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crypto scammers phish with physical mail

John Hammond · 2,020 words · 10 min read

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0:00A gentle reminder for you.

0:02Authentication check will soon become a

0:04mandatory part of Trezor. You know, at

0:07Trezor, of course, protecting your

0:08digital assets is our highest priority.

0:11As part of an ongoing commitment to your

0:13security and alignment with global

0:15cryptocurrency regulations, we're

0:17introducing authentication check, a new

0:20security feature designed to provide

0:22greater confidence in the safety of your

0:24crypto transactions. So, if you're on

0:27these devices, what you got to do is

0:29scan the QR code to prevent any

0:31disruption to your Trezor Suite access

0:34by February 15th. If you don't, your

0:38access to Trezor may be limited. Maybe

0:40some things are unavailable or you have

0:42limited functionality. So, hey, you take

0:44out your phone and you try to scan this

0:46QR code here. But, if you do try to scan

0:49that QR code as of right now, the

0:51website that it redirects you to can't

0:53be reached.

0:54trezor.authentication-check.io

0:59is unavailable. And you know, that's a

1:01good thing because if you weren't able

1:03to tell, this is a scam. It's a lie.

1:06It's a fish. It's some social

1:07engineering. But, a clever cutsey tidbit

1:10is that this was a physical mail,

1:12literally snail mail, sent through

1:14postage, a physical envelope and letter

1:17sent in the mail. Now, I know, you

1:19probably get spam in the mail all the

1:21time, right? Like fake car insurance

1:23warranty crap. But, this I thought was

1:25just a little neat because it's

1:27literally like a digital fishing social

1:30engineering attempt to get your

1:31cryptocurrency wallet sent via pigeon.

1:35Not literal pigeon, but you know, like

1:37real-world mail as opposed to where we

1:39usually see fishing in your email inbox.

1:42Funniest thing is, you might have saw

1:43it, it had a signature from the Ledger

1:45CEO, not Trezor. But, I was a little

1:48curious, okay, where did this QR code

1:50lead? What was on or present or shown in

1:53that scam website? Since the site is

1:56down, I was taking a look at the Wayback

1:58Machine, but unfortunately, I did not

2:00see any results. It does not have that

2:03captured. But, of course, some of my

2:05friends were talking about this thing,

2:06too. You know, Flare, they are a huge

2:08supporter of the channel and the sponsor

2:09of this video, so I wanted to be sure to

2:11give them some love. But, scammers are

2:13targeting crypto users through the mail.

2:16And they caught wind of this while it

2:17was still hot. I'll admit, I am a little

2:20bit late, but big shout out to Dimitri

2:22for sharing this thing. They include the

2:24picture that was shared on Twitter. They

2:26talk a little bit about the letter, but

2:27then they get to the site. So, this is

2:30the landing page.

2:31trezor.authentication-check.io/block

2:35is where it puts you, and this looks

2:38dumb.

2:39Like, this just looks stupid. Okay,

2:40complete the authentication setup by

2:42February 15th, so add a little bit of

2:43urgency, add a timeline to it if you

2:46purchase these cold wallets. It's got

2:48some bogus down at the bottom to try to

2:50add some credibility, but the submit

2:53page, where they actually bring you into

2:54this, you have to enter your recovery

2:57phrase. Which should sound off so many

3:00alarms and, you know, sirens and red

3:03bells ringing in your head. No, do not

3:05enter your wallet recovery phase to

3:07verify device ownership and enable

3:09authentication check. That is the scam.

3:12That is the social engineering. That is

3:14the phish. And a couple other folks are

3:16chiming in, "Hey, it's not only Trezor

3:18that you're seeing some of these strange

3:19mail and in the real-world physical sent

3:22letters to." Another one from Ledger.

3:24"The Ledger one is using a similar, oh,

3:26just subdomain based off of any generic

3:29domain to add Ledger or Trezor at the

3:31very start." That domain and website, of

3:33course, has been taken down, as well.

