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h?ckers a[r]e gl*bbing

John Hammond · 2,988 words · 14 min read

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0:00So at work, one of the Slack channels

0:02for my team is basically a big dumping

0:04ground for a lot of our security

0:06operations center analysts, detection

0:08engineers, threat hunters, and security

0:09researchers to just drop resources into.

0:12And one of the cool ones that came

0:13through the other day was a new LOL

0:16Globs project, a catalog of

0:18wildcardbased command obfuscation

0:20techniques for Linux, Mac OS, Windows,

0:23CMD, and PowerShell from Hex V1N or Hex

0:27Vin. I'm not sure. But Josh comes in and

0:30says, "Hey, this is kind of cool. It

0:31looks a lot like uh Weeds's project for

0:33Argfuscator. This resource is all about

0:35obfuscating or manipulating, tweaking,

0:37and sort of changing what a command

0:39looks like when it's ran on the command

0:41line or like a processor program that

0:43executes on your computer. So when

0:45hackers start to manipulate how certain

0:48syntax looks, they might be able to

0:50adjust and break some sort of detection.

0:53in case it's looking for a literal

0:54string with any parts and pieces for the

0:57exact representation, but some things

0:59might get in the way or change a

1:00representation. And we've showcased

1:02Arfuscator with the video on this

1:04channel before, but that focuses mainly

1:06on command line arguments. And when I

1:08say arguments, I mean like the slashs or

1:11-ash i or parameters and configurations

1:14or values that are passed after the

1:16command or program itself. There's a big

1:18list of all of the built-in native and

1:21natural Windows binaries that kind of

1:23allow for this capability. Oh, and being

1:25able to tweak and adjust how it's

1:27executed with other command line

1:29references. And that focus on native

1:31natural like built-in applications,

1:34programs, or binaries kind of all come

1:36from a living off the land idea where

1:39you're naturally just using tools that

1:41are already available on the operating

1:43system that a hacker could be targeting.

1:45This living off the land resource,

1:47LOLASS or LOL as that acronym for living

1:50off the land, has kind of caught on and

1:52it's been awesome for the cyber security

1:54industry. I'm sure you're familiar.

1:56You've seen GTFO bins, something more on

1:58the Linux side of the house. Tons of

2:00these projects started to pop up like

2:02living off the land remote monitoring

2:04and management or RMM tools. There's

2:06living off trusted sites. There's living

2:08off the land drivers for like kernel

2:10drivers that could be exploited. I'm

2:12wearing their shirt right now. So many

2:14of these awesome projects have come to

2:16life that there's now been a new

2:17resource living off the living off the

2:19land like lol.farm

2:22where you could see each of these in

2:24their awesome capability for really just

2:27documenting known techniques. So hex v1n

2:31I believe a detection engineer over at

2:33Reliquest really leaned in on command

2:36line obfuscation amongst a lot of the

2:39recent attacks that the industry has

2:41seen here. Defense evasion techniques

2:43remain fragmented, a little bit all over

2:45the place, but command obuscation does

2:48always emerge as the top technique. So

2:51this is their project LOL globs process

2:54execution through wildcard pattern

2:56evasion. Because while you could just as

2:58easily run the command copy item, get

3:01content invoke command or ooh invoke

3:04expression, that on its own might get

3:06detected by EDR or security solutions

3:09that are in place in an environment. So,

3:11what if you did some weird wild

3:14shenanigans and globbed? Use a wild card

3:16like a star or an asterisk or use

3:19question marks to act as a placeholder

3:21for a specific single character. I just

3:24think it's cool to have all of this

3:26documented and cataloged and archived

3:29and listed in an awesome way that sure,

3:31you as a human can search through, or

3:32you could even use an API and just dump

3:35all of the data. I'm a huge proponent of

3:38living off the land projects and

3:40resources like this because they really

3:41do centralize the information for the

3:43most high signal understanding. And some

3:46of you probably know I am uh getting a

3:48little bit more on board with the old AI

3:51bandwagon, but like look back at the

3:53API. Imagine this that you could just

3:55give oh give and let your LLM run with

3:58humans might be overwhelmed with the

4:00weird strange syntax but a machine doing

4:02that pattern matching and having now in

4:04context what is known bad or known

4:07trickery that could be really cool. I'll

4:09be honest I think there is some really

4:10cool opportunity for AI in the security

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6:28Alrighty. So, after I saw this low globs

6:31project shared in Slack at work, I saw

6:33it on Twitter that evening. So, this is

6:36Vin Gabe or Gabriel, I believe, uh,

6:39dropping new Linen Lobbass inspired

6:41project called LOL Globs. And I thought,

6:44man, this is just cool. This is just

6:46sleek. I think this is helpful. And I

6:48wanted to help spotlight it, showcase

6:50it, show it to y'all. So, I thought,

6:52hey, this is just so cool. I want to

6:54ask, of course, for permission. Can I

6:55showcase this in a video? pretty please.

