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TiKTok needs to fix this vulnerability

John Hammond · 1,506 words · 7 min read

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0:00TikTok has known about this

0:01vulnerability for over a year, but they

0:03haven't fixed it. And the problem is

0:05that it is actively being used and

0:07abused in a handful of different

0:09phishing email campaigns. This is one

0:11email that we saw with the subject line

0:13incoming voice message transcription

0:15available play now. And it's the usual

0:17like oh listen to a voicemail social

0:20engineering pretense. But it includes an

0:21attachment that is not a sound file or

0:24audio. It's an HTML file called play _

0:27now. And that HTML attachment is just

0:30this. A body tag and a script language

0:33to trigger some JavaScript and

0:35redirecting in their web browser to a

0:36different location. But take a look.

0:39They're going to tiktok.com.

0:42And just to be clear, that is the real

0:44tiktok.com

0:45obviously. The gimmick is that the rest

0:48of this URL contains some extra secret

0:50sauce to redirect the end user to a

0:54different website. Something that the

0:55attacker controls. Let me copy paste

0:57this. Again, going to the real

1:00tiktok.com as the domain, press an

1:03enter, it brings you to a Cloudflare

1:06Turnstile. Actually, you might have saw

1:07it over in the address bar. We're not at

1:10TikTok anymore. We're at

1:11holistic.homes.s3.us-east.amazon.aws

1:14an S3 bucket. Amazon AWS S3 bucket. With

1:18what I would have thought would have

1:19been a click fix lure like oh verify

1:21you're human I'm not a robot and

1:23actually tell you to press the Windows

1:24key and R on your keyboard. Press

1:26control V to paste the payload and run

1:28malware and infect your system with a

1:30virus. But clicking through here, I get

1:32an invalid email format because really

1:34it had a victim email address that I

1:37have redacted. You might have caught

1:38that while I was showing you the

1:40attachment. But the parts and pieces of

1:42this that make for an open redirect

1:45vulnerability, cleaning up what was here

1:48previously, all of these percent 2F

1:50percent 2F they're URL escaped or

1:52encoded representations of just a

1:55forward slash. Since those are

1:56duplicative, we can remove them. The %6B

1:59is just the letter K to fill out the

2:02word link. V2 being that usual address

2:04AID as a variable that's set. That is

2:07important. The language doesn't really

2:09matter, but seen as a variable to bio

2:12URL and a target actually lets an any

2:16end user go to any other website like

2:19facebook.com. Let's get back to take a

2:21look. Let me paste that in and now I'll

2:23head to Facebook. Not TikTok. Obviously,

2:27this is just a little slight of hand an

2:29open redirect vulnerability to look like

2:32oh, some end user might think they're

2:34going to tiktok.com, but you could fill

2:36this out with anything. Pad up and make

2:39a whole lot of noise and nonsense so

2:40they never actually check or see what's

2:42in that URL. Maybe add another variable

2:45at the end and just to add even more

2:46noise. You can fill that up with more

2:48random data to look like some sort of

2:50key or token or whatever. But this on

2:52its own lets an adversary steer a victim

2:56anywhere they want. In this specific

2:57case for this fishing email, if this

3:00were to actually have an email address

3:02included as an argument, that would

3:04redirect you. We could click through our

3:06fake Cloudflare Turnstile and things

3:07just some fake GIF animation brings you

3:10to another page where it looks like you

3:12see an Outlook Entra ID animation to oh,

3:15access your email. But at the moment at

3:17the time recording, I think the hacker's

3:19infrastructure is broke cuz we're

3:20getting an error API expired. I'll show

3:22you a screenshot though. This is what it

3:24did look like of the hey, listen to your

3:26voicemails and sign in with the usual

3:29AITM adversary in the middle maybe

3:32reverse proxy

3:34to be able to collect your credentials

3:35as you think you're signing into your

3:37online account filling out multi-factor

3:39authentication. The hacker is listening

3:41and collecting all that data to receive

3:42it at the other end. I don't want to

3:44fall down the rabbit hole too much on

3:45the code here, but if I hit F12 on my

3:47keyboard and actually try to track a lot

3:49of the network requests to see the

3:51redirect and to see what happens

3:53following this, we actually kind of hit

3:55something interesting when the next page

3:57loads. It gets paused in the debugger.

4:00And there's some more JavaScript that we

4:01could see in a little cool fishing kit

4:04syntax. Let me pull this into Sublime

4:06Text so we have a little bit better

4:07syntax highlighting and color coding.

