Full transcript
0:01So, wanted to thank you for that um kind
0:03introduction, but in particular extend
0:05my thanks to the organizers who put so
0:08much hard work into this event and to
0:11our hosts for their just incredibly uh
0:14kind hospitality for us. Uh now
0:20to lay the groundwork for centuries
0:23military doctrine treated the mind as
0:26the objective but the physical domain as
0:30the arena. You maneuvered brigades. You
0:35controlled sealanes. You bombarded
0:37industrial centers seeking to break an
0:40adversar's political will. Today that
0:44relationship is becoming inverted.
0:47The human mind and increasingly the
0:51algorithmic systems
0:53designed to both support and shape that
0:57mind.
0:58It's no longer where the military
1:02campaign is conceived.
1:04It's the active contested maneuver space
1:07itself.
1:08We've been part of this effort to
1:10rethink this as cognitive warfare and to
1:14reinforce the messaging laid out by Jay
1:16and Sakur and our leaders of the last
1:19panel. It's not simply public affairs
1:23with a modern paint job. It's not just
1:26information operations rebranded for the
1:28cognitive for the algorithmic age. It's
1:31a fundamental shift in the way that both
1:33state and non-state actors compete,
1:38subverge,
1:41wage conflict. And I think importantly
1:44to state this, I believe not merely
1:47below the threshold of kinetic force as
1:50it's often framed, but rather in
1:53alignment with and sometimes even in
1:56substitution to that kinetic foreside.
1:59And so what I'd like to do today is take
2:01you through not merely how cognitive
2:04warfare is rapidly expanded to become
2:06one of the most significant challenges
2:08for the alliance but what happens next
2:12and to suggest perhaps what should
2:16happen next for us. Now as was
2:19introduced I bring two perspectives to
2:21this. I wear two professional hats so to
2:24speak. The first is as a professor and a
2:28writer and consultant of non-fiction
2:31issues and I've worked in this area for
2:34multiple decades now and it's great to
2:36see so many old friends. Um what's also
2:39quite interesting to me is
2:42literally two nights ago I gave a
2:46lecture to my graduate school class from
2:50my Istanbul hotel room and our course is
2:54on the future of war and as timing would
2:56have it this week was on cognitive
2:59warfare and information operations. So
3:02uh I'll be giving a grade not just to
3:05them but I'll be grading all of you
3:07after this event to see how you do. Um
3:10but the second hat that I wear is I work
3:13with an organization engaged in what we
3:15call strategic narrative. Useful fiction
3:18uh that I lead is a network of military
3:21leaders, tech forecasters, creators of
3:25Hollywood movies, best-selling books,
3:28video games. And what we do is we seek
3:30to bring realworld issues to life
3:34through the fusion of non-fiction
3:38doctrine strategy research reports
3:40combining them with the oldest and
3:43arguably the most effective
3:44communication technology of all story.
3:47basically what we've done for uh
3:49partners like NATO ACT but also the US
3:53military, the Canadian military, the
3:55Norwegian military, the UK, the French,
3:58Australian, etc. is that we create
4:01fictionalized scenarios of what that
4:04future fight might be. Now, what's
4:07notable is before this conference, I
4:10went back and looked at the more than
4:12100 different scenarios that we've
4:14created trying to envision the future of
4:17conflict and over half of them connected
4:21in some way, shape or form to the topics
4:24of this conference. And I think that
4:27shows how the issues of the mind are on
4:32the minds of our leaders when they're
4:35asking for help and how to think about
4:38and visualize tomorrow. So let's jump in
4:41with that idea of fusion. One technique
4:44that we often use with organizations is
4:46the idea of what's called a perfect
4:50future history. In this what we do is we
4:53create a vision of not the world that we
4:57predict is going to happen but rather a
5:01world in which all our goals, all our
5:04dreams, all our strategies came true.
5:08And then we use that as a destination
5:11point to work backward from and say how
5:14might we make this world come true? So
5:17what might that look like for a group of
5:20leaders like yourself? Um, one very
5:22appropriate outcome might be a project
5:25that we created two years back actually
5:27for the US military special operations
5:30command and we were helping them to
5:33envision special operations command
5:35strategy and lessons for the future of
5:37conflict. Uh but the scenario that we
5:40built was set a decade from now. And in
5:46our story, a imaginary
5:50recently retired sakur, a NATO
5:53commander, has recently retired and done
5:57what recently retired flag officers
5:59usually do. He's just written a book
6:02about leadership lessons. It's a pathway
6:04that many have done. Only in this case,
6:07our imagined future Sakur is writing his
6:12lessons in the wake of a successful
6:15conflict, an imagined future war that
6:19we've won in the Baltic region. And
6:22what's notable in this scenario that we
6:24built is that this officer in his
6:28lessons of leadership is trying to share
6:31with his audience of both future
6:33military officers but also civilian
6:35leaders what he describes as the quote
6:38crucial power of the cognitive part of
6:40the fight. Again I have to note we wrote
6:43this two years back so we didn't do this
6:45for this conference. And he then goes on
6:48in this book chapter to talk about the
6:51integration of elements ranging from AI
6:54to drones to scops, EW, IO coming
6:58together. But most of all, he describes
7:00an alliance cognitive warfare effort
7:03that is working seamlessly not just
7:06across borders but across the different
7:08militaries and ministries and domains.