6:57And he says yes. So, I did want to be

6:59sure to give Vin or Gabe or Gabriel uh

7:02some support and love. So, hey, I'll of

7:04course leave a link in the video

7:05description for his GitHub, his Twitter,

7:08his LinkedIn, his blog, all the awesome

7:10stuff that they are up to out on the

7:12interwebs and internet airwaves. But I

7:14thought we could have some more fun

7:16trying this out, trying to see how it

7:17might work, trying to see what we could

7:19do to mask and hide some process

7:22execution. Now again I think the benefit

7:24here is that okay this is tracking how

7:26you run a program or run a command. Now

7:29there are a handful of these entries and

7:31listings for PowerShell. You can see

7:33there are even some for Linux and I

7:35think they even have Mac as well and you

7:37could of course contribute right open

7:38source project. They have the GitHub

7:39link and anyone could add to it but they

7:41use some of the square braces to try to

7:43match specific characters. you might be

7:45able to have a little bit more runway

7:47with, but at the very least, again, that

7:48will break a literal string pattern

7:50matching that, hey, very likely some

7:53security solutions might do. There are a

7:56lot here, but there certainly could be

7:58more. I think again, community effort,

7:59anyone could contribute, but I thought,

8:01man, it would be fun to play with some

8:03of these. My team was pointing out the

8:05red server 32 one because that is an

8:08oldie but a goodie and that you can do a

8:10whole lot with it. And they reference

8:11the lolbass or lol bins resource down

8:13below. But I noticed something

8:15interesting for a lot of the cmd.exe or

8:18like regular Windows command prompt

8:20execution. They're actually kind of

8:22proxying the command from where being

8:26the command prompt rendition. Let me

8:28open up cmd.exe of like you might be

8:31used to on Linux. The witch command does

8:34not exist over in the Windows world, but

8:36for strictly cmd.exe exe where will tell

8:40you where a program or binary is and get

8:43the absolute path. So if I were to where

8:45calc it'll say look that's in system 32.

8:48So same thing as which on Linux but when

8:51you run something like that from within

8:52PowerShell it's going to take in the

8:54alias of like a wear object filter not

8:57the strict wear.exe exe, you know what I

9:00mean? Anyway, I thought that was

9:01peculiar because they use that to like

9:04resolve in some command substitution

9:06with the for loop syntax to then get the

9:08full path of the binary. So where.exe is

9:12the process that's executed and then it

9:14ends up using that via the for command.

9:17So the literal command if you are only

9:20getting like oh script logging of the

9:22transcription of what's entered in some

9:24specific command line session then

9:26you'll see this and that might break on

9:29reg server but for process execution

9:31like process create events I believe

9:33you'll still see it run on its own like

9:36go to search for the four binary I guess

9:39for files might be the one for files is

9:42an actual.exe command but the batch or

9:45cmd.exe exe shell scripting language for

9:49the syntax for for like a for loop is

9:52going to end up using that percent i

9:54variable to take the place of okay the

9:56command you want to run anyway just an

9:58interesting nuance I thought was

9:59peculiar and I'm curious and I I'd love

10:01to get your opinion in the comments if

10:03you're listening if you got to this part

10:05yeah wouldn't that still end up having

10:06the binary once it's resolved given its

10:09name kind of transplanted into the

10:11syntax for what a process creation event

10:13end up firing anyway so I was curious

10:15about the Windows CMD ones, but I was

10:17more interested in the PowerShell ones

10:19because normally, you know, we like to

10:21see a little bit of a PowerShell stager

10:23where we use IWR or IRM invoke web

10:26request or invoke rest method to then

10:28pull down a payload and execute it with

10:30invoke expression. Now, invoke web

10:32request uh has had a little bit of love

10:34lately, I think, from dead overflow or

10:37underflow or whatever the individuals

10:39that were kind of looking and seeing

10:40like, oh, PowerShell does some weird

10:42stuff when it's working with the like

10:45Trident MHTML engine, I think,

10:47processing and will actually

10:48automatically run some JavaScript. So,

10:50they patched that and did something

10:51weird for script logging capability. So,

10:54I'll show you right the usual alias IWR

10:57for the default PowerShell alias for

10:58invoke web request. They're masking it

11:01and hiding it in some better, more

11:02interesting ways here that I really

11:04like. But back on the command prompt,

11:06like if I were to actually get into

11:07PowerShell, let me do just regular IWR

11:10example.com here, you can see it

11:13automatically has a prompt for a

11:14security warning, the script execution

11:16risk that Microsoft added, unless you

11:18add in the use basic parsing switch,

11:20which we could, but it adds more to the

11:24like indicator like more to the command

11:25in the command line. We could accomplish

11:27the same thing to download something

11:29from an external site. Rather than using

11:31IWR invoke web request, we can use the

11:34invoke rest method option. And since we

11:36can use LOL globs now to get a fancy

11:39funny looking invocation without ever

11:41having the literal invoke rest method or

11:44even the IRM alias in here, we could use

11:46some of these other stagers. Now, we

11:48could potentially like pull down a

11:49payload, right? Get me example.com.

