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HUGE AI-powered Microsoft Account phishing campaign

John Hammond · 2,691 words · 13 min read

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0:00One of the ways that cyber-criminals

0:02steal your Azure Microsoft 365 accounts

0:05or take over and compromise your Entra

0:07ID identities is with the technique

0:10called device code fishing. And this

0:12technique takes advantage of a genuine

0:15legitimate sign-in process, device code

0:17authentication. You can think of it like

0:19you're trying to sign in to Netflix on

0:21your TV. All you have is your remote, so

0:23they give you some random string of

0:26letters and numbers, a code, to

0:28authenticate that device. And for some

0:31reason, Microsoft has support for this,

0:33not that you'd ever log in to Outlook or

0:34Teams or SharePoint on your TV, but it

0:37allows a full sign-in and it is

0:39extremely over permissive. And we've

0:42covered the device code fish plenty of

0:44times on this channel. The most sinister

0:46part is that it basically bypasses, air

0:49quotes, bypasses two-factor

0:51authentication because it ends up going

0:53through the real genuine authentication

0:56process to official Microsoft. So, very

0:59recently, just a few weeks ago at my day

1:02job, I work at Hunters, by the way, if

1:03you weren't already aware, we saw a

1:05surge in Microsoft 365 fishing attempts.

1:09And what looked like a huge device code

1:12fishing campaign that's fast and unique

1:14to every single potential target or

1:16victim because hackers, threat actors,

1:19cyber-criminals are leveraging AI.

1:21Here's the skinny, over 340 different

1:24organizations across the globe, getting

1:27started at the end of February, and in

1:29March it exploded, impacting all

1:31different kinds of organizations, law

1:33firms, construction companies, schools,

1:36and there has been no identical fishing

1:38lures or initial domains. Each lure is

1:41personalized to the victim while

1:43avoiding exact replication. Let me show

1:45you one of these live fishing pages that

1:47is still online. You can see, oh, a fake

1:50DocuSign setup, please verify your

1:52identity with Microsoft, and they give

1:53you a verification code. You would click

1:56copy and then sign in to Microsoft here

1:58with the genuine pop-up for actual

2:01Microsoft online login. Going through

2:03the steps here is literally giving

2:05hackers your account. Now, I wanted to

2:07show you some behind the scenes because

2:10we're getting a little inundated from

2:11signals and events and alerts from this

2:13device code off flow from Railway. Now,

2:17Railway is a, again, legitimate,

2:20genuine, like actual third-party

2:22solution that has good intents, just

2:24being used and abused, but it is a

2:26platform as a service. So, what that

2:28means is that you could leverage AI and

2:31spin up a Docker container, a GitHub

2:33repository, put it on AWS

2:35infrastructure, Cloudflare, whatever you

2:37want. You just prompt it into existence.

2:40It's vibe coding infrastructure. So,

2:43threat actors and cyber-criminals say,

2:45"Hey, this is pretty easy." They can

2:48just seamlessly spin up whatever they

2:50want, and in this case, being used and

2:52abused, leveraged to host infrastructure

2:55for this device code fishing campaign.

2:58And let me be clear, I'm not saying this

3:00is fishing or malicious intent from

3:02Railway, the platform itself, but the

3:04platforms that it serves and hosts via

3:07Railway's infrastructure. To give you a

3:09better visualization, shout-out and

3:11credit to another teammate, Casey, and

3:13of course, Tanner from just previously.

3:14Casey put together a little video demo

3:16to see Railway in action. So, I'm

3:18speeding through it a little bit, but

3:19you can see on the right-hand side, the

3:21prompt is to create a reverse proxy so

3:23that that way we could capture all

3:24connections, all requests, all messages

3:27sent back and forth in the traffic. You

3:28back this to a GitHub repository, you

3:30hook it up with networking and DNS, and

3:33just like that, you have a ready-made

3:35working fishing lure. Casey plays

3:37pretend victim, goes through the login

3:39process, enters his password, goes

3:41through multi-factor authentication, and

3:43then thinks he's authenticated,

3:45naturally logged in to Azure, but all of

3:47that traffic has now been captured, and

3:49the hackers have stolen the secrets to

3:52fully steal and compromise that account.