7:11And there is a book chapter in this
7:14imagine future uh sakur memoirs that's
7:18called lesson three control the
7:20narrative control the story and the
7:23future retired forar tells his audience
7:27about the important lessons he's learned
7:29in his career. Quote the modern
7:31information ecosystem is like nature. It
7:35abhores a vacuum. If you aren't telling
7:37your story, someone else will.
7:42So with that idea of what might success
7:46look like in the future where a NATO
7:49leader doesn't just win a war, but they
7:53are able to deploy cognitive means
7:56successfully.
7:57Let's explore the trends that face us on
8:01that journey to reach that positive
8:03future. Now, futures are often hard to
8:06predict, but I think we can anchor
8:09ourselves in two certainties as NATO
8:13plans and prepares for the future global
8:15operating environment. The first is
8:18massive compounding technologic change
8:20and the second is a learning complex
8:23among our adversaries. So we've done
8:27projects working with partners uh and
8:29helping to understand and envision
8:32technologic change. Uh and three in
8:36particular stood out to share with you.
8:38One was in support of US Army Research
8:41Laboratory, one was in support of NATO
8:44allied uh command transformation and the
8:47third was an open-source intelligence
8:49effort to understand Chinese priorities.
8:52And what happened in each of these
8:53projects is the top experts, the
8:56university professors, technology
8:58leaders were asked by their respective
9:00organizations to identify the
9:04gamechanging technologies of the future,
9:07the equivalent of say the computer in
9:091980 or the internet in the year 2000.
9:13So these are not my predictions. These
9:15are the predictions of the collection of
9:17top US army and US scientists, top NATO
9:21subject matter experts, etc. And then on
9:24the Chinese side, we didn't have access
9:25to their experts, but it was what their
9:27government has put out as what it
9:29believes to be the transformative
9:31technologies of tomorrow. And what's
9:34notable is
9:37convergence. There's certain
9:39technologies that experts
9:43US, NATO, China all felt were the most
9:47important to win the future. And then
9:50there's other areas of divergence. Uh as
9:53an example, you might see China has a
9:55greater emphasis on 6G communication
9:58than either NATO or the US. But what
10:02stands out to me and for you is that
10:05every single one of those emerging
10:08gamechanging determinative technology
10:11areas at least within the view of the
10:14experts inevitably manifest themselves
10:18into the information environment. And so
10:21while you know targeting an enemy's um
10:24command control communication
10:26intelligence architecture is as old as
10:29warfare itself we have crossed a
10:33fundamental threshold in both technology
10:38but how that technology shapes the world
10:41and the way that war is waged.
10:45Essentially, it goes back to this notion
10:47of the information environment is not
10:50just merely a parallel, but in many
10:52cases an outright replacement for
10:54kinetic military action. Now, this is
10:57what um we called in a non-fiction book
11:00like war, a mode of political and
11:03military conflict premised on the
11:06command of attention. and that by
11:10driving information viral you can
11:12achieve
11:14real world change.
11:16If cyber war is the hacking of networks
11:20like war is the hacking of people on
11:23those networks.
11:25Now
11:27the key is those people on those
11:30networks they now encompass virtually
11:34every single human on this planet.
11:38So this transformation should force us
11:40to fundamentally reexamine our
11:43strategies, the core set of skills that
11:46our forces require, rethink the ideal
11:50composition of our forces. We can no
11:53longer assume that traditional military
11:55approaches will triumph. More
11:58profoundly, it should force us to
12:00redefine what victory itself looks like.
12:04In a world where we have instant global
12:07connectivity, where algorithms shape not
12:11just individual human but societal
12:14perspectives far faster than any kinetic
12:17operation.
12:19Winning the physical ground is
12:22meaningless if you lose the battle for
12:25virality and therefore lose the battle
12:28for reality.
12:31The second trend though is that these
12:34technologic shifts, they're not maturing
12:36in isolation. They're being accelerated
12:40by our adversaries willingness to
12:43cross-pollinate, to share playbooks on
12:46everything from tools, operational
12:49techniques, and sometimes to do it at
12:51literal network speed. Now, there's many
12:54different national interests and
12:57governing philosophies and worldviews
13:00that motivate and guide our global
13:02challengers. But we need to recognize
13:06that across them there is not just the
13:09sharing of weapons, technology, and
13:12personnel, but doctrine, lessons
13:16learned, training. The Australian expert
13:19Mick Ryan has called what we see is the
13:22ation between Russia, Iran, China, North
13:27Korea, a quote learning complex. Now
13:32this complex is complicated but there
13:35are four standout areas that all of us
13:39should understand. The first is the idea
13:42of military civil fusion. It's where
13:46they're seeking to shape synergies
13:48between economic development and
13:51military modernization. It's
13:53collaboration and synchronization
13:55between the commercial enterprise,
13:58academic enterprise and the military
14:00side. So MCF is where we see everything
14:03from big data and infrastructure
14:05connecting into logistics to national
14:07defense mobilization. The second is the
14:10idea of cognitive warfare and we need to
14:13recognize that they have been at it and
14:16thinking of it as important for much
14:20longer than we have and that it's been
14:23it's been incorporated not just at the
14:25high strategy doctrine level but all the
14:27way down. For example, the PLA for
14:30multiple decades has considered
14:32cognitive warfare to be equal to air,
14:35land, sea to the extent that their
14:38leaders don't have to say that
14:43it's understood.