11:52Yeah. And then it returns the actual

11:54response. So, the next thing I was

11:55thinking about to actually give you a

11:57demo, have some fireworks for the video,

11:59was to just host a payload. And I was

12:01thinking, you know what? We could do it

12:02on like stupid Dumbo Pace bin. Everyone

12:04knows that. Then I thought, you know

12:05what? We can get a little bit more

12:06creative. Maybe we use some of the cool

12:08new tricks that I heard about with Poly

12:10Uploader. I learned this from that uh

12:12sweet webinar time with Sublime Security

12:14and Brian Baskin. He showed me this

12:16utility that will like mass spread out

12:19or slap up your file that you want on as

12:23many different like hosting sites as it

12:25supports over 133 different sites. And

12:28they're the like weird random ones that

12:30you've never heard of. Of course, like

12:32Go File is in there, but they actually

12:34have a cool legend and mapping of which

12:36of these services allow for a totally

12:38anonymous upload like no account

12:40required or even let you delete files or

12:44give you flexibility with an API. So,

12:46really cool resource here. And look at

12:48this list. I'm going to scroll out here

12:50so this is a little bit more readable.

12:51But the amount of hosts here in this

12:53table with that legend to be able to see

12:55how much you could upload, where and

12:57how, and if you need an account is wild.

13:00Like I like the living off trusted sites

13:02resource. I'll bring that up super quick

13:04just so folks are aware. Like things

13:06like GitHub or One Drive or Google Docs

13:08or Mega like the things that you could

13:10just oh upload a file to, but everyone

13:12knows about those. These are the lesserk

13:14known esoteric obscure stuff that ooh

13:18maybe some actor could stage some

13:20payload or part of an attack chain

13:23there. We saw Catbox Mo and tons of

13:27others. Anyway, Poly Uploader, sweet

13:29utility for you. And if anything, the

13:31GitHub repository is a neat reference.

13:33Anyway, just wanted to cram in that

13:35resource here for you. But anyway, let's

13:37get a super small, simple, silly, stupid

13:40little Notepad.exe

13:42payload that we'll just host up on paste

13:45bin. Keeping it easy. Create new paste.

13:48Oh, thank you. This better be a real

13:50turn style and not clickfix malware.

13:51Cool. So, we've got a raw link here now,

13:54right? And that'll give us the paste bin

13:57raw URL. Now, I think that on its own is

14:00a little ugly indicator. So, I like to

14:01use some of the like URL shortening

14:03services. And this one I really really

14:05like is.gg because it looks tiny and

14:08doesn't make any sense. But we could go

14:09ahead and shorten that URL and we'll

14:11have a super tiny is.ggd

14:14random number string after the fact. But

14:17now we could use the staged and prepared

14:20invoke rest method PowerShell command

14:23lit using the LOL globs project to just

14:26tuck that away with the star asterisk or

14:29wildcard. So it could then fill in what

14:31might be the rest of the command lit

14:33there. And this on its own will pull

14:35down notepad.exe, right? What we just

14:37staged in past. And if we really wanted

14:40to get super crafty and stupid, we could

14:42mix in and pour in our own little teeny

14:43weeny obuscation because this is

14:45PowerShell backicks can just be strewn

14:49about randomly. Is that a word? Is that

14:51the right word? Is strewn about? Strewn

14:53about is anyway. We can then pipe that

14:55to invoke expression or ex using the

14:59alias. But of course, we could now use

15:02low globs to mask and tuck that away

15:04too. Now, I think it's worth pointing

15:06out, right? I've been using these

15:07PowerShell commandletits and

15:08instructions for the actual execution of

15:11like a process or a command lit, right?

15:13Argfuscator doesn't do that. Arguscator

15:16is focused on obfuscation of arguments.

15:18While we could obuscate again in

15:20whatever PowerShell way we might like,

15:22we could still get kind of parts and

15:23pieces and even use those two projects

15:25in harmony. So, I am actually just not

15:28going to add uh back ticks in every

15:31spot. Like, we don't need for the back

15:33slashn, but you could probably track

15:35down and play with some other

15:37opportunity to get that return back. You

15:40can get clever and creative with your

15:41command line obuscation. Now, let's pipe

15:43in thatex equivalent. And with that,

15:46we'll fire Notepad. [laughter]

15:48Obviously, tiny cutesy trinket little

15:51showcase. But look at our command line,

15:53right? There is no clear invoke

15:55expression, invoke rest method, invoke

15:57web request, a URL that makes no sense.

16:00Like that is some cool little clever

16:02tricks. So, uh maybe something worth

16:05adding to your arsenal. Big thanks to

16:07Gabriel Hex V1N and the LOL Globs

16:10project. Big thanks to Exo Force for

16:12sponsoring this video and their support

16:14of the channel. Link below in the video

16:15description for that and everything

16:17else. And thank you for watching. and

16:19I'll see you in the next video.

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