4:09And you could see through some of the

4:10stuff here. Oh, they're tracking the

4:12browser navigator and they can

4:14determine, oh, is the webdriver actually

4:16something that includes Phantom, like

4:18Phantom JS? They're looking for others

4:20here. Does the user agent match

4:21something indicating Burp Suite, like a

4:23debugger? If that's the case, they

4:24actually redirect you, bring your

4:26location to about:blank. They're trying

4:28to bail out because it's likely that

4:30individual accessing this page is an

4:32analyst or a security researcher trying

4:34to understand this. The key codes here

4:36that they're checking and tracking are

4:38actually maybe you pressing

4:39control-shift-L or control-U to view the

4:42source or F12 to open up the browser

4:44tools like we just did. That's all to

4:46prevent you and not allow you to press

4:48those keys. And they don't even let you

4:50right-click, so you won't be able to

4:51open, oh, view source from a context

4:54menu. So you can see a lot of these

4:55tricks with random variable names, with

4:57sort of this obfuscation, and even

4:59anti-debugger checks where they actually

5:01intentionally trigger the debugger, just

5:03like we saw, and then determine is there

5:06a time difference or a little bit of a

5:08delta as to when you resumed? Because if

5:11it did actually pause, they know they're

5:13being analyzed, they're under the

5:15microscope, and then they take you to

5:16Google or some other safe, innocent, and

5:19not malicious site. All to trick or to

5:21fool the security researcher or analyst.

5:24The rest of the gunk here is all the

5:26actual payload doing some funny, silly

5:28XOR capability to then get more, another

5:31stage or payload of JavaScript. That's

5:33the real malicious piece of this fishing

5:35kit. But by the way, a lot of the

5:36breadcrumbs and kind of puzzle pieces

5:38we're seeing here map really well to a

5:40cool webinar that I just did last week

5:42with Sublime Security looking at the

5:44trends to watch out for in 2026. A lot

5:46of fishing email shenanigans, myself and

5:48Brian Baskin, and we covered exactly

5:50this. Uh that happened last week, but if

5:52you're curious, you can grab the

5:53recording, tune in, and see what we were

5:55up to. Literally some of those exact

5:56fishing kit telltale signs and syntax

5:59that we just saw in the JavaScript code.

6:00Funny thing, now that we got a chance to

6:02look through the JavaScript, we know,

6:03okay, we hit the debugger, the time is

6:05going to pass, and it's going to

6:07redirect me to Google, and there it is.

6:09They don't want me to see the shady

6:11shenanigans of the real fishing email.

6:13Anyway, that specific email isn't really

6:15what I wanted to scream and shout about

6:16in this video. I think the real takeaway

6:18here is that, hey, this TikTok open

6:21redirect has been around for a while,

6:23and it's actively being used and abused.

6:26This blog post write-up article from

6:28Cofense and a couple others that have

6:29seen it are from 2024. This is September

6:32of 2024, and they see the exact same

6:34indicator of compromise with a

6:36different, you know, infrastructure

6:37here. But it's that TikTok link V2 AID

6:401988, when a scene is a bio URL, and

6:43then the target can be anything. Others

6:46in the industry, Hawks Hunt, are also

6:48tracking this just as well, and they see

6:50the same thing. It's a TikTok fishing

6:52link kill chain. And maybe someway,

6:54somehow, the lure of, "Oh, check out

6:56this video that I shared with you," and

6:58they include, oh, bad actor provides a

7:01genuine tiktok.com real legitimate

7:03domain URL, it doesn't know, the end

7:06user isn't aware, that's going to drive

7:08them wherever because of the open

7:10redirect vulnerability. But why haven't

7:13they fixed this? Is this intended

7:15behavior? Is this a feature or not a

7:17bug? Is this just part of a TikTok

7:19profile someway, somehow, to include a

7:21bio URL, and then it just goes anywhere?

7:24But I feel like there could be some

7:26better checks in place. I don't know if

7:28there are, maybe if it does some domain

7:29reputation, but we were getting shot

7:31straight to the adversary infrastructure

7:34for them to collect your credentials and

7:35multi-factor authentication. Or because

7:37it hits an Amazon S3 bucket and then

7:39redirects you through even more hoops

7:41and hurdles.

7:43It's bad news bears, right? TikTok open

7:45redirect vulnerability, that's the

7:47video.

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