14:45Next issue is the idea of what translate
14:48in Chinese as intellig intelligitized
14:52warfare. It's basically what they view
14:55as a quote network information system
14:58that seeks to fuse data, integrate real-
15:01time battle awareness, bringing together
15:03precision strikes and psychological
15:06operations to create what translates as
15:09quote dynamic kill networks. And the
15:13last and it's taking on greater
15:14importance and I think it's really
15:16interesting to understand. We've seen it
15:18in several journal articles recently. It
15:21translates as dissipative warfare and it
15:24basically is the idea that the key to
15:28victory is to create chaos in the
15:33enemy's systems and preserve stability
15:37in your own systems.
15:40and like so much. They could be talking
15:43about individual computer networks
15:46creating chaos in your enemies,
15:48preserving stability in yours. They
15:50could be talking about supply chains and
15:52logistics. They could be talking about
15:55overall political stability structure.
16:00It's a it's a theory that weaves through
16:02all of it. So understanding and um these
16:06trends that that shape this environment
16:08to be very direct that's the easy part.
16:12The hard part is how do we confront the
16:16institutional the technical the
16:18doctrinal friction that's where we'll
16:21ultimately succeed or fail. Our
16:24adversaries have recognized that the
16:27seam between peace and war, civilian and
16:30military,
16:31human perception and algorithm,
16:34algorithmic logic, that's where modern
16:37conflicts will be decided.
16:39What about us? And so these are the
16:43challenges that we've got to face and I
16:45would argue the sort of decisions that
16:46we have to make if we want to win that
16:49future. And to operate in this this
16:52reality, we've got to understand that
16:55our answers have to extend across the
16:58entire architecture of modern defense.
17:02And it breaks down into three areas that
17:05I'd like to share with you to redefine
17:08how we think not just of technology but
17:11of targets.
17:13Everything from machine learning models,
17:16command and control systems to drone
17:20operators and their families sitting
17:22thousands of miles off the battle space.
17:24And when I say targets, how to defend
17:26those targets, how to reach those
17:29targets. They demand that we shatter
17:32outdated doctrine that divides up
17:35different domains, different
17:38specialties,
17:39treats certain aspects of our IO, our
17:43cyber, our scops as some kind of scarce
17:46or fragile resources. And finally, they
17:49force us to rethink both the tempo of
17:54information and to figure out new ways
17:57to push forward a strategic narrative.
18:00In short, these are the areas that
18:04we must face, we must resolve if we hope
18:10to maintain the cognitive high ground.
18:13So number one, technology and the
18:16redefined target. You can see here what
18:19uh imagined character says in the future
18:22fight. You think the front line is a
18:25trench in Poland?
18:31buzzing on a nightstand in Brussels
18:33while its owner tries to sleep. It's a
18:35training data shaping some invisible and
18:38yet all powerful algorithm. We aren't
18:40fighting for dirt anymore. We're
18:42fighting for the six inches between
18:44their ears and the six digits in that
18:47line of code. That's what a character is
18:50saying. I think that's what we need to
18:52be thinking in the future. So, this
18:55breaks down into a lot of different
18:56areas. One is to recognize the dual
18:59nature of AI. Um
19:03it can be a weapon. Its integration into
19:06the cognitive space has transformed the
19:09speed, the scale, the fidelity of
19:10moative cognitive operations. It allows
19:13us, it allows our adversaries to
19:18undertake operations that used to take
19:21months,
19:22hundreds of people working in some troll
19:24farm and engage it in a second.
19:30It allows us to and allows them to
19:32generate massive amounts of not just
19:35data but information
19:39narratives that can be false.
19:42It can
19:44monitor audience reactions in real time,
19:48rapidly iterate on messages,
19:51seek to provoke maximum emotional
19:53resonance. Maybe it's division, maybe
19:56it's paralysis. So, it's a very powerful
19:59weapon. But we also need to understand
20:02that the operational calculus has to
20:05change in another way. AI is not merely
20:09a weapon to be deployed in information
20:11operations. It will increasingly be a
20:14target of those operations.
20:17As we integrate more AI in automated
20:21sensemaking tools, predictive analytics,
20:24decision aids, and command and control,
20:26our reliance on machine intelligence
20:29creates profound vulnerabilities.
20:32An adversary does not need to destroy
20:35our physical sensor platforms if they
20:38can manipulate those models, turning
20:42those feeds against us, turning our own
20:44decision loops contrary to what we might
20:47wish.