3:54So, cyber-criminals take advantage of

3:56this AI-powered platform as a service to

3:58basically do fishing as a service. These

4:01superpowers effectively give adversaries

4:04a cloud-hosted token harvesting engine

4:06that is clean to Microsoft's risk

4:08scoring, and they are seizing that

4:10opportunity. I'm not going to drag you

4:12down through the entire blog post. There

4:14will be a link in the video description

4:16if you're interested on this, a little

4:17bit more insight on what device code

4:19fishing is, a little bit more insight

4:21into Railway, but realistically, the

4:23infrastructure that it uses and how it

4:25is being used and abused to perform

4:28these attacks. Some neat-o things to

4:30draw your attention to, though, is that

4:31it's leveraging a lot of different

4:33redirect services, again, legitimate,

4:35trusted vendor domains, Cisco secure

4:37email, Trend Micro URL protection,

4:39Mimecast, and they use these to bounce

4:42the victim, so email security filtering

4:44is not going to get in the way. Whether

4:46it's Cloudflare worker pages or

4:48compromised domains or any of these sort

4:51of amalgamations, pick and choose

4:53however many puzzle pieces you want, two

4:55hops, three hops, or four hops, you

4:57eventually land on the lure site. And I

4:59want to show you a couple of these lures

5:01because they're across different

5:03industries or sectors and using the

5:05appropriate, oh, little dangling carrot

5:07that makes sense for that work, whether

5:09it's construction bids or DocuSign,

5:11sending documents, business partnership

5:13agreements, fake voicemails, password

5:16expiration, and they have a good many of

5:18these, all completely faked to look like

5:22an application that you're expecting,

5:23but totally a lie. The final ending site

5:26is undeniably a Cloudflare workers.dev

5:29instance, and they all seem to have a

5:30certain sort of schema, some sort of

5:32standard convention for how these lures

5:34are hosted, and we'll see a good many of

5:36them. I want to show you a couple more

5:38of those lure pages that we saw, but if

5:40I may, one of the coolest things about

5:43this saga and story is that we got to

5:45collaborate with my friends over at

5:47Flare. Flare helped us attribute the

5:49Railway attack to Evil Tokens, a

5:52fishing-as-a-service platform that has

5:54been chirping in Telegram. If you aren't

5:56familiar, Flare is an awesome data

5:58source and a threat exposure management

6:00platform and solution. So, any of your

6:02exposed info, like credentials or

6:05cookies or sessions, things that could

6:07tie back to your data or your account or

6:09your identities, they're tracking it

6:11across the dark web, the clearnet,

6:13Telegram, shady ransomware leak sites,

6:15marketplaces, forums, all the illicit

6:17and illegal spots where that data is

6:19just shared. Across infostealer malware

6:22logs, they're tracking over like 2

6:24billion credentials, and of course, they

6:26have this hooked up and integrated with

6:28your Entra ID environment. So, if there

6:30is any spill, leakage, or account that's

6:32at risk and in danger, about to be

6:34compromised, they can lock it down and

6:36prevent that. But, the real secret sauce

6:39is their data. Because Flare has this

6:42unparalleled insight into the ecosystem,

6:44dark web, and cybercrime, I can go take

6:46a look at their events page, and while I

6:48will automatically be in my current

6:50tenant feed for different identifiers

6:52that I set up for my own organization or

6:54you to protect your own, I could just

6:55straight up search like Google search,

6:58"Hey, anything related to Evil Tokens?"

