port to staging to rail or
2:33road across the border into
2:35manufacturing and finally toward Europe.
2:37But underneath that physical movement
2:39are three critical supporting layers.
2:42The first is energy, the grid, LNG, and
2:45green hydrogen. The second is digital
2:47infrastructure, tracking, customs,
2:50authentication, and data. And the third
2:52is manufacturing, which which depends on
2:54both the physical and energy systems.
2:58This means a failure in one layer can
3:00propagate through the entire corridor.
3:03So, our approach treats the TRMLC as one
3:06integrated physical, energy, digital,
3:08and manufacturing system.
3:13Now, we establish the quantitative
3:15baseline that we use throughout our
3:17solution.
3:19The crisis diverts 142.9
3:22million
3:23million tons per crisis. 40% of cargo
3:26handling equipment is affected. Normal
3:29terminal capacity is 10,000 TEU per day.
3:33Turnaround increases from 14 to 58
3:36hours. Industrial electricity falls from
3:3914,000 to 9,800 megawatts. And the
3:42corridor requires a 100 gigabits
3:45sovereign data loop.
3:47These figures define the constraints
3:49that our solutions have to work within.
3:52We're not solving one isolated problem.
3:54We're balancing throughput, energy,
3:56cybersecurity, data sovereignty, and
3:58manufacturing continuity simultaneously.
4:02With the baseline established, we can
4:05now move to our first question. How do
4:07we restore trust in the cyber-physical
4:09system while keeping cargo moving?
4:15>> Our answer to question one begins with
4:17one principle, restore trust before
4:19restoring full automation. Every cargo
4:22unit on vehicle first has a verified
4:24identity. That identity goes through
4:27secure authentication.
4:30We then use network segmentation to
4:32prevent a compromised system from moving
4:35freely through the network.
4:37Because GPS can no longer be trusted as
4:40reliable, we introduce alternative
4:42location verification.
4:44All of this passes through a secure
4:46gateway before reaching custom
4:49uh terminal or rail system. We use HSM
4:54uh to protect uh
4:56cryptographic keys uh MTLS
5:00as verifies both sides of a connection
5:03rather than trusting only one side.
5:06Microsegmentation limits movement
5:08between system if one system is uh
5:11compromised.
5:12An LORAN-C and RTK provide alternative
5:15positioning.
5:16When GPS is unreliable, uh the key
5:18principle is that no single location
5:21sign uh signal is trusted alone.
5:24We verify identity device devices
5:28request and location before allowing
5:30critical operations.
5:34Cybersecurity alone does not solve
5:36throughput problem. We also need uh to
5:39estimate what the crisis does to uh to
5:42terminal capacity. Using the case normal
5:45capacity of 10 uh 10,000 2 per day
5:49and turnover change from 14 to 58 hours.
5:53We estimate uh 10,000 * 14 / 58, which
5:58give uh
6:00gives
6:01uh 2,400
6:03and 14 uh 2 per day.
6:06That represents an estimate 75.86%.
6:11Reduction and profit. This is an
6:13estimate derived uh charts from the case
6:16uh turnover figures.
6:18That uh the case itself does not
6:20directly state the a crisis uh 2
6:23capacity because capacity is separately
6:26uh constrained, we cannot treat every
6:28shipment equally.
6:30Priority A includes critical cargo such
6:32as food, biomedical supplies, and
6:34critical industrial inputs. Priority B
6:37includes time-sensitive manufacturing
6:40inputs and essential production.
6:42Priority C includes uh commodity cargo
6:44that does not uh uh
6:46tolerate delays. Priority A does formal
6:50uh first across every major node from
6:52the port through uh staging area or road
6:56across the border and the and the
6:59inter-manufacturing. [clears throat]
7:03Our second challenge is uh energy
7:05allocation. The case gives us uh 14,000
7:09uh MW of industrial electricity and uh
7:124,200 MW is our auction.
7:15That gives uh 9,800 MW available. Before
7:20distributing the remaining power, we
7:23protect the loads that keep the current
7:26uh current function.
7:28Terminal automation requires 1,200 MW.
7:32Green hydrogen and LNG uh cooling uh
7:35requires 1,800 MW. Together, that's uh
7:393,000
7:41MW. So,
7:439,800
7:45uh, minus 3,000 leaves 600 uh, 6,800
7:50MW for flexible allocation.
7:53The critical constraint is that
7:55manufacturing must remain above uh,
7:57above 70
7:59uh, percent of baseline uh, output.
8:07The next step is deciding exactly how
8:10that energy is
8:11prioritized while also protecting the
8:13physical corridor and its data.
8:21Our energy strategy followed a clear
8:25priority later. First, terminal
8:27utilization because carriage cannot move
8:30efficiently without without it.
8:33Second,
8:34uh, LNG and green hydrogen colon because
8:38this project affects the energy
8:41infrastructure.