20:48Could this happen? Well, we know they're
20:52working on making it happen. Um, and
20:54they're working in the open on it. Uh
20:56recently the PLA published its summary
20:59of a counter AI playbook in PLA daily
21:05their open source media outlet and in it
21:07they describe the concept in their um
21:10intelligized warfare panorama series.
21:14Now I'm not going to go into a deep
21:16dive. I'll just share with you the
21:17slide. But we need to understand when we
21:19say hacking AI, there's four different
21:23approaches to doing it that then break
21:25down into different models where I'm
21:27affecting everything from the training
21:29data to I'm affecting the sensor feeds
21:31that come in. The point of all of these
21:34is to affect and maybe paralyze our
21:39ability to make proper decisions.
21:42Let me illustrate it with some scenarios
21:44uh that we did actually for US military
21:47cyber command. Um in these we were
21:50tasked to visualize in an unclassified
21:54manner future technologies effect on the
21:57fight including in the cyber domain and
22:00a particular area they wanted help in
22:02understanding is this idea of threat
22:05from AI uh but also against AI. So you
22:11can see here visuals from this uh where
22:14one was um the idea of an adversary
22:18targeting the underlying training data
22:21that our AI relies on. So shaping it
22:25months years before to affect the
22:28decisions that come out of it. Another
22:30is the idea of affecting the world
22:34around the AI. So if it's gathering,
22:38it's using sensors to gather data to
22:40steer the decisions that you make. I
22:43don't have to hack the AI directly. I
22:45just have to hack the feed of the
22:47sensors to subtly shift it to operate
22:50contrary to what I might want. But
22:53there's another risk from AI that we
22:55don't talk about enough, which is the
22:58notion of what scientists call cognitive
23:02offloading.
23:04This is the human dimension of our
23:08increasing reliance on algorithms
23:12across both our citizens but also our
23:16command structure and staffs and
23:18analytic selves. We're increasingly
23:20using um generative tools, coding
23:23assistance, analytic models. They're
23:26performing for us everything from
23:28synthesis to problem solving to they're
23:31even starting to undertake decision-
23:33making on our behalf. The dividend of
23:36this is huge. We can delegate routine
23:39tasks, cognitively taxing workflows and
23:43it might be helping me to write a
23:44summary. It might be to extract data
23:46from a sensor feed. Help me identify a
23:49complex pattern. It can help me both
23:53save time, save energy, it may even
23:56produce better results. But within that
24:00is an inescapable
24:03tension. And let me be direct. It's a
24:06tension that the Silicon Valley tech
24:10bros wearing the fleece vests are not
24:14going to talk to you about. The tension
24:16is this. And to be very clear on a
24:19second part, it is one that our
24:22adversaries are eager to exploit, but
24:25they don't even have to exploit it
24:28because we do it to ourselves. The more
24:31we offload
24:33fundamental thinking to our machines,
24:36the more we introduce new cognitive
24:39vulnerabilities. It is an inherent
24:42tension. And those vulnerabilities as it
24:46shows you here are of three types. One's
24:49deskkilling. It's basically the gradual
24:52often quiet atrophy of our domain
24:57proficiencies.
24:58It's basically comes when operators in a
25:01domain whether it's a doctor to a
25:04scioper
25:05no longer either learns but also
25:09regularly practices their craft. The
25:12second is cognitive complacency. It's
25:16basically where the more we use the
25:18system, it erodess our instincts and
25:23skill to question its outcome. And this
25:27links to perhaps I would argue the most
25:29dangerous of all which is known as
25:32diminish metacognitive monitoring.
25:35Basically, you lose the ability not just
25:39to question what's being told to you or
25:42outcome from the machine, you lose the
25:45ability to even judge whether it's a
25:49proper outcome or not.
25:53In short, the more machines think and do
25:56for us, the less we can think on our
25:59own.
26:01So the result of that is that we have an
26:04outcome. We have to figure out how do we
26:08bring together human and AI in our
26:13operational side. Just as the physical
26:15side of war increasingly brings together
26:18human and ever improving machines like
26:20the drones that we've seen in Ukraine,
26:23that intelligence in cognitive conflict
26:26will also be both machine and human or
26:30at least it should be both because I
26:33would argue that the human intelligence
26:35side in fact becomes even more important
26:38in a world of ever improving machines.
26:42And at its base level, it comes down to
26:44this. There's certain things that AI
26:47excels at. Speed, scale, pattern
26:50recognition. Humans, we're better at
26:53contextual understanding, complex
26:55judgment, generating something that's
26:57truly original rather than uh, you know,
27:01false creativity because we can draw
27:03upon lived experiences.
27:06To put it another way, machines are
27:10really good at rules.
27:13Humans are good at finding exceptions.
27:18And war is the realm of both. Knowing
27:23when to follow the rules, knowing when
27:27to come up with something new. And so in
27:31all this discourse today about war
27:34fighters and how many push-ups they can
27:37do, if you want to be a war winner,
27:42you have to be able to bring in the best
27:45of technology but also have humans
27:49capable of independent action,
27:52collaboration, bringing together new
27:55concepts and ideas.
27:58Next issue,
28:00mindset challenges.