7:00And whether it's from different data

7:02sources, like anything on the dark web

7:05or on the open internet, or I could

7:07toggle for a date range or any sort of

7:09severity, but here we go. I already see

7:11Evil Tokens chatting on Telegram. And

7:13they'll give you the dark web onion link

7:15if it's something on Tor or the Telegram

7:18channel, and of course, we could explore

7:19the content, even AI-assist, any of the

7:21operations and things they see here. I

7:23want to scroll through the Evil Tokens

7:25Telegram channel just to see what

7:27they're chatting about, but before I do,

7:28I did want to show you the collections

7:30page on Flare's platform because

7:32goodness gracious, they have so much

7:34insight. Wild to see all of the billion

7:37events and more that they're tracking

7:39for infostealer malware logs, Telegram

7:41chat signals, forums, marketplaces, and

7:44if you want to drill down into even

7:45named data breaches or other Telegram

7:48channels that they are aware of, there's

7:50just an insane amount of stuff here, and

7:52it gives you legitimate, genuine cyber

7:54threat intelligence for what is

7:56targeting your industry and sector. Big

7:58shout-out to Flare, you know I'm a huge

7:59fanboy, incredible people, incredible

8:01work, incredible research, and just

8:03awesome stuff. Hope you take a look at

8:04them, link below in the video

8:05description. Thanks again to Flare for

8:07sponsoring this video and helping us out

8:09in the Railway case. So, for funsies,

8:11let's take a look at the Evil Tokens

8:13Telegram. Starting way back when, they

8:16are introducing Evil Tokens B2B,

8:19business-to-business sender version 0.1.

8:22And I think, look, honestly, this is a

8:24testament to how cybercrime has become

8:29so monetized, how it is literally an

8:32industry, it is genuinely an ecosystem,

8:35and it is a product. They are buying and

8:38selling this capability to perform this

8:41illegal access. They have the bot

8:44itself, which is the actual store, so to

8:48speak, to be able to buy and get

8:51specific tooling, Evil Tokens device

8:53capture marketplace. And if you wanted

8:56to, you just click along through this to

8:59perform each of these things. Let me

9:02check the Office 365 capture link. You

9:05can see, they're talking a whole

9:06back-end management panel, secure

9:08session architecture, inbox management

9:11so that you have a dashboard, and here

9:13it is, bypassing Microsoft security

9:15controls, capturing tokens without

9:16credentials, however they go about

9:18whatever of these offerings, but their

9:20support chat is totally AI-oriented. I

9:23want to scroll through and find, oh,

9:25they're talking about, oh, their

9:26community feedback. "We always

9:28appreciate hearing from members of the

9:29community who are actively using the

9:31tools and sharing their experience."

9:33Goodness gracious. You can see some

9:35pictures of their back-end, and here are

9:37they're discussing open redirect's

9:39capability. Oh, even ICS fishing with

9:42like calendar invites. Man. But look at

9:45it, they're just selling the product,

9:47built for serious users, limited stock,

9:49buy now. They have a freaking referral

9:52program.

9:54>> [laughter]

9:54>> Look at some of the pictures they're

9:55showing of, uh, how you can use their

9:58like builders to build and deploy Adobe

10:01Acrobat DocuSign, voicemail, one-click

10:03deployment to Cloudflare workers. Yep,

10:05yep, they got testimonials and I'm still

10:08scrolling through February right now.

10:11Look at this, capture link support all

10:12Microsoft email, Mimecast, Cisco Secure

10:15Email, exactly what we were alluding to

10:16here. All right, I'm getting into March

10:19and they do discuss a bit of their

10:21monthly subscription and I wanted to

10:23highlight that because I think it'll be

10:25a little important Easter egg. And

10:26remember March is the timeline where

10:28we're seeing this thing explode. And

10:30there they go, look, they say it, "Hey,

10:31we're using AI." Sharing some

10:33screenshots of the exact functionality

10:36that we have seen. Like you saw exactly

10:38this interface and here we go down

10:40below, AI upgrade, smarter tools. They

10:43have a 15-minute video. Geezom, I'm just

10:47clicking through to see a bit of the

10:49interface here. Cloudflare workers,

10:52goodness, look at all the keyword

10:53suggestions that they've got there. And

10:55the settings let them build it into

10:57Telegram, add two-factor authentication,

11:00it's a whole app. And look at this,

11:01they're getting to customize their

11:03little template here, exactly what we

11:05saw. They go take a look at it displayed

11:08and yeah, it's the exact same. They're

11:10literally all the different sort of all

11:12displays for it. Goodness gracious,

11:14that's wild. Log into Microsoft, take

11:17over your account.