8:43Third, critical manufacturing which must
8:46uh,
8:46remain above uh, 70%
8:50percentage uh,
8:51baseline output.
8:55Fourth, real border
8:57uh, communication and security because
9:00this uh, those uh,
9:03military coded continue.
9:06Uh, and finally, flexible or
9:09non-flexible coal production which is
9:11treated
9:13first when the additional uh, reduction
9:15are are necessary.
9:24How we can continue exist how we can
9:26continue
9:28uh, using existing physical
9:31infrastructure without exposing
9:34sensitive data.
9:36We divided operation into four zones.
9:40Starts from physical cell operation and
9:43secure gateways to self-sovereign data
9:47storage.
9:48And there's And there's restricted
9:50external shared sharing.
9:53Everything is secured through
9:56of
9:57authentication,
9:59authorization, and creation
10:02uh
10:03and the and login to ensure employment
10:06control.
10:17Uh so So, on this slide, we look at how
10:20to make business resilient resilient
10:25resilience
10:27uh
10:28enforceable.
10:32Okay.
10:33Uh so, to call builders
10:37So, five level agreements we defined the
10:39standard
10:41into two categories.
10:43Digital SLAs,
10:45which focus on critical network
10:47availability.
10:49Uh authentication
10:51and response time and energy SLAs,
10:55which cover
10:57classes
10:59uh planning and terminal authentication,
11:02calling, uh protection, and 10 to
11:05minutes if you
11:07uh credits.
11:13The progressive planets as killing
11:16system
11:17starting with warnings and 75 credits
11:21leading to corporate financial
11:23uh planets.
11:25Um
11:29>> In 2026, we stabilize the priority is
11:33stopping the disruption from spreading.
11:35We isolate compromised systems,
11:38implement zero trust access, establish
11:41backup tracking, protect critical
11:44energy, and prioritize essential cargo.
11:47Our proposed digital availability target
11:50is at least 99.95%.
11:54In 2027, we integrate transport custom
11:58transport customs, energy and
12:00manufacturing need to operate from
12:02common information and procedures. We
12:05introduce standardized cargo
12:07identification, digital customs
12:10documents, rail and staging
12:12coordination, and common cross-border
12:15procedures. Our proposed target is 90%
12:18of eligible priority a cargo digitally
12:22pre-cleared.
12:24In 2028, we automate. We move from
12:27reacting to problems toward predicting
12:30them through predictive maintenance,
12:32digital twins forecasting, and automated
12:35energy management. Our proposed target
12:38is 80% coverage of critical equipment
12:41for predictive maintenance.
12:44In 2029, we industrialize. We build
12:47stronger regional support through secure
12:50data centers, maintenance capability,
12:53resilient energy, and supplier
12:55diversification. And finally, in 2030,
12:59we institutionalize institutionalize
13:01resilience. Cybersecurity controls,
13:03STL's disruption exercises, supplier
13:06diversification,
13:07distributed energy, and predictive
13:09logistics become part of normal corridor
13:12operations. The corridor should be able
13:14to regularly test itself against cyber,
13:18energy, and multimodal disruptions. The
13:21important point is that resilience
13:24becomes a permanent operating model
13:26rather than an emergency project.
13:30So, to manage all of this, we propose
13:34one integrated control tower monitoring
13:37six operating signals. Throughput tells
13:40us the TEU per day and turnaround. Cyber
13:44tells us authentication and cargo
13:46validation status. Energy tracks
13:49available megawatts and critical loads.
13:52Manufacturing tracks output against
13:54baseline. Borders track customs and
13:57processing. And finally, cargo tracks
14:00priority flows and alternative routes.
14:03These signals feed a very common
14:06escalation path from normal to capacity
14:09stress to severe gridlock and then
14:11emergency diversion. This means
14:13decision-makers don't wait until the
14:16corridor completely fails before
14:18responding.
14:20Our entire approach can be summarized in
14:23six key moves. Map the dependencies,
14:26verify identities, and restore trust.
14:29Prioritize critical flows, protect
14:32energy and sensitive data. Coordinate
14:35partners through enforceable SLAs. And
14:38finally, build permanent resilience by
14:412030. So, we move from emergency
14:44response to permanent corridor
14:46resilience.
14:47So, to conclude, our solution rests on
14:51five key principles. First, secure
14:54systems and restore trust. Second,
14:57prioritize critical cargo and protect
15:00essential energy. Third, separate
15:03sensitive data from physical operations.
15:06Fourth, make supplier performance
15:08measurable and enforceable. And fifth,
15:11build a resilient corridor by 2030. So,
15:15the goal here is not simply to keep the
15:17corridor operating during one crisis,
15:20but it is to make the corridor resilient
15:23to the next one.
15:25Thank you.