28:03As our character says,
28:17As you well know, usually they're in
28:18multiple buildings or in even different
28:20nations
28:22and they hate each other often.
28:25To the person on the receiving end,
28:28they're just one bad day.
28:31So with that in mind, I personally
28:33believe that we've treated the various
28:36elements of the cognitive fight, the
28:38cyber, the EW, the public affairs,
28:40information operations as not just
28:42separate departments, sometimes separate
28:45domains,
28:47separate tribes,
28:50cultures.
28:52But there's another part. We often treat
28:56major, sometimes the best parts of them
29:00like
29:02rare, fragile silverware that we only
29:06bring out on special occasions.
29:11My family, we have uh some nice
29:13silverware uh that we got uh for our
29:16wedding and my wife and I have only
29:18brought it out seven times. I've went
29:21back and counted. So, we got all this
29:23wonderful stuff and we never use it
29:25except on the most special occasions. I
29:28could also be talking about an EW
29:30capability or a cyber capability. The
29:33point is is that we need to strip away
29:35that preciousness about them and treat
29:38them as standard, scalable, integrated.
29:44No commander in the modern age would
29:47think about a ground offensive where
29:50artillery and closeair support are not
29:52just walled off, but hold it. I don't
29:55want to use it because it's too special.
29:58Non-kinetic fires need to be the same
30:01way. Integrated, scalable, pushed down
30:04to the people actually planning. Jamming
30:07an enemy's drone link, corrupting the
30:10data feeding their targeting display,
30:12putting out a narrative that shatters
30:15the morale of the next unit over. That
30:18needs to be all part of the same fire
30:21mission. And Importantly, until we don't
30:24just say that, but train that, we're not
30:29going to be able to win that fight
30:31against enemies who practice that
30:33approach every day. So, let me give you
30:36a um and sorry to go back. That visual
30:39uh
30:42that visual at the top is how we think
30:44the battle space and your approaches and
30:48integration
30:50should look and could look. It's from a
30:52project called Blitz.
30:55So let's go back to that scenario
30:57example of our Sakir of the future
31:01writing in his book about the war that
31:03NATO's won. Um
31:06he describes part of the win was all
31:09sorts of innovative approaches and how
31:11we used you know cyber attacks hitting
31:14unit morale to drones operating behind
31:18enemy lines graffitiing the walls to not
31:23just hit morale but force the adversary
31:27to chase ghosts of an imaginary
31:30resistant cell. But what he credits in
31:34his memoirs is the key was how it all
31:37came together.
31:39He writes this that each information or
31:41cognitive campaign on its own was
31:43meaningful but taking together they had
31:45a profoundly destabilizing impact.
31:49Successful military operations are not
31:51just about tallying destroyed tanks, but
31:53the almost ephemeral ability to
31:55synchronize the timing and impact of
31:58combined physical and digital effects
32:00which then shape that narrative.
32:09When it comes to the cognitive fight,
32:11the single most unforgiving variable is
32:15speed.
32:17If you lose the tempo in the information
32:20space, you lose the narrative. And once
32:24an adversar's narrative sets, clawing
32:27back terrain is exponentially harder
32:31than holding that terrain in the first
32:34place. There was a recent um study uh
32:37that was um online of successful
32:40information operations. It was written
32:41by um Troy. I want to give credit to
32:43Troy Troublefield at the US National
32:46Defense University. And what they did is
32:49they examined successful information
32:52operations over the last 10 years in
32:56multiple different environments and
32:58trying to understand what led to
33:01success. And in these they found they
33:05used 45 minutes as the benchmark being
33:09able to push out a new narrative within
33:1245 minutes. And it found in the most
33:16important finding was across these
33:18diverse information operations, the
33:20successful ones was not just a um best
33:24practice uh nice to have, but a
33:26non-negotiable
33:28was information planners working
33:31alongside kinetic planners. Every single
33:34successful case, 100% of them had that
33:36kind of fusion of the two. And that
33:39allowed them to have a timeline that was
33:4245 minutes, not days or weeks. They also
33:47found force multipliers that allowed us
33:50to unlock that speed. Um it might be
33:52physical collocation, uh unified
33:55approval authority, synchronized
33:57planning, timelines, integrated
33:59training, command culture. All of these
34:02led us to that. Very important.
34:06I'm going to make one push back though.
34:08That's historic success.
34:12In the future, 45 minutes,
34:15it's already too late. In a world that
34:18will be defined by synthetic media,
34:21automated distribution swarms,
34:23algorithmic velocity, a 45inut latency
34:27gap. It's an eternity. By the time we
34:32draft, clear, broadcast a response in
34:36threequarters of an hour,
34:38the algorithmic campaign has already
34:41circled the globe. And if it's pushed by
34:42an enemy, it's poisoned the news cycle
34:45and set the cognitive frame. So, we're
34:48going to have to figure out how to
34:50bridge this gap. going back to how we
34:53use that technology that's both a tool
34:57and a vulnerability.
34:59So as an example, there is a um recent
35:02initiative by the US strategic
35:05capabilities office and what they're
35:07seeking to do is not just um detect
35:11adversary cognitive operations in real
35:14time, but how can we generate
35:18counternarratives
35:19grounded in factual truth? also in that
35:22near term that real time and then have
35:26them cycling maybe even we can get ahead
35:31where we're setting the stage
35:32beforehand. Basically the idea is that
35:36on the modern uh cognitive battlefield
35:38at least the upcoming decade speed is
35:41not just going to be an advantage it's
35:43the key to survival.
35:46Now
35:48you're
35:50uncomfortable with consequences of what
35:54that means because the most crippling
35:58bottleneck within military organizations
36:02is not a deficit of budget or
36:05technology.
36:06It's a authority latency gap.
36:11As we enter this world of agile,
36:14algorithmically optimized influence
36:16strikes conducted in seconds, an allied
36:20response
36:21can't stay in the industrial age.
36:24Bureaucratic hierarchies, multi-day
36:26reviews.
36:28Again, in this space,
36:31time
36:36approval cycles take three committees.
36:42general officer sign off.
36:45We're forfeiting the battle space before
36:47we even engage.
36:50And winning this requires unlearning
36:53things like the the instinct of board
36:56control.
36:57We need to embrace a new tenant of
37:01command but communication.
37:05The best communicators
37:07delegate rather than restrict. They
37:11provide intent and wide guard rails
37:15rather than trying to micromanage every
37:18single word. Where this is a particular
37:21tension for military organization is
37:25the nature of hierarchy within your
37:28system. In traditional military
37:31structure, authority scales directly
37:34with rank, which inevitably mean that
37:39decisions
37:41are made by more senior
37:46in both meanings of the term. More
37:49senior in rank, more senior in age.
37:54So by default they built their career
37:58and reached that rank in a prior
38:01information environment.
38:04The people who intuitively understand
38:07network dynamics, emerging platforms,
38:10online manipulation,
38:12they're often not our highest ranking
38:16but our youngest operators.
38:20Rigid hierarchy. It works for areas like
38:23logistics,
38:24but it suffocates cognitive maneuver.
38:29If NATO ever wants to outtempo our
38:31adversaries, we're going to have to be
38:33willing to empower digital natives at
38:36the tactical edge with pre-delegated
38:38authorities to speak, correct, and
38:41counter adversary narratives at network
38:44speed.
38:47Third final area,
38:49goal of defending truth and projecting
38:52strategic narrative.
38:54As our character tells us here, you
38:57don't beat
38:59cynicism the dry press release.
39:02You don't tell who you are. Your enemy
39:05will write the obituary for you.
39:11strategic narrative
39:14defining and this is something I have to
39:16emphasize we didn't coordinate it but uh
39:18it very much aligns with what Zakir said
39:22defining and defending the core story of
39:25our alliance must operate not just on
39:29multiple levels of authority but
39:31multiple levels of narrative
39:34NATO as a system a rulesbased order
39:39versus authoritarian coercion. It's NATO
39:44as an identity. Shared democratic
39:48values. It's NATO as a purpose.
39:52Why deterrence and collective defense
39:56define who we are.
39:59I'll add on, this is Peter Singer, not a
40:01government official saying this defense
40:05has to be 360 degrees, not just from
40:10foreign information attackers, but from
40:14what Russia information operations
40:16describe as fellow travelers, those who
40:20knowingly and willingly work on behalf
40:23of authoritarian states, or what Russia
40:26uses to describe, quote,
40:28useful idiots, those who support tearing
40:31down the alliance for their own
40:33political purpose. They are part of this
40:36information fight and false narratives
40:39from these actors also need to be
40:42countered. So what are some of the new
40:44ways that we have to be willing to go
40:46after that? One is the idea of radical
40:50transparency and decentralized delivery.
40:54We have to be open to new approaches,
40:57new voices. One is that we have to be
41:00willing to um allow others to tell our
41:03story. Uh we heard a little bit about
41:05this before at a small level, but I
41:08think we can go much further. Instead of
41:10relying on sterile headquarters
41:12briefings, NATO could embrace a new
41:15generation of digital native embeds,
41:19bringing in not just journalists in the
41:21traditional sense, but independent
41:24streamers, OSENT analysts, content
41:26creators into the operational space by
41:30granting trusted platform fluid
41:34communicators, giving them real access
41:38to document the ground truth in real
41:40time. We can cut through enemy
41:43disinformation with an authentic
41:46authenticity and a speed that
41:50traditional
41:52press releases simply can't match.
41:56This is actually something that both
41:58Ukraine and Russia have already started
42:02to use. Indeed, it's frankly a big part
42:04of how Russia clawed back some of its
42:08narrative fight within its own domestic
42:11audience. So, let me give an example of
42:13what this might look like. This was a
42:16project for the British military. Our
42:18role was to help envision their future
42:21strategy
42:23uh new threats, new technologies, new
42:26responses in British military doctrine.
42:29The scenario that we created for it, the
42:31story that we told is of a NATO
42:36deployment into the high north. And we
42:39were tasked to show the importance of
42:41logistics in this hostile environment.
42:45But as an inherent part of telling that
42:47story, we also told the story of the
42:50hostile information environment that
42:53surrounded that operation in the high
42:55north. And so the new way that NATO
42:59could face this was through our
43:01character who is a journalist that's
43:05been given free reign to roam that NATO
43:09logistics base live streaming. And the
43:13character as you see there says conflict
43:15is all around us be it inbound artillery
43:17or malicious propaganda. He continues to
43:20say every square meter in this
43:22historically contested borland territory
43:24is now in play again. and the fight for
43:26it is taking place in every domain.
43:29Indeed, even your own observations and
43:32sentiments about this war are part of
43:35the fight. He's speaking to his
43:36audience. Thus, NATO has allowed me
43:38access to report on its mission. Now,
43:42this sounds radical and a lot of you are
43:44saying, "We could never do something
43:46like that."
43:48The historic precedent is this is
43:50actually from another project that we
43:52did for British TSTL. Um, what we did,
43:56we took what Winston Churchill did
43:59during the Bore War and instead said it
44:03in a future NATO mission. So back then,
44:07Churchill was a 24year-old
44:10correspondent for the Morning Post
44:12newspaper. What if today he was a 24
44:16year old YouTuber?
44:19The second issue is the importance of
44:22telling your own story in a direct
44:25unfiltered way. Again, our institutional
44:30sort of um reflex is to filter
44:33everything that we do through, you know,
44:36polish it in a press release, speak from
44:38a podium, um send out the official
44:41transcript.
44:43But in a fragmented, low trust
44:46information environment, something
44:48that's hyper curated
44:51that's packaged,
44:53it's sometimes read as evasive or it
44:57comes across corporate or going back to
45:00that issue means you're giving up speed.
45:03So what if NATO could instead deploy
45:07live broadcasting from live field
45:11exercises? humanitarian missions,
45:14operational hubs that would give us the
45:16ability to deliver immediate
45:18highfidelity ground truth straight to a
45:21global audience bypassing the latency
45:25issue and the distortion of intermediary
45:28filters. Basically, we get our message
45:30out there before the enemy can uh
45:33weaponize the vacuum. Now what it does
45:36is live casting transforms stratcom from
45:39a defensive post talk explanation into
45:44an active realtime posture of
45:46deterrence. Basically if they're
45:49launching a synthetic narrative or
45:51claims an unproked aggression, we have
45:53an unedited live stream feed. We have
45:57indisputable proof that dismantles the
46:00lie in seconds. Basically what this
46:02means is that we have to trade off the
46:07illusion that we have of message control
46:10for the power of raw undeniable
46:12authenticity
46:14and that gives us that advantage back.
46:17So what's a scenario? What's an
46:19illustration of what this might look
46:22like? This is actually from a project
46:25that we did for NATO act several years
46:28back uh on the potential strategic
46:30futures. Now what we were tasked to do
46:34is to help envision what hybrid warfare
46:37might look like and potential NATO
46:39responses. Um, this chapter from this
46:43which was titled a new rock in a hard
46:45place is visualizing what grreyzone
46:48activities might look like in the Arctic
46:50if Russia was to undertake the kind of
46:54activities that China has already done
46:57in the South China Sea. Basically slowly
47:01but surely taking it over. The way that
47:05we told this story is a NATO P8 flown by
47:10a Norwegian pilot is encountering one of
47:14these gray zone operations in the Arctic
47:17in the future. And what they do is when
47:22they encounter it, they treat turning on
47:25the live feed to broadcast out as
47:29important as equal to deploying the UUV
47:34to gather sensor data. They want to
47:37ensure NATO leaders want to ensure that
47:39the world is able to watch before
47:42anything can be warped.
47:46Now,
47:48let me this point though by being clear.
47:52This doesn't mean that in appropriate
47:55settings and times such as in outright
47:59warfare, we should not use the classic
48:02tool of deception.
48:05There is a growing belief that in a
48:07world of pervasive observation,
48:10satellites, drones, social media, that
48:14the battlefields become transparent,
48:17that hiding is dead.
48:20That assumption is false.
48:23Indeed, Ukraine and Russia, despite all
48:27this new technology, have repeatedly
48:29figured out how to surprise each other
48:32on the strategic level. and they do it
48:34every day on the tactical level.
48:37Surprise has also not gone out of style
48:39in the conflicts in the Middle East.
48:44All this high-tech doesn't make
48:47deception operations go away. It makes
48:50them exponentially more important in
48:53outright warfare.
48:55The best deception has never been about
48:58making an army disappear. It's about
49:01warping
49:03commanders quests for certainty to
49:06achieve your goals. So we see in the
49:10modern world repeats of lessons such as
49:15um McGrder's principle which is about
49:17reinforcing pre-existing biases feeding
49:20an adversary what they already believe
49:23to um Joan lema which is the idea that
49:26if you can control information channels
49:30you can shape what that adversary
49:32thinks. So the point is these have been
49:35around for not just hundreds of years
49:38but thousands of years. Today they have
49:41their new versions and NATO needs to
49:43embrace their new versions.
49:45Electromagnetic decoys, synthetic cyber
49:48trails, physical mockups, narrative
49:52camouflage
49:53where we want to create a multi-domain
49:57trap for the enemy sensors and their
50:01algorithms.
50:03Another way of putting it is deception
50:05takes on even more importance with AI
50:08because AI is particularly vulnerable to
50:12selfdeception which is the most powerful
50:15deception of all.
50:18The irony for the members of NATO is
50:22that
50:24we were once the masters of this craft.
50:27some of the greatest historic deception
50:30operations such as um Operation
50:33Bodyguard before D-Day. That's in our
50:36history. And yet
50:39in our current doctrine, in our
50:42investment, in our training, in our
50:44operational practice, it's atrophied.
50:49We actually did a study where we went
50:50through the training manuals for
50:52officers everywhere from the US to
50:55British to French. And across those
50:58training manuals outside the SCOP space,
51:00the people that also have to implement
51:02them. Basically, deception got what's
51:05called the bumper sticker treatment.
51:08There would be a line telling that young
51:10captain, deception operations are really
51:13important. And then it'd go on next page
51:16to something else. not about how do we
51:19implement them or most importantly how
51:22do you not be taken in by them by an
51:25adversary using modern techniques. So,
51:27it's basically a buzzword, but it often
51:32doesn't penetrate into our training and
51:35as a result, our staff exercises, our
51:38operational planning. And so, we I
51:41believe um there's an imperative for the
51:43alliance to rebuild this undervalued
51:46area of military expertise. And that's
51:49going to require changes in um
51:52everything from our investments to our
51:55training to our doctrine because it's
51:58inevitable that adversaries that are
52:01constantly sharing lessons about it will
52:03use these.
52:05We also need to bring back that skill.
52:08And this leads to the last point that
52:09I'll end on which is across not just the
52:13scops and deception space across the
52:16entire space if NATO is to gain the
52:20capability for proactive agile cognitive
52:24maneuvers that transformation has to
52:27take place in both the schoolhouse and
52:31staff planning cells. We need to shift
52:34the training pipeline, but we also need
52:37to better prepare our leaders for this
52:40space. They should be forced regularly
52:43to train and make decisions in
52:47environments about cognitive warfare so
52:51they can understand it, so that we can
52:54stress test our ideas. Now, I'm again
52:57biased on this, but I really believe the
53:00cornerstone to this is um improving our
53:03synthetic environments to war game. Just
53:05as um pilots have uh flight simulators,
53:10combat units have virtual shoot houses,
53:14cognitive planners need a training space
53:17that they can regularly use.
53:20Unfortunately, right now, we have a dual
53:24choice of either something that's
53:26incredibly complicated, incredibly
53:28expensive, or we're using, we call them
53:33TTXs. Let's be direct. They're board
53:37games. We're using the Dungeons and
53:40Dragons approach to NATO trying to win
53:43the future space.
53:46So, in closing, if there's one lesson I
53:50hope you take away from this, and I
53:52think what's interesting is that it's
53:54very similar to um the lessons of drone
53:57warfare from Ukraine.
53:59Effective strategic communication in the
54:01modern age is not about acquiring new
54:03technology. It's not about building a
54:05defensive perimeter against it. It's
54:08about an operational ethic of constant
54:12learning, adaptation, relentless
54:15flexibility.
54:17And to achieve that kind of
54:18adaptability,
54:20we have to leverage the greatest
54:22strategic asset of the NATO alliance.
54:26And it's one that our authoritarian
54:28allies can never truly compete with.
54:32That's our ability for open
54:35collaboration.
54:37We have the unparalleled ability to
54:41aggregate diverse perspectives,
54:43specialized skills, operational insights
54:45across 32 different sovereign states. We
54:48can draw upon boundless innovation from
54:51commercial industry and all of these
54:52different nations. We can partner with
54:55dynamic and most importantly free
54:58research communities. Autocracies, they
55:02can achieve message discipline.
55:06They can never match our collective
55:09intelligence and creative problem
55:12solving that comes from open societies
55:15working in concert. So the closing
55:18story, the scenario of this is one that
55:20we actually did for um NATO allied
55:22command transformation called Cold
55:24Comfort. And what's happening in it is
55:27um there's a hotel uh bar in Brussels
55:32and three people walk into the bar.
55:35They're killing time. They realize they
55:38each have a meeting to go to where
55:40they're going to be awarded a medal for
55:44recent achievements.
55:47One of them is a university research
55:49professor. One of them is a soldier. One
55:52of them's a commercial technology
55:53executive. And as they sit and talk,
55:56they realize they're each there because
55:59they played a crucial role in NATO
56:02winning this future fight. And so they
56:06close by jokingly each toast the other
56:09for being the true hero of the fight.
56:13It's a light-hearted way of illustrating
56:15that the future, the high ground of the
56:17next war, the future fight is going to
56:19be won by whole of alliance, whole of
56:22society efforts where the soldier, the
56:25scientists, and the technology each work
56:27together to defend not just the
56:30integrity of truth, but our alliance and
56:33our values. Thank you.