3:35You can see Google Chrome added the

3:37usual dangerous site banner, but if you

3:39were to fall for this, right, if you

3:40were to enter your wallet recovery

3:43phase, that's the master key to your

3:45whole crypto wallet. So, then the threat

3:47actor, hacker, and attacker, adversary

3:49would drain the wallet and steal all the

3:51money in that crypto account. Alarm

3:54bells, sirens, you don't give out your

3:56secret recovery key phrase. I was

3:58looking through the comments on this

4:00post and it was pretty cool to see

4:01Trezor out and about like, "Hey, stay

4:03safe everybody. We don't do that. We'll

4:05never contact you first. Don't share

4:07your wallet back up with anyone. Uh

4:09don't just trust but verify." Big

4:10hearts, dig that for sure. Appreciate

4:12it. Now, I think there's more of a story

4:14to tell here other than this individual

4:16incident because you got to wonder and

4:18ask, "Okay, how do you get the customer

4:20physical home address locations to send

4:23legitimate real mail, right?" I'm over

4:25on BreachForums, one of the well-known

4:28cybercrime forums, organized cybercrime.

4:30And granted, this is a post from

4:32yesterday. So, the timeline doesn't

4:33really line up, but I know that this is

4:35sort of ongoing. A user posts a thread,

4:37"I'm putting up for sale a fresh

4:39database of Ledger customers obtained

4:41via a breach of the global e-payment

4:44gateway on January 5th. Whatever 100,000

4:47plus unique entries, 68 K, and a little

4:51bit of a Costco free sample for you to

4:52see oh, some of the data that's included

4:54there. Obviously, that includes a

4:57physical home address. That's the damage

4:59of a data breach, right? Your customer

5:01data, personal identifying information

5:03published out to the world, available

5:05for then sale and resale. Now, I tracked

5:07this down with Flare, the threat

5:08exposure management platform and

5:10solution that you know, I'm a huge

5:11fanboy of. They have incredible, super

5:13cool research and insight. I was taking

5:15a look at what some of the threat

5:16actors, hackers, and cybercriminals are

5:17up to, how they're chatting about this

5:19over on the dark web or those Tor onion

5:22links. Again, this post is very recent,

5:24so not in the exact timeline before the

5:26letters would have been sent out by

5:27physical mail. But look at this,

5:29someone's saying, "Hey, cold storage

5:30private databases are needed for my

5:32campaign. Ledger, Trezor." But trying to

5:35track that one down, you know, go to the

5:36source, look at that on exploit.in. That

5:39is a pay-to-play forum, but I've got an

5:41account and unfortunately, hey, that one

5:43doesn't have the item. Post is not

5:45found. You saw the BreachForums post

5:47where the user was selling a database,

5:49but here was one a bit further back,

5:50February 19th, over on exploit.in, and

5:53that link should actually come through

5:55for us. Yeah, crypto database for sale

5:58posted on January 20th, best crypto

6:01database available for sale. Message me

6:03with money. And people are like, "Yo,

6:05these are literally public, dude. Stop

6:07selling this crap." Oh, usual cybercrime

6:10high school drama. Hey, that is some of

6:12the sweet awesome advantage that you get

6:14with Flare, a threat exposure management

6:16with seriously incredible visibility

6:18into the dark web underground cybercrime

6:21infostealer malware ransomware leak

6:23sites, and your exposed attack surface

6:25for your organization. So, so cool. Link

6:28below in the video description. Huge

6:29thanks to Flare for sponsoring this

6:30video and their continued support of the

6:32channel. But, there are more nerd

6:34nuggets here. Take a look. I wanted to

6:36showcase uh big thanks to Jeremy. Give

6:38him a shout-out. I'll have a link below

6:40to his blog because after this

6:43real-world physical mail letter envelope

6:45snail mail, get the news, right? You can

6:48see BleepingComputer covered it also in

6:50their own article. Jeremy writes this

6:51blog called disrupting a cryptocurrency

6:54phishing scam abusing Telegram bots. He

6:58says, "Hey, while scrolling Twitter, he

6:59saw a little repost recycle from the

7:01crazy cat guy with an active phishing

7:04campaign targeting Trezor users with

7:06physical mail." He got to dig into this,