11:19There they go. I'm going to have to

11:20redact a lot of this cuz I don't know if

11:22it is a true victim or not, but look at

11:24it, they're open up the little extension

11:26here that they've got to do a actual AI

11:29scan of their email. Of all the

11:32communications that victim might have

11:33had. Look at it, it's so vibe coded.

11:36So without a doubt, absolutely. Look,

11:38threat actors, cybercriminals, they are

11:40on the move with AI. Especially for, you

11:44know, I think what a lot of us maybe had

11:45in mind as a sci-fi doomsday where you

11:48have genuinely unique, however many

11:50permutations, absolutely distinct,

11:52totally personalized lures and lies for

11:55every single potential victim. Kind of

11:58crazy. So we did go ahead and report all

12:01of domains that we were tracking, but

12:03there are still some that are still live

12:05and haven't been taken down quite yet.

12:07So for our last hurrah, I thought we

12:09could go through a couple of them that I

12:11have here. I am going to have to redact

12:13because I believe it looks like it has a

12:15component or part and piece of a

12:17potential victim name in the URL. So

12:19let's take a look at the very first one

12:21and this is what I was alluding to. Kind

12:24of wild, kind of funny. You can see,

12:25look, the subscription expired. Whoever

12:28was using this for their mass fishing

12:30campaign with Evil Tokens has their

12:33subscription to Evil Tokens expired, so

12:35all the bells and whistles are not going

12:37to function. They haven't paid the

12:39bills. Totally fishing as a service.

12:41This one we get hit with the old Google

12:43Chrome dangerous site here. We can visit

12:45along anyway and that's exactly that.

12:48Another expired. A lot of these that

12:51we're seeing are DocuSign, but okay,

12:52yeah, this is exactly another that is

12:55live still.

12:57This one was a Cloudflare worker page

12:59that I assume was taken down. Here was

13:00the Adobe Acrobat that we saw. Not a

13:03huge variation in the templating here.

13:06This one was a meeting invite, but I

13:08thought the subscription expired was

13:11just really funny and I wanted to show

13:12you. One other peculiar thing though,

13:15the timeline of us hey spreading the

13:17word, sharing, releasing the articles

13:19and getting the word out about this

13:20thing, it's hitting the news, right?

13:22Hey, The Hacker News is publishing about

13:23it. They cover this device code fishing

13:25story on March 15th tracking our work

13:28and the Evil Tokens Telegram channel

13:31>> [laughter]

13:31>> forwards it and has [clears throat] a

13:33couple heart emoji reactions. So it's

13:36pretty clear, right? It's it's confirmed

13:38that is Evil Tokens. And again, big

13:40thanks to Flare for helping us out here.

13:42That was really cool to just genuinely

13:44get hey some industry collaboration and

13:46partnership here and we're all doing

13:47really good stuff the best we can.

13:49They'd help provide a lot of the

13:50insights and I wanted to help share that

13:52story cuz it is a wild one in my mind.

13:55Link below in the video description for

13:56all the things, especially if this is

13:58probably pretty pertinent to you. We

13:59could see even more insight from other

14:01abused domains, some of the user agents

14:04that you might be able to key off of,

14:05more data and statistics on the specific

14:08sectors, what they're targeting, what

14:10they're using leveraging here. And if

14:12you need some other mitigation advice

14:13for your own response, for your own

14:16remediation, there are some more

14:18insights in the indicators of

14:19compromise, detection rules, everything

14:21that you'd like and need all down below.

14:23And that's today's world, right?

14:25AI-powered for better or for worse, for

14:27good and evil and cybercriminals, threat

14:30actors, they are taking advantage of.

14:32They are first movers and solutions like

14:35that we want to innovate and create even

14:37for ourselves to do good things are

14:38still going to be used and abused by bad

14:41actors. Both on the endpoint, both on

14:43identity, both for your data, your

14:45exposed attack surface. So that's the

14:47gist, that's the wrap-up and thank you.

14:49Thanks to Huntress for not firing me yet

14:51and thanks to Flare for sponsoring this

14:52video and their continued support of the

14:54channel. Thank you. Please do all those

14:56YouTube algorithm things like comment,

14:57subscribe and I'll see you in the next

14:59video.

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