7:09and then he noticed that the website,

7:10while it was up, was actually sending

7:12the data right to Telegram. Oh, a

7:15classic. We could have expected this. It

7:17submitted the data directly to the

7:19Telegram bot API without proxying it

7:21through a back-end, which meant the

7:23token, the bot token, was public to

7:25anyone who knew how to F12 Missouri

7:27hacking read the source. It included the

7:30bot token in the URL with the payload of

7:32ooh, new authentication check, someone

7:35just fell for the bait, included their

7:37recovery phrase and their token and the

7:39current time. Then Telegram would

7:41respond with this info. Now, I'm going

7:42to break out the JSON into a text

7:44editor, Sublime Text, so we have a

7:45little bit better syntax highlighting

7:47and you can see that more clearly. But,

7:48here's our bot, Fur Merger Merger, also

7:51known as T5 Bot, a little bit easier to

7:53say. That immediately revealed some

7:54information about our attacker,

7:56including the bot's username and the

7:57chat group that was used to exfiltrate

7:59the information. Then he queries the

8:00bot's get me endpoint, and this gives

8:02some of the metadata, some more of the

8:04privileges and permissions that might be

8:06configured here. Since the bot had the

8:08admin role, could delete messages,

8:09invite users, and manage the overall

8:11chat, he exported the invite link to

8:13himself to export chat invite link. And

8:16that let him see the other operators, or

8:18potentially the threat actors, in the

8:21exfiltration dumping ground. What Jeremy

8:23is building up to, which is super cool,

8:25is using some of the Telegram API to be

8:28able to listen in on the bot and see the

8:30messages that might have been sent back

8:31and forth, and then ultimately take down

8:34the Telegram bot. Now, we've showcased

8:36some of that process before on this

8:37channel, couple other cool videos that

8:39show a little bit of that process more

8:41behind the scenes, but Jeremy was able

8:43to pull out one of the potential actors,

8:45right? We don't know, a first name Flexi

8:48and a username Flexi6T.

8:50And for the sake of Jeremy's blog post,

8:52and I will comply, he redacted a good

8:55many details here, just in case that uh

8:58hypothesis is wrong, right? He was able

9:00to get all this information, but that

9:01does leave the question mark. We don't

9:03know, maybe maybe not, is that

9:05individual the bad actor, the threat

9:07actor, the adversary. But, because it

9:09can join groups, well, he could forward

9:12all the messages and see each and every

9:14one of the actual victim information

9:17that was provided. With that, he was

9:19able to see really when the campaign

9:20started, how many folks fell for the

9:22fish, and he was even able to find a

9:24second bot token. Part of me wonders if

9:26that would have been for Ledger as

9:28opposed to Trezor or any of the others

9:30that are trying to roll through with

9:31this campaign, but he walks through the

9:34process here. Web browsers are adding

9:36the appropriate deceptive site ahead,

9:38but the website was still accessible

9:40even with that warning. So, Jeremy went

9:42ahead and well, he thought, "You know

9:44what? Okay, I could disrupt the

9:46operations here and inconvenience the

9:48operators by telling that API bot to

9:51leave." Now, the buttons that used to

9:54exfiltrate your data, your secret key,

9:56your Bitcoin recovery or crypto wallet

9:58secret phrase, now no longer could exfil

10:01out. Cool. Little good Samaritan

10:04neighborhood cybercrime watch for threat

10:07actor sending real snail mail for

10:10fishing scams of crypto users. So,

10:13perhaps an extra exercise for the

10:15reader, maybe we wanted to track down

10:17what that Flexi Telegram account might

10:19be up to. You could use Flare. In fact,

10:21you could track down any of the sort of

10:23cybercrime, hacker, threat actor antics

10:25all across Telegram group chats,

10:27ransomware leak sites, just incredible

10:29threat intelligence and deep dark dark

10:32web research with Flare. Big thanks to

10:34them for sponsoring this video and their

10:36support of the channel. Please do show

10:37them some love. Link below in the video

10:38description. Thanks so much for watching

10:40and I'll see you in the